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This petition is filed on behalf of four women who were sexually assaulted, and 
yet the public prosecutor with jurisdiction refused to file criminal charges against their 
attackers.  The plight of these victims is hardly unique.  In this country today, an intense 
debate is raging about how women who have been raped or sexually assaulted can make 
themselves believed by a criminal justice system that all too often seems ready to ignore 
their pleas.   
Fortunately, here in Utah, a remedy is at hand.  Utah Constitution, article VIII, § 
16, anticipates situations where a crime victim might need her own avenue for initiating 
criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, this constitutional provision provides that “[i]f a 
public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to 
appoint a prosecutor pro tempore.”  Id.  Indeed, to underscore the fact that other ways to 
initiate a prosecution are available, the provision specifically states that public 
prosecutors in this state shall have the “primary responsibility” for prosecuting crimes.  
“Primary” responsibility is, of course, not the same as exclusive responsibility.   
This petition presents a compelling case for this Court to use its power to appoint a 
prosecutor, both to bring justice for these four particular sexual assault victims and, more 
broadly, to help protect a class of victims – women and girls who have been sexually 
assaulted – who are under-protected by current prosecutorial practices in our country.  
This Court can address systemic under-prosecution of rape cases through its power under 
the Utah Constitution, not only under the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, art. 
 2 
VIII, § 16, but also to protect rights contained in Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, art. 
I, § 28, the Utah Uniform Operation of Laws Clause, art. I, § 24, and the Utah Equal 
Rights Provision, art. IV, § 1. It also has power to act through the federal Equal 
Protection Clause, U.S. Const., amend. XIV.   
Because the filing of serious criminal charges is plainly justified in each of these 
four sexual assault cases, this Court should appoint a prosecutor to prosecute the sexual 
assaults committed against these women. 
THIS COURT POSSESSES ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE 
PETITION 
This Court has original jurisdiction over this petition for appointment of a 
prosecutor pro tempore (hereinafter referred to as a “court-appointed prosecutor”) 
pursuant to Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16 (“If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to 
prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro tempore”).  
As this Court has explained: “This Court has original jurisdiction over certain matters, 
including petitions for extraordinary writs. In such situations, we do not conduct a review 
in our appellate capacity, but rather serve as the forum in which claims are initially 
heard.”  Mouty v. The Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 521 (internal 
citation omitted).   
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RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
This petition is filed under the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision of the Utah 
Constitution.  This provision appeared in the original 1896 Constitution, authorizing 
district courts to appoint prosecutors: 
[County attorneys. Election, term, etc.] A County Attorney shall be 
elected by the qualified voters of each county who shall hold his office for a 
term of two years. The powers and duties of County Attorneys, and such 
other attorneys for the State as the Legislature may provide, shall be 
prescribed by law. In all cases where the attorney for any county, or for the 
State, fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according to law, the court 
shall have power to appoint an attorney pro tempore. 
Utah Constitution of 1896, art. VIII, § 10. 
The provision was amended in 1984 by the Utah electorate, vesting the power to 
appoint prosecutors in this Court.  The provision currently provides: 
[Public prosecutors.]  The Legislature shall provide for a system of public 
prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility for the prosecution of 
criminal actions brought in the name of the State of Utah and shall perform 
such other duties as may be provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be 
elected in a manner provided by statute, and shall be admitted to practice 
law in Utah. If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, the 
Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro tempore. 
Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16. 
In 1994, the Utah electorate added a Crime Victims’ Rights Amendment to the 
Constitution, promising victims rights to justice and due process throughout the criminal 
justice process: 
Article I, Section 28.  [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] 
(1) To preserve and protect victims’ rights to justice and due process, 
victims of crimes have these rights, as defined by law: 
 (a) To be treated with fairness, respect and dignity, and to be free from 
harassment and abuse throughout the criminal justice process. 
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Utah Const., art. I, § 28. 
Also relevant to this case is a provision from the original 1896 Constitution, the 
Uniform Operation of Laws Provision: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Utah Const., art. I, § 24. 
Also relevant is another provision from the original 1896 Constitution protecting 
equal rights for women: 
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to hold office shall not be denied 
or abridged on account of sex.  Both male and female citizens of this State 
shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.   
Utah Const., art. IV, § 1. 
THE JANE DOES ARE ENTITLED TO PROCEED BY WAY OF 
PSEUDONYM 
Because the specific names of the sexual assault victims – and their attackers – are 
not relevant to the issues presented by this petition, we refer to the victims 
pseudonymously as Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4 – collectively 
“the Jane Does.”   The Jane Does are aware that, should the Court order a prosecution, 
the trial court may determine, at some stage of the proceedings, that their names should 
become a matter of public record.  At this stage in the proceedings, however, the victims’ 
specific identities should be protected.  The Jane Does are simply seeking initiation of a 
criminal prosecution, at which point the case will travel through the criminal justice 
system in the district court in the ordinary manner.  The initial determination by this 
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Court of whether to initiate a prosecution does not require immediately and publicly 
disclosing the identities of these sexual assault victims (one of whom was sexually 
assaulted as a minor). 
Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment promises crime victims that they will be 
“treated with fairness, respect, and dignity” and be “free from harassment and abuse 
throughout the criminal justice process.”  Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1)(a).  Construing very 
similar language in the New Mexico Victims’ Rights Amendment, New Mexico courts 
have instructed attorneys to “refrain from alluding to matters that are not reasonably 
relevant to the case at bar,” such as crime victims’ names.  See State v. Fry, 2010 WL 
4550716 (N.M. App. 2010).  It is common practice for the courts of this state to use 
pseudonyms in sexual assault cases, particularly in cases (such as this one) where a 
juvenile is involved.  See, e.g., M.J. v. Wisan, 2016 UT 13, ¶ 1, 371 P.3d 21 (using the 
pseudonym M.J.).   The reason for such protection is that “[f]or most sexual assault 
victims, privacy is like oxygen; it is a pervasive, consistent need at every step of 
recovery.” Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next 
Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 473 (2005).   
In civil cases, this Court has recognized the ability of a plaintiff to proceed under a 
pseudonym “where there is an important privacy interest” at stake.  Gardner v. Board of 
County Comm’rs of Wasatch County, 2008 UT 6, ¶ 52, 178 P.3d 893.  The federal courts 
with jurisdiction in Utah follow a similar approach.  See, e.g., Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson 
Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1979). 
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For all these reasons, the Jane Does file this petition pseudonymously.   Should a 
separate motion to proceed by way of pseudonym be required, the Jane Does respectfully 
request that this petition be construed as a motion for leave to proceed by way of 
pseudonym or, alternatively, that they be granted leave to file a specific motion to 
proceed in this fashion.1 
FACTS RELEVANT TO THE PETITION 
This petition is brought by four women, who were all recently sexually assaulted.  
They all made timely reports to law enforcement authorities, who investigated and found 
the allegations appropriate to present to the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office for 
prosecution.  Yet despite the seriousness of the crimes and the compelling evidence 
demonstrating victimization, the Office thereafter refused to prosecute.  The facts 
surrounding each of the four crimes are set out in this section, following the traditional 
approach for evaluating criminal charging decisions of viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to prosecution.  See, e.g., State v. Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 42, 356 P.3d 1204 
(reversing magistrate judge’s decision to refuse to bind over sex abuse case for 
prosecution because, in disregarding victim’s testimony “the magistrate impermissibly 
weighed the evidence instead of viewing witnesses' testimony in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution”).  The following brief factual summaries are supported by the 
materials indicated, including police reports and other materials contained in the 
appendix to this petition (“App.”).  Further details are also contained in the supporting 
                                            
1  The Jane Does have also redacted the names of the perpetrators of the crimes against 
them, referring to them only as “Richard Roe” 1, 2, 3, and 4.   
 7 
materials.  Should further proof of the facts be required by the Court, the Jane Does 
request an evidentiary hearing or such other procedure as the Court may direct to 
establish the prima facie validity of their assertions. 
I.  The Rape of Jane Doe 1 and the Non-Prosecution of Her Rapist.  
A.  The Rape of Jane Doe 1. 
On November 17, 2017, Richard Roe 1 came over to the home of Jane Doe 1.  
[App. at 3.]  Both Roe and Doe were seventeen years old, and both were high school 
classmates.  [App. at 3.]  Jane Doe 1 has been diagnosed with Charcot-Marie-Tooth 
(CMT), which is a form of muscular dystrophy.  [App. at 309.]  According to her 
physical therapist, CMT affects the peripheral nervous system and is characterized by 
muscle atrophy, muscle weakness, and disturbances in peripheral sensation.  [App. at 
309.]  Jane Doe 1 has undergone standardized testing and demonstrated considerable 
deficits in regard to strength, balance, and ability to perform coordinated tasks and 
activities requiring endurance.  [App. at 309.]  Functionally, she must act slowly and 
deliberately, including with her speech.  [App. at 309.]  What strength she does have 
diminishes rapidly during a sustained effort and she fatigues quickly.  [App. at 309.] In 
order to walk, Doe relies on an imposing German Shepard assistance dog.  [App. at 8.]  
Roe was ostensibly at Doe’s home to work on a school project.  [App. at 3.]  Roe 
was aware that Doe’s mother had left the home and was taking Doe’s assistance dog with 
her to a dog kennel.  [App. at 315.]  While both her trained dog and mother were away 
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from the house, Roe suggested that the two watch a video related to the school project in 
the basement of Doe’s home.  [App. at 4.] 
Roe assisted Doe down the stairs, where Roe had Doe alone and isolated in her 
home.  Doe was not in a romantic relationship with Roe.  [App. at 4.]   Soon after 
beginning to watch the video on the couch, Roe forced a kiss on Doe.  [App. at 4.]  Roe 
then reached behind Doe and unclasped her bra.  [App. at 4.]  He rapidly pulled off her 
shirt.  [App. at 9.]  Roe further undressed Doe within a very short time.  [App. at 9.]  Roe 
was aggressive in the way he moved her, as well as pulled off her clothes.  [App. at 9-10.]  
Doe became scared and froze. [App. at 9.]  Further, because of her medical condition, she 
was afraid to say no; she worried if she said no, he would hurt her.  [App. at 4, 10.]  Roe 
knew of Doe’s medical condition, and thus was in a position to know she would not or 
could not fight back.  [App. at 9.]  While Doe is physically disabled, Roe is a much 
larger, athletic young man.  [App. at 4, 9.]  Doe was scared by Roe’s aggressiveness.  
[App. at 4, 9.]  Doe knew Roe to be an aggressive person and was fearful as his demeanor 
changed and his gaze on her was unrecognizable.  [App. at 4, 9.] 
Doe’s body language communicated she was unwilling to participate.  [App. at 9.]  
Her physical limitations made it impossible for her to resist Roe’s advances.   [App. at 9.]  
Doe did not have the protection of her dog nor her mother to yell out to, and she was 
frozen by her fear.  [App. at 9.]  Doe was shocked and scared and did not know what to 
do or say.  [App. at 9-10.]   
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Within a few seconds, Roe pulled off Doe’s pants and underwear.  [App. at 9.]  
She acted in a way that Doe felt he would understand that she didn’t want to participate.  
[App. at 4, 9.] 
Roe then aggressively performed oral sex on Doe.  [App. at 9.]  He also inserted 
his fingers in her vagina.   [App. at 9, 10.]  Roe also grabbed Doe’s head and forced her 
to perform oral sex.  [App. at 9, 10.] Doe remained paralyzed by fear throughout the 
attack.  [App. at 9.]   
Roe also inserted his penis in Doe’s vagina.  [App. at 9.]  Doe was afraid that if 
she said anything he would hurt her.  [App. at 9.]  The attack happened very rapidly.   
[App. at 9.]  Doe’s only participation through all of this was initially allowing Roe to kiss 
her for 10 seconds.  [App. at 8-9.] 
When the sexual attack ended, Roe told Doe not to tell anyone what had happened.   
[App. at 10.]  Later that day, Doe called a close friend and was very upset.  Doe told the 
friend that she had not told Roe no because he was being aggressive and thought he 
would hurt her.  [App. at 16.]  Doe was not herself in the following days and disclosed 
the attack to her mother about one week later.  [App. at 9, 10.]  Roe declined an interview 
with police.  [App. at 13.]   
B.  The Rape of Jane Doe 1 Is a Felony Crime Under the Utah 
Criminal Code. 
The Utah Criminal Code defines a first-degree felony crime of rape in Utah Code 
§ 76-5-402.  An actor commits the crime of rape when he “has sexual intercourse with 
another person without the victim’s consent.”   Utah Code § 76-5-402(1).   Utah Code 
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also provides that an act of sexual intercourse is “without the consent of the victim” in 
any of the following circumstances: “the actor overcomes the victim through actual 
application of physical force or violence” or “the victim has not consented, and the actor 
knows the victim is . . . physically unable to resist.”  Utah Code § 76-5-406(2) & (5).   
An actor commits the crime of object rape when he “causes the penetration, 
however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person who is 14 years of age or 
older, by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, including a part of the 
human body other than the mouth or genitals, with intent to cause substantial emotional 
or bodily pain to the victim or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any 
person.”  Utah Code § 76-5-402.2.   
The evidence described above, if believed by the jury, would clearly prove the 
crimes of rape and object rape. 
C.  The Public Prosecutor Has Refused to Prosecute the Crimes 
Committed Against Jane Doe 1. 
On February 23, 2018, a Deputy District Attorney in the Salt Lake District 
Attorney’s Office sent an email to Jane Doe 1’s attorney.  The letter states: “I have 
decided that I will NOT file a charge against the suspect.”  [App. at 314 (emphasis in 
original).]  The prosecutor explained that he believed Jane Doe 1 but did not think that a 
jury was likely to convict Roe.  [App. at 314.]  On March 1, 2018, the prosecutor sent a 
formal letter to the Sandy City Police Department declining the case.  [App. at 321.] 
Following a request from Jane Doe 1 to the Utah Attorney General’s Office that it 
prosecute the case, on April 10, 2018, the Office declined to do so in light of the “high 
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degree of deference” that it affords local prosecutors.  [App. at 323.]   A further meeting 
with the District Attorney’s Office was also unproductive in securing prosecution.  
II.  The Rapes of Jane Doe 2 and the Non-Prosecution of Her Rapist.  
A.  The Rapes of Jane Doe 2. 
Jane Doe 2 is a 38-year-old woman suffering from cerebral palsy, a condition 
generally marked by impaired muscle coordination (spastic paralysis) and/or other 
disabilities, typically caused by damage to the brain before or at birth. [App. at 22, 74.] 
Before being sexually assaulted, Doe had limited knowledge of what sexual intercourse 
was in general.  [App. at 36, 40.] 
On May 9, 2016, Doe was walking to an appointment when she was approached 
by Richard Roe 2, a convicted rapist.  [App. at 22.]  Roe recognized Doe from her 
previous employment, but Doe didn’t recall ever meeting him before. [App. at 22.]  Roe 
continued walking with Doe to the health center, where they exchanged numbers and Doe 
passingly stated which apartment she lived in. [App. at 22, 26.]  Roe waited outside for 
Doe to finish her appointment before they ate lunch together. Roe then took Doe back to 
his residence by bus.  [App. at 22.]   
After going inside of Roe’s home, Roe ordered Doe to remove her clothing. Doe 
felt that she didn’t have a choice and complied.  [App. at 22, 26.]  Roe removed his own 
clothing and then inserted his tongue into Doe’s vagina. [App. at 22.]  Roe then inserted 
an unknown number of fingers into Doe’s vagina.  [App. at 22.]  Doe cried out in pain 
and repeatedly begged for Roe to stop, but he continued.  [App. at 22-23, 72.]  After 
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finishing assaulting Doe, Roe finally allowed Doe to get dressed.  [App. at 23.]  He 
followed her onto the bus and stayed next to her until she got off at her home stop.  [App. 
at 23, 27.]  Doe was afraid to call the police because Roe knew where she lived, and she 
wasn’t sure exactly what happened to her.  [App. at 27.]  Doe’s husband later reported 
that Doe seemed depressed but refused to talk about why.  [App. at 29.]   
For two to three days after the initial assault, Doe noticed that Roe had left her 
multiple voicemails. On one of these mornings, Doe left her apartment at the same time 
as usual, when she noticed that Roe had been unknowingly waiting for her outside of her 
complex.  [App. at 23.]  Roe brought Doe to lunch, where he told her that he was a sex 
offender and threatened that “if she left, he would do something worse than what he had 
done.”   [App. at 27.]  Roe then led Doe back to his residence.  [App. at 23.] 
Once at Roe’s residence, Roe played pornographic videos for Doe to watch so he 
could explain to her what intercourse was.  [App. at 36.]  Then, Roe ordered Doe to 
remove her clothing and she again complied out of fear.  [App. at 38, 72.]  Roe orally and 
digitally penetrated Doe’s vagina, causing pain. [App. at 23.]  Doe asked him to stop and 
Roe climbed on top of Doe’s naked body, then forced his penis into Doe’s vagina.  [App. 
at 23.]  Doe repeatedly protested and told him that he was hurting her, and Roe responded 
that she must be “tight” if she was saying that it hurt.  He continued the assault.  [App. at 
23.]  Doe remembered Roe talking about an orgasm a couple of times but wasn’t sure 
what it meant, so she was not able to confirm whether Roe ejaculated inside of her.  
[App. at 23.] 
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Roe didn’t finish assaulting Doe until nighttime, after the busses were no longer 
running.  [App. at 28.]  Doe felt that she could not leave because Roe was situated in 
between her and the front door, he had access to her cellphone, and had even blocked the 
entrance to the bathroom with a fan.  [App. at 23, 28, 38.]  At some point in the night, 
Doe attempted to text her husband for help, but Roe caught her and became angry.  [App. 
at 23.]  He told her that he deleted the text messages and then yelled at her, lecturing that 
her husband was going to call the police.  [App. at 23, 28.]  This outburst stopped any 
more sexual assaults against Doe for the night, but Roe kept her in the apartment.  [App. 
at 28.]   
The next day, Roe again forced Doe to allow oral penetration of her vagina.  [App. 
at 23.]  Roe then commanded Doe to position herself on her hands and knee. Roe 
proceeded to forcefully and repeatedly penetrate Doe’s anus and vagina with his penis.  
[App. at 23, 37, 72.]  Doe continuously cried out in pain and begged Roe to stop.  [App. 
at 23.]  At some point during this assault, Roe told Doe that he couldn’t stop because 
“people were spying on them.”  [App. at 23.]  He opened the front door and stood naked 
in the doorway, “as if looking for people.”  [App. at 23.]  After this brief break, Roe 
continued anally raping Doe against her protests.  [App. at 23.] 
When Roe was finished, he applied lotion to Doe’s naked body. He then steered 
Doe to the shower in the bathroom. Using the detachable shower head, Roe sprayed water 
inside of Doe’s vagina and anus, and Doe watched blood rinse down the shower drain.   
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[App. at 23, 72.]  Roe then guided Doe back to the mattress, where he fell asleep with his 
arm again tightly wrapped around her. [App. at 23.] 
The next morning, Doe quietly dressed herself and gathered her belongings in an 
attempt to leave without awaking Roe.  [App. at 23.]  As she opened the front door, Roe 
pulled her back inside.  [App. at 23.]  He dumped her purse and bookbag and searched 
through the items. [App. at 23.]  After calling Doe a “retard,” he allowed her to leave his 
residence.  [App. at 28.] 
Doe reported the assaults to police on May 15, 2016.  [App. at 22.]  She was 
interviewed by an officer and then transported to the hospital where a SANE nurse 
conducted a physical examination of her abrasions and collected rape kit evidence.   
[App. at 24, 70-80.]   
Roe was interviewed multiple times throughout the investigation, where he gave a 
series of conflicting and evasive stories.  [App. at 3-35, 41-43, 62.]  Roe admitted that he 
knew that Doe was a virgin and had extensive mobility problems.  [App. at 33-34.]  He 
repeatedly denied that any actual penetration of Doe ever happened. [App. at 42, 62.]  
But the results from the DNA found inside Doe’s vagina matched Roe.  [App. at 42, 63, 
66.]2   
                                            
2  Because Roe was a convicted sex offender, his DNA was available for comparison.  A 
later buccal swab, obtained via search warrant, confirmed the match.  [App. at 46, 48.] 
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B.  The Rapes of Jane Doe 2 Are Felony Crimes Under the 
Utah Criminal Code. 
As discussed above in connection with Jane Doe 1, the Utah Criminal Code 
defines a first-degree felony crime of rape in Utah Code § 76-5-402.  An actor commits 
the crime of rape when he “has sexual intercourse with another person without the 
victim’s consent.”   Utah Code § 76-5-402(1).  The Utah Criminal Code also defines a 
first-degree felony crime of object rape, which includes penetration of the genitals with 
fingers.  Utah Code § 76-5-402.2.  Roe’s actions described above violated these criminal 
statutes. 
C.  The Public Prosecutor Has Refused to Prosecute the Rapes 
Committed Against Jane Doe 2. 
The District Attorney of Salt Lake City declined to file charges, citing an alleged 
lack of evidence.  [App. at 45, 49, 50.] 
III.  The Rape of Jane Doe 3 and the Non-Prosecution of Her Rapist.  
A.  The Attacks on Jane Doe 3. 
Richard Roe 3 is a prominent law enforcement officer in Utah County who is more 
than 50-years-old.  In January 2015, Roe instituted a new Citizen’s Advisory Board.  Jane 
Doe 3, a 24-year-old student at Utah Valley University at the time, was interested in the 
Board’s activities.  She hoped to conduct research regarding the use of body-worn 
cameras and a simulator for officer-involved shootings.  [App. at 89, 103, 113.]  One of 
Doe’s professors arranged for her to become involved with the Board and to work with 
Roe while doing so.  Roe and Doe started working together.  [App. at 89, 103.]  Soon 
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thereafter, Roe started acting in a sexually aggressive manner toward Doe.  [App. at 89, 
90, 103.]   
At the end of October 2016, Doe sent Roe a text. She wrote that although she 
wanted to learn more about police work, she wanted to set clear professional boundaries 
and did not want to have a romantic or sexual relationship with Roe.  [App. at 90.]   
Not long after this exchange, the two were at Roe’s house, where Roe repeatedly 
attempted to kiss Doe, but she rebuffed his advances.  During the same encounter, Roe 
placed his hand on Doe’s leg. She pushed his hand away twice before Roe stated 
something to the effect of “I’ll decide” and moved his hand higher up on her leg.  [App. 
at 107, 113.]  On a separate occasion, after Doe had rebuffed his advances, Roe stood up, 
placed his hand on his gun and said in a threatening manner, “I am going to go put this 
away.”  [App. at 92.]   
Doe definitively stated (again) that she wanted to learn about police work but was 
not interested in a romantic relationship with Roe.  Concerned about what to do, Doe 
discussed Roe’s behavior with her professor.  [App. at 90.]  Her professor advised her to 
set clear professional boundaries and avoid being alone with Roe.  [App. at 90.]   
Roe later asked Doe to attend a dinner with other members of the board and a 
friend of Roe under the guise that the dinner was related to their work.   [App. at 91.]  
Upon arrival, Doe realized that the dinner was a social gathering and did not involve her 
work on the Board.  During dinner Roe continually placed his hand on Doe’s leg in a 
sexual manner.  [App. at 91, 114.]  After dinner Roe called Doe.  During this 
 17 
conversation, Roe stated, “thank you for letting me put my hand on your leg and thank 
you for liking it.”  [App. at 91.]  Over the coming weeks, Roe’s sexual advances became 
more aggressive as Doe continued to feel threatened, trapped, and unable to dissuade 
Roe’s advances.  [App. at 93, 114.]   
In January 2017, Roe raped Doe on two separate occasions, four different times.   
[App. at 93-97, 115.]  On at least one of those occasions, Doe repeatedly and audibly said 
“no” as Roe forced himself on her, she clutched her pants to avoid having them removed, 
and only succumbed after Roe slammed his shoulder into her chest and overpowered her 
physically.  [App. at 93, 115.]  Doe reported these instances to at least three different 
individuals at the time they happened or shortly thereafter.  [See, e.g., App. at 99, 106, 
113-16.]   
None of Doe’s sexual encounters with Roe was consensual. She resisted his 
suggestive comments, his groping and fondling, and his assaults, but did not know what 
kind of response she would trigger if she tried to forcibly reject his advances.  [App. at 
93, 114.]  She knew he had a gun and that he had specifically talked to her about his gun, 
she knew he had refused to remove his hands when requested to do so, and she knew that 
he had the final say in the Department.   [App. at 93, 114.]  Her fear of reporting Roe’s 
sexual assaults to the Department where Roe worked was clear.  [App. at 93, 114-15.]   
Shortly after the last time Roe raped Doe, Roe left on vacation.  Doe took the 
opportunity to go to the police and report the attacks.  [App. at 94, 97-98.]   
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B.  The Attacks on Jane Doe 3 Are Felony Crimes Under the 
Utah Criminal Code. 
As discussed above in connection with the other Jane Does, the Utah Criminal 
Code defines a first-degree felony crime of rape in Utah Code § 76-5-402.  The Utah 
Criminal Code also defines a crime of Forcible Sex Abuse, committed when “under 
circumstances not amounting to rape, object rape, sodomy, or attempted rape or sodomy, 
the actor touches the anus, buttocks, pubic area, or any part of the genitals of another, or 
touches the breast of a female, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with another, with 
intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any individual or with the intent to 
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any individual, without the consent of the other, 
regardless of the sex of any participant.” Utah Code § 76-5-404(1).  As used in this 
section, taking “indecent liberties” includes “touching the actor’s genitals . . . against any 
part of the body of the victim” or “simulating or pretending to engage in sexual 
intercourse with the victim.” Utah Code § 76-5-416(1) & (3). 
The evidence described above in the case of Jane Doe 3 would, if believed by a 
jury, prove multiple crimes of Rape and Forcible Sex Abuse. 
C.  The Public Prosecutor Has Refused to Prosecute the Rapes 
Committed Against Jane Doe 3. 
Because Roe was a very prominent member of law enforcement in Utah County, 
consideration of the prosecution of Roe was moved to the adjoining county of Salt Lake.  
This case was screened in person with a senior Deputy District Attorney in the Salt Lake 
District Attorney’s Office, who declined to prosecute based on alleged “evidence 
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problems.”  [App. at 117.]  A subsequent meeting with the Office proved futile in getting 
charges filed.    
IV.  The Sexual Assault of Jane Doe 4 and the Non-Prosecution of 
Her Molester. 
A.  The Sexual Assault of Jane Doe 4. 
On February 18, 2017, Jane Doe 4 received a massage from Richard Roe 4 at a 
licensed and established massage and spa business. This was Doe’s second massage from 
Roe, with the first massage being very professional. [App. at 121, 133.] 
During the second massage, Roe asked Doe if she had any problem areas, and she 
mentioned her hips.  [App. at 133.]  He started massaging her back, lower back, glutes, 
hips, shoulders, and neck using both hands.  He told her that he obviously couldn’t see 
well from a certain angle and instructed her to tell him if he got too close.  [App. at 122, 
133.]  While Doe was lying on her stomach, Roe moved around the area where Doe’s leg 
connected to her body and touched the outside of her labia briefly a couple of times, then 
quickly moved to her other side and worked on her right leg.  [App. at 134.]   Roe asked 
repeatedly if things were tender and Doe always answered yes. As he worked on her glute 
and upper thigh area he asked if it was too close and she said no.  [App. at 134.]  Right 
after that he put a lot of pressure on her glute and then inserted two fingers into her anus.  
[App. at 123-24, 134.]  Doe was not immediately sure what was happening and if it was 
just the pressure of the massage that made her feel like something was in her anus.  [App. 
at 124.]   She told Roe that that was too close, and he apologized and kept his distance.  
[App. at 124.]  A minute later he asked her to roll onto her back. [App. at 124.]  Roe 
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started massaging Doe’s legs and moved toward her inner thighs.  [App. at 134.]  Roe’s 
fingers touched Doe’s labia again, multiple times, and came closer each time.  [App. at 
125, 134.]  She told him that was too close, and he apologized again.   [App. at 125.]  He 
had her bend her left leg and brought it to the side and opened her leg.  [App. at 134.]  
Roe asked if that was tender and Doe said yes.  [App. at 126, 134.]  Roe then pressed on 
the front area with one hand, pulled her left glute down and away. Doe felt that he was 
touching or partially inserting his thumb into her vagina.  [App. at 126.]  She said “ow, 
that hurts,” and he apologized and said a certain muscle was really locked up.  [App. at 
126.]  He stopped what he had been doing, lightly massaged her outer hip, and then 
recommended stretches she could do daily.  [App. at 127.]  Doe got dressed and then left.   
[App. at 127.]   
Two days later, on February 20, 2017, Doe reported the incident to the Salt Lake 
Police Department.  [App. at 133.]  Officer Taryn Culverwell asked Doe if she sustained 
any injuries and Doe reported a burning sensation in her rectum and believed it was a 
direct result of Roe placing his fingers in her anus.  [App. at 135.]  The officer 
recommended that Doe be examined by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE), 
which was completed at LDS Hospital. [App. at 197-204.]  SANE nurse Baldwin (of 
Wasatch Forensic Nurses) noted a laceration in Doe’s anus.  [App. at 135, 151, 203.]   
In an interview with Detective Mott on February 24, 2017, Doe reported that 
during her first massage with Roe she felt that he was pushing against her arms with his 
private parts.  [App. at 151.]  During the second massage she again felt like he was 
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pushing his private parts into her arm and she knew it was not an accident.  [App. at 151.]  
She remembered freezing and wondering if it was really happening.  [App. at 151.]  Doe 
also remembered Roe’s penis rubbing against her and that it was partially erect.  [App. at 
151.] 
B.  The Sexual Assault Against Jane Doe 4 Is a Felony Crime 
Under the Utah Criminal Code.  
The Utah Criminal Code defines a first-degree felony crime of object rape in Utah 
Code § 76-5-402.2.  An actor commits the crime of object rape when he “causes the 
penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of another person who is 14 
years of age or older, by any foreign object, substance, instrument, or device, including a 
part of the human body other than the mouth or genitals, with intent to cause substantial 
emotional or bodily pain to the victim or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual 
desire of any person.” 
The evidence described above, if believed by the jury, would prove that Richard 
Roe 4 committed the first-degree felony crime of object rape against Jane Doe 4.  (Roe 
also committed other lesser included sexual offenses as well.) 
C.  The Public Prosecutor Has Refused to Prosecute the Sexual 
Assault Against Jane Doe 4. 
Detective Jeff Mott of the Special Victims Unit of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department presented the case to the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office, recommending 
prosecution.  On April 17, 2017, a Deputy District Attorney in the Office sent a 
declination letter, declining to file charges due to alleged “insufficient evidence.”  [App. 
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at 189.]   Detective Motts then contacted the prosecutor and told him he didn’t agree with 
that assessment.  The Detective screened the case again with the prosecutor’s supervisor, 
a senior Deputy District Attorney.  That supervisor later wrote Detective Mott an email 
stating the case would be declined for unlikely success for prosecution.  [App. at 187.] 
Detective Mott then reached out to a SANE nurse, Beth Weekly, to set up an 
additional screening for May 4, 2017.  In this screening meeting, Ms. Weekly explained 
the significance of Doe’s anal tear, but the case was declined again.  Detective Mott set 
up a final screening on May 16, 2017, attended by prosecutors and Detective Mott; Jane 
Doe 4; Salt Lake Police Sergeant Christansen; victim advocate Alex Merritt; and Doe’s 
attorney, Bethany Warr.   After the parties discussed the case, the District Attorney’s 
Office again declined to file charges.  At that point, Doe attempted to secure the filing of 
charges by the Attorney General’s Office but was unsuccessful.   
ARGUMENT 
The Court should appoint a prosecutor to prosecute the sexual offenses committed 
against Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4 by exercising its undoubted 
power under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16 – the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision.  
This provision authorizes this Court to appoint a prosecutor where a public prosecutor 
“fails or refuses to prosecute.”  Because prosecutors have failed and refused to prosecute 
the violent crimes committed against the Jane Does, this Court has the power to act.   
This Court should act.  Appointment of a prosecutor to pursue these well-founded 
cases would serve the interests of justice.  Not only would it help to secure justice for 
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these four victims and enforce this State’s criminal laws against sexual violence, but it 
would also help to respond to the problem of under-prosecution of violent sexual crimes 
against women and girls, thus securing state constitutional rights under the Utah Victims’ 
Rights Amendment, art. I, § 28; the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause, art. I, § 24; and 
the Equal Rights Provision, art. IV, § 1.  An appointment is also necessary to protect 
federal constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause.  Accordingly, the Court 
should rule that appointment of a prosecutor is appropriate and direct briefing as to whom 
that prosecutor should be. 
I.  The Court Should First to Determine the Meaning of the 
Relevant Utah Constitutional Provisions Without Reference to 
Federal Law.  
Before turning to the specifics of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, it is 
useful to set out the methodology for the proper interpretation of a provision of the Utah 
Constitution.  This petition seeks judicial appointment of a prosecutor, raising both state 
and federal constitutional claims.  This Court should prioritize consideration of the Utah 
Constitutional claims, turning to them first.  See generally ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE 
LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 231-32 (2010) (arguing for a “New Judicial 
Federalism”).   
The key constitutional provision at issue in this petition is Utah’s Court-Appointed 
Prosecutor Provision.  This is a unique provision, drafted in response to the Utah 
Territory’s unique experience of under-prosecution.   The provision uses language that 
does not appear anywhere in the federal constitution.   This Court has emphasized that 
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“the standards for state and federal constitutional claims are [often] different because they 
are based on different constitutional language.”  Jensen ex rel. Jensen v. Cunningham, 
2011 UT 17, ¶ 45, 250 P.3d 465.   
In evaluating which order to proceed, Judge Sutton has recently provided useful 
insight in his book on state constitutional law.  He suggests that state courts prioritize 
state constitutional claims, explaining that “[a] state-first approach to litigation over 
constitutional rights honors the original design of the state and federal constitutions.”  
JEFFREY S. SUTTON, FIFTY-ONE IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 179 (2018).  Cf. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 
P.2d 999, 1006-07 (Utah 1994) (calling for a “primacy model” to interpreting Utah’s 
constitution).  State constitutional law issues predominate in this petition and accordingly 
this Court should turn to them initially.   
Generally, this Court has handled state constitutional law issues by seeking to 
determine the original meaning of Utah Constitutional provisions.   Under this approach, 
the natural starting point for state constitutional interpretation is the text, as “[t]he 
language of our constitution contains the surest indication of the intent of its framers and 
the citizens of Utah who voted it into effect.”  Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 
40, ¶ 16, 140 P.3d 1235.   Words in the Utah constitution “must be taken to mean what 
they meant to the minds of the voters of the state when the provision was adopted.” Tintic 
Standard Mining Co. v. Utah Cty., 80 Utah 491, 15 P.2d 633, 637 (1932); see also 
Richardson v. Treasure Hill Mining Co., 23 Utah 366, 65 P. 74, 81 (Utah 1901) 
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(examining “[the framers’] discussions upon this subject[ ] [i]n the official report of the 
proceedings of the constitutional convention”); Ritchie v. Richards, 14 Utah 345, 47 P. 
670, 679 (1896) (per Batch, J.) (adopting interpretation that was “in harmony with public 
thought and expression respecting the [issue in question] at the time of and before the 
holding of the constitutional convention”); State v. Elliott, 13 Utah 200, 44 P. 248, 251 
(1896) (discerning the intent “of the framers of our fundamental law” in determining the 
scope of article VIII, section 4)).  See generally Jeremy M. Christiansen, Some Thoughts 
on Utah Originalism: A Response, 2014 UTAH L. REV. ON LAW 1, 5–6 & nn.26–36, 9–10 
& nn.59–64 (concluding that the prevailing approach to interpreting Utah’s Constitution 
has been originalist).3 
Of course, the text of a provision is not examined in isolation.  This Court has 
made clear that “[c]onstitutional language must be viewed in context, meaning that its 
history and purpose must be considered in determining its meaning.”  Am. Bush, 2006 UT 
40, ¶ 24 (quoting Laney, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 37, 57 P.3d 1007).  This Court “has a very long 
history of interpreting constitutional provisions in light of their historical background and 
                                            
3  Some of the older decisions of this Court have called for a consideration of “policy 
arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to assist [the Court] in 
arriving at a proper interpretation of the [state constitution] provision in question.”  
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993).  More 
recent decisions cast doubt on that approach, with several Justices of this Court calling 
for repudiating Whitehead’s policy-oriented approach.  See, e.g., State v. Houston, 2015 
UT 40, ¶ 154, 353 P.3d 55 (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 86, 140 P.3d 1235 (Durrant, J., 
concurring).  Happily, this case presents no need to resolve these possibly conflicting 
views, as both originalist and policy-oriented interpretations of the Court-Appointed 
Prosecutor Provision lead to the same conclusion. Compare Part II, infra (discussing 
original meaning of the provision) with Part V, infra (explaining public policy arguments 
regarding the provision).  
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the then-contemporary understanding of what they were to accomplish.” In re Young, 
1999 UT 6, ¶ 15 & n.5, 976 P.2d 581.   
Finally, this Court had explained that it is reluctant to wade into “important [state] 
constitutional waters” without “in depth” briefing.  Zimmerman v. Univ. of Utah, 2018 
UT 1, ¶ 23, 417 P.3d 78.  Accordingly, “in depth” briefing follows. 
II.  Article VIII, Section 16 of the Utah Constitution Reflects a 
Long-Standing Tradition of Victim-Initiated Prosecution in 
America.   
Utah Constitution, article VIII, section 16 – and particularly the sentence we will 
refer to as Utah’s Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision – reflects a long-standing 
tradition of victim-initiated prosecution in this country, which remains particularly salient 
for victims of sexual assault crimes in Utah today.   
A.  America’s Criminal Justice System Initially Relied on a 
System of Victim-Initiated Prosecution. 
At the time of the drafting of the federal constitution and continuing throughout 
the nineteenth century, victim-initiated prosecutions were a significant way in which 
criminal charges were pursued.  Under this system, victims directed their own criminal 
prosecutions – a fact later reflected in Utah’s Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision.    
Victim-initiated prosecution rests on the principle that a crime harms not only the 
state but also the victim.  Blackstone articulated this general view in his Commentaries 
on the Law of England: “In all cases the crime includes an injury: every public offense is 
also a private wrong, and somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise affects 
the community.” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 
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Vol. IV, Ch. 1, p. 5 (Dawsons of Pall Mall, London 1767).  Relying on this fact as a spur 
to effective prosecution, the English tradition long recognized private criminal actions.  
As Sir James Stephen explained: “The fact that the private vengeance of the person 
wronged by a crime was the principal source to which men trusted for the administration 
of justice in early times is one of the most characteristic circumstances connected with 
English criminal law . . . .”  JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW OF ENGLAND 245 (1883); see also John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the 
Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 311-12 (1978).   
The English conception of victim-initiated prosecutions crossed the Atlantic to the 
American colonies. Histories concerning eighteenth century criminal justice in the United 
States – including the period before, during, and after the framing of the Constitution – 
reveal that victims frequently brought and prosecuted criminal cases.  At our nation’s 
founding “private persons regularly prosecuted criminal cases.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 127-28 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  This victim-initiated prosecution is often referred to as “private prosecution,” 
although this nomenclature may be a bit misleading.  The prosecutions were often 
brought in the name of the State, such that the action was formally a criminal prosecution 
of the type that exists today.  But “many criminal trials were in reality contests between 
subjects rather than contests between government and subject.” William E. Nelson, 
Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical 
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Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 468 (1967).  As one scholar has described the 
Colonial system: 
At that time the victim was a key decision-maker in the criminal justice 
system as well as a direct beneficiary of it.  He served as policeman and 
prosecutor who, if he chose to apprehend an offender and initiate a 
prosecution, did so directly and at his own expense.  He did not have to rely 
on other government agencies.  On the contrary he could not rely on them 
even if he had wanted to because they either did not exist or did not 
perform the function he sought. . . . 
While criminal prosecutions were brought in the name of the state, they 
were, in effect, private prosecution in which the state typically did not play 
an active role and did not have a vested interest.  Crime was conceived of 
primarily as an injury to the individual victim, not an attack against the 
state or society. 
William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The 
Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 649-50 (1976). 
This form of victim-initiated “prosecution dominated criminal justice during the 
colonial period,” Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: 
Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 568, 571 (1984), and continued to be “a significant element of the criminal 
justice system through the nineteenth century.”  Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded 
Prosecutors in the Nineteenth Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 43 
(1995).  As the Supreme Court recently explained in Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 
(2012), during the nineteenth century “it was common for criminal cases to be prosecuted 
by private parties.”  Id. at 364; see also Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 198 (1879) 
(Bradley, J., dissenting) (“[E]very man in the community, if he has probable cause for 
prosecuting another, has a perfect right, by law, to institute such prosecution, subject 
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only, in the case of private prosecutions, to the penalty of paying the costs if he fails in 
his suit”).   
Perhaps the most detailed study of private prosecution in the United States – a 
book-length historical review of nineteenth century prosecution in Philadelphia – reveals 
that direct victim prosecution for some types of crime continued late into the nineteenth 
century in one of the most urban and developed parts of the United States, Philadelphia.  
See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA 
1800-1890 (1989).  Based on a thorough examination of court records, Steinberg reports 
that “[d]uring the first half of the nineteenth century, private prosecution dominated 
criminal justice in Philadelphia. . . . [M]ost criminal prosecutions were initiated by 
private citizens.” Id. at 38.  Observers remarked on the “spirit of litigation” that pervaded 
this use of the courts for a wide range of complaints.  Id.  Citizens from all walks of life 
and in all economic circumstances initiated criminal prosecutions.  See id.  Of particular 
relevance to this case, private prosecutions were particularly useful for relatively 
disempowered groups, such as women who were victims of domestic violence.  See id. at 
69-71 (noting how women used private prosecutions in Philadelphia to protect against 
sexual violence and domestic abuse); see also Edwin Surrency, The Evolution of an 
Urban Judicial System: The Philadelphia Story, 1683-1968, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 95 
(1974). 
The Philadelphia story is typical of the experience in other states, where victim-
driven prosecution was also widely used.  See, e.g., Richard Gasjins, Changes to the 
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Criminal Law in Eighteenth Century Connecticut, 25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309 (1981); 
Michael S. Hindus, The Contours of Crime and Justice in Massachusetts and South 
Carolina, 1767-1878, 21 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 212 (1977); William H. Lloyd, Jr., The 
Courts of Pennsylvania in the Eighteenth Century Prior to the Revolution, 56 U. PA. L. 
REV. 28 (1908); William Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the 
Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450 (1967); Donna J. 
Spindel, The Administration of Justice in North Carolina, 1720-1740, 25 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 141, 145 (1981); Mike McConville & Chester Mirsky, The Rise of Guilty Pleas: 
New York, 1800-1865, 22 J.L. & SOC’Y 443, 448-59 (1995) (explaining how New York 
City private prosecutors or complainants initiated indictments during the first half of the 
nineteenth century and often conducted trials).4  Thus, one key observer of America in 
the first half of the nineteenth century, Alexis de Tocqueville, recognized that at the time 
“the officers of the public prosecutor’s office are few, and the initiative in prosecutions is 
not always theirs.” ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 96 (J.P. Mayer 
ed. 1969).5 
                                            
4  Recently, Professors Woolhandler and Nelson have been cited by a justice on this court 
for the proposition that “[e]arly American courts uniformly proscribed the private 
prosecution of criminal actions.”  Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 76, 299 P.3d 1098, 
1123 (Lee, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does 
History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 696 (2004)). To the extent 
that the point was being made that criminal prosecutions must be brought in the name of 
the State, the point is entirely accurate.  Indeed, as originally drafted, Utah Const., art. 
VIII, § 18 provided that “[t]he style of all process shall be, ‘The State of Utah,’ and all 
prosecutions shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of the same.”  (This 
provision was repealed in 1984.)  But if a broader point is being suggested that private 
citizens could not initiate a prosecution in the early days of this country, Woolhandler 
and Nelson are clearly incorrect.   
5  Although this case focuses on state constitutional law, it may also be relevant to note 
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This historical research demonstrates that victim-initiated prosecutions were 
widely available in this country during the nineteenth century. 
B.  The Utah Constitutional Convention Specifically Drafted 
Article VIII, Section 16 to Preserve Victim-Initiated 
Prosecutions in Utah. 
Against this backdrop of a well-established tradition of victim-initiated 
prosecution in this country, it is unsurprising to find that this form of prosecution is 
specifically enshrined in Utah’s Constitution – in the Court-Appointed Prosecutor 
Provision.   
Before turning to the specifics of the provision, some history about Utah’s 
Constitutional Convention may usefully set the stage.  The Convention began on March 
4, 1895 and continued for a little over two months.  See generally JEAN BICKMORE 
WHITE, CHARTER FOR STATEHOOD: THE STORY OF UTAH’S STATE CONSTITUTION (1996).  
The Convention’s goal was to draft a state constitution that would “prove acceptable to 
Congress.”  Brad C. Smith, Comment, Be No More Children: An Analysis of Article I, 
                                                                                                                                             
that victim-initiated prosecutions existed (albeit in more limited form) in the early federal 
system.  An early opinion by Attorney General Bradford indicates that the colonial 
practice continued at least for a brief period under the Constitution.  Bradford considered 
a request by a British consul for prosecution of a crowd that had harassed him in 1794 
after the district attorney had declined to prosecute.  While agreeing with the district 
attorney that federal prosecution was not warranted, the Attorney General opined that: 
[I]f the party injured is advised or believes that the federal courts are 
competent to sustain the prosecution, I conceive he ought not to be 
concluded by my opinion or that of the district attorney.  If he desire it, he 
ought to have access to the grand jury with his witnesses; and if the grand 
jury will take it upon themselves to present the offense in that court, it will 
be the duty of the district attorney to reduce the presented into form, and 
the point in controversy will thus be put in train for judicial determination. 
1 Op. Att’y Gen. 43 (1794) (emphases omitted).  
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Section 4 of the Utah Constitution, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1431, 1454.  As a result, the 
delegates at the Convention often “’borrowed heavily from earlier Utah constitutions and 
other state constitutions.’”  Paul G. Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and 
Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 UTAH L. 
REV. 751, 800 (quoting John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government—The 
History of Utah’s Constitution, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 319, 323). 
Victim-initiated prosecution was protected in the Article addressing Utah’s 
Judicial Department – e.g., Article VIII.  Other provisions in Article VIII were  
“designed to fit the pattern common to other state court systems at the time.”  JEAN 
BICKMORE WHITE, THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 113 (2011).  The Article contained 
twenty-eight detailed sections, including detailed sections regarding the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court (§ 4) and district courts (§ 7), the definition of judicial districts (§ 16), 
and a requirement that Supreme Court decisions be in writing (§ 25) and with a syllabus 
(§ 26).   
Article VIII also contained a provision providing for the election of County 
Attorneys, while preserving victim-initiated prosecution in its last sentence – the Court-
Appointed Prosecutor Provision: 
Sec. 10. [County attorneys. Election, term, etc.] A County Attorney shall be 
elected by the qualified voters of each county who shall hold his office for a 
term of two years. The powers and duties of County Attorneys, and such 
other attorneys for the State as the Legislature may provide, shall be 
prescribed by law. In all cases where the attorney for any county, or for 
the State, fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according to law, the 
court shall have power to appoint an attorney pro tempore. 
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Utah Constitution of 1896, art. VIII, § 10 (emphasis added) (currently found in art. VIII, 
§ 16, as discussed below).6 
Given that many other provisions in the Utah Constitution were simply copied 
from other Constitutions, the question arises as to where the Court-Appointed Prosecutor 
Provision came from.  While the Nevada Constitution of 1864 served as a source for the 
proposed Constitution for the State of Deseret of 1872, and thus, in turn, as a source for 
many of the provisions of the Utah Constitution of 1896, see Cassell, supra, 1993 UTAH 
L. REV. at 802, that does not appear to be the lineage for this provision.  Neither the 
Nevada Constitution nor the draft constitution for the State of Deseret appear to contain 
language concerning the subject of victim-initiated prosecution (one way or the other).  
Indeed, so far as can be determined, the language was not imported from any other state 
constitution but rather is original to Utah and added during Utah’s 1895 Constitutional 
Convention.7  Cf. SUTTON, supra, at 177 (noting importance of state courts “marshaling 
the distinct state texts and histories and drawing their own conclusions from them”). 
                                            
6  Justice Lee has recently examined some of the history around the time that Utah’s 
Constitution was drafted, reporting that he could “find no instance of a private party [in 
Utah] indicting or trying a criminal suspect independent of state involvement.” Gregory 
v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 77, 299 P.3d 1098, 1123 (Lee, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  Nothing in this history is inconsistent with the view offered here.  An 
appointment by a district judge of an “attorney pro tempore” (i.e., a temporary 
prosecutor) would not be an instance of a “private party” pursuing a criminal case 
“independent of state involvement,” but rather the appointment of a prosecutor by the 
state judiciary at the request of the private party, who would then pursue a prosecution on 
behalf of the State to enforce the State’s criminal laws. Indeed, perhaps envisioning the 
existence of prosecution by private actors, the Constitution as drafted in 1895 provided 
that “all prosecutions shall be conducted in the name and by the authority of the [State].”  
See Utah Const. of 1896, art. VIII, § 18.  
7  Proposed Utah Constitutions were drafted in 1882 and 1887.  See BICKMORE, CHARTER 
OF STATEHOOD, supra, at 35-39.  Neither of those drafts contained language similar to 
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What happened in Utah between 1872 and 1895, ultimately leading to the addition 
of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision – not contained in any of the previously 
proposed Utah constitutions or any other of the 43 then-existing State constitutions?  
Here a “page of history is worth a volume of logic.”  Am. Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 
P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 
(1921) (Holmes, J.)).  During this time, the residents of Utah territory witnessed firsthand 
the consequences of non-prosecution of various crimes.  See generally Paul G. Cassell, 
Search and Seizure and the Utah Constitution: The Irrelevance of the Antipolygamy 
Raids, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1, 10-13.  Criminal prosecutions in the state at this time were 
directed by unelected federal outsiders, who myopically focused on politically-motivated 
antipolygamy prosecutions.  See GUSTIVE O. LARSON, THE “AMERICANIZATION” OF 
UTAH FOR STATEHOOD 302 (1971) (describing “vindictive carpetbag methods” of law 
enforcement).  Historians agree that the anti-polygamy prosecutions in Utah began most 
intensively following the passage of the Poland Act of 1874, which changed prosecuting 
practices in Utah by eliminating the offices of territorial marshal and attorney general and 
expanded the powers of the U.S. Marshal.  See Tracy Panek, Search and Seizure in Utah: 
Recounting the Antipolygamy Raids, UTAH HIST. Q.  317 (1994).   
This focus by federal law enforcement officials on polygamy prosecutions after 
1874 meant under-enforcement of other criminal laws that directly affected day-to-day 
living conditions of Utah residents – particularly conditions for women.  This sentiment 
                                                                                                                                             
the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, but these drafts were largely copycat drafts 
from the earlier 1872 proposal.  Id. at 35, 38.   
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is reflected, for instance, in a petition signed by 22,626 women of Utah and sent to 
Congress in 1876: 
We ask to be relieved from the unjust and law-breaking officials forced 
upon us by the Government, and that we may have the jurisdiction of our 
own courts and the selection of our own officers, as we had in the past, 
when our cities were free from dram-shops, gambling-dens, and houses of 
infamy. As mothers and sisters, we earnestly appeal to you for help, that 
our sons may be saved from drunkenness and vice and our daughters from 
the power of the seducer . . . . 
H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 42, 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1876).  
Given this unfortunate historical experience with lack of effective prosecution, it is 
hardly surprising that the drafters of the Utah Constitution would be concerned about 
preventing such under-prosecution in the future.  Indeed, such concerns would have been 
shared not only by delegates to the Convention who were members of The Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints but also by those who were non-members (sometimes 
referred to as “Gentiles”).  In construing Utah’s Constitution, this Court should not 
overlook a period of religious reconciliation following the announcement of the 
Woodruff Manifesto in 1890 (effectively ending the practice of polygamy) and the 
consequent end of the anti-polygamy raids.  See generally Jean B. White, Prelude to 
Statehood: Coming Together in the 1890s, 62 UTAH HIST. Q. 300 (1994).  In drafting 
many provisions in Utah’s Constitution – such as the search and seizure provision – the 
drafters simply came together to adopt existing law from other jurisdictions.  See Cassell, 
1995 BYU L. REV. at 3-10.  But on other provisions, Utah’s unique experience would 
have led to specialized provisions – such as the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision. 
 36 
Particularly at the time when the Utah Constitutional Convention was meeting, the 
general view in the country was that the “state posed no threat to American legal order.  
Rather, the threat came from defendants—the dangerous classes, which included rural 
criminals, urban criminals, rural paupers, urban paupers, and tramps.  Accordingly, 
emphasis [in criminal justice] shifted . . . to the . . . theme of crime control.”  Lawrence 
Friedman, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice in the Late Nineteenth Century, 53 
ALBANY L. REV. 265, 271-72 (1989) (cleaned up).  Consistent with this focus on crime 
control came a movement away from making private prosecution the primary mode of 
prosecution.  As America became more populous and towns and cities began to grow in 
size, “[t]raditional notions of community responsibility for mutual welfare . . . vanished 
in the impersonality of large urban concentrations.” McDonald, supra, 13 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. at 666.  “In former times, law enforcement had relied greatly upon the ancient 
institution of the ‘hue and cry’ whereby victims called upon their fellow townsmen to 
assist in pursuing criminals.  However, this practice became unworkable as the growth of 
urban centers inhabited by increasingly mobile populations developed in response to 
commercial needs.”  Id. at 653; see also Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to 
Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal 
History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568 (1984); Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded 
Prosecutors in the Nineteenth Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43 (1995).   
Against this backdrop, an understanding emerges that the drafters of Utah’s 
Constitution – both members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and 
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Gentiles – sought to institute a system of public prosecution to most effectively control 
crime, while protecting victim-initiated prosecutions as an effective backstop for bringing 
criminals to justice when public prosecution failed.  The text of the provision clearly 
indicates this intent, although the records of the Utah Constitutional Convention do not 
appear to contain any specific discussion of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision.  
The Convention did, however, briefly discuss the role of public prosecutors and the 
financial support they would need to effectively prosecute criminals.  PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1028 (1896).  And at various points in the 
proceedings, there was allusion to far-flung counties in Utah, see id. at 1028-30, 1376-77, 
where more distant and less populated counties might lack the financial strength of more 
populous counties close to the State capitol.   
The text of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision thus reflects a need to 
ensure public-accountability and responsiveness to the needs of the local community – 
and to crime victims.  To control crime, a public prosecutor would be elected, as provided 
in art. VIII, § 10 itself.  The prosecutor would then have the first opportunity to prosecute 
a criminal.  But following any failure or refusal to prosecute, a crime victim could 
approach an (elected) district court judge, art. VIII, § 5, who could then appoint a 
prosecutor pro tempore to ensure that criminal cases were effectively pursued and thus 
that society and crime victims would be fully protected.8   
                                            
8  It appears that Utah has exported this court-appointed prosecutor language to at least 
one other state.  See Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 5 (“In all cases where the Attorney for any 
district fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according to law, the Court shall have 
power to appoint an Attorney pro tempore.”).  The provision does not appear to have 
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C.  From 1898 Through Much of the Twentieth Century, a 
Victim Had a Statutory Right to Seek to Initiate a Criminal 
Prosecution.   
In Utah, between the adoption of the Utah Constitution in 1895 and the early 
1980s, victims do not appear to have often used the Court-Appointed Prosecutor 
Provision (then contained in Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 10).  No mention of the 
provision is found published Utah appellate decisions, at least so far as a Westlaw search 
reveals.  But a partial explanation for the dearth of constitutional invocations may be the 
fact that, from the earliest days of statehood, the Legislature specifically protected a right 
of victim-initiated prosecution by statute.   
Some history:  After Utah’s admission as a state into the Union, it was necessary 
to generally revise Utah’s laws.9  To that end, the Governor was authorized to appoint, 
and did appoint, a commission to revise the laws of our newly recognized state.  The 
Code Commissioners undertook that revision, with the result that in January 1897, the 
Commissioners submitted to the Legislature a printed bill ready for enactment, that 
would take effect on January 1, 1898.  The Legislature approved the bill substantially as 
prepared. The new Utah Code contained within it a Code of Criminal Procedure.  See 
1898 Revised Statutes of Utah, Title 76, §§ 4406-5173.   
Significantly, Utah’s first Code of Criminal Procedure fully protected the right of 
a crime victim to seek directly judicial initiation of prosecution.  Title 76, §§ 4610-14 
                                                                                                                                             
generated much case law in that state.  See generally LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE 
STATE CONSTITUTION 124 (2011).   
9  All of the facts described in this paragraph are taken from the “Preface” to the 1898 
REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH (Lincoln, Neb., State Journal Co. 1897).   
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contained provisions governing the filing criminal complaints.  Section 4611 provided 
that “[e]very person who has reason to believe that a crime or public offense has been 
committed, must make complaint against such person before some magistrate having 
authority to make inquiry of the same.”  Id. at § 4611 (emphasis added).   Section 4612 
provided that the magistrate would then examine “complainant” regarding “his 
knowledge of the commission of the offense charged” as well as other witnesses.  Id. at § 
4612.  Thereafter, if based on the examination of witnesses the magistrate “was satisfied 
therefrom that the offense complained of has been committed[] and that there is 
reasonable ground to believe that the accused committed it,” the magistrate judge “must . 
. . issue a warrant for arrest.”  Id. at § 4615.  Following issuance of a warrant, a private 
person was empowered to make an arrest if the offense was a felony, id. at §§ 4635, 
4638, and peace officer was empowered to arrest for any offense, id. at § 4637.   
Following any arrest, the magistrate with jurisdiction over the matter would 
conduct a preliminary examination.  See id. at §§ 4657-87.  This was very much a 
judicially-driven procedure, as the magistrate judge who was required to “first read to the 
defendant the complaint and the depositions of the witnesses examined on making the 
complaint.”  Id. at § 4665.  At the conclusion of the examination, the magistrate judge 
was required to hold the defendant to answer if sufficient evidence supported the charge: 
“If . . . it appear from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and that 
there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate must 
indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him,” holding the defendant to answer.  Id. 
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at § 4675 (emphasis added).  To protect against a vindictive victim initiating an 
unfounded prosecution, the Code also provided that, if the defendant was not held to 
answer, and “if the magistrate finds that the prosecution was malicious or without 
probable cause, he shall enter such judgment on his docket and tax the costs against the 
complaining witness . . . .” Id. at § 4674.   
Because this whole process could be driven by a victim and a magistrate, the 
drafters of Utah’s first criminal procedure code then had to consider what a prosecutor 
was obligated to do after a defendant was held to answer on victim-initiated or other 
complaints.  The drafters decided that prosecutors would generally be duty-bound to file 
the charges, on penalty of contempt:  “When a defendant has been examined and 
committed as provided in this code, it shall be the duty of the county attorney, within 
thirty days thereafter, to file in the district court of the county in which the offense is 
triable, an information charging the defendant with the offense for which he is held to 
answer, or any other offense disclosed by the testimony . . . . If the county attorney fails 
to file the information within the time specified, he shall be deemed guilty of contempt, 
and may be prosecuted for neglect of duty as in other cases.”  Id. at § 4692.  The drafters 
did allow a prosecutor the option of not filing an information, but only where a 
prosecutor wrote a detailed statement of reasons for not filing such charges.  The judge 
would then review “such statement, together with the evidence filed in the case, and if 
upon such examination the court is not satisfied with such statement, the county attorney 
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must be directed and required by the court to file the proper information and bring the 
case to trial.”  Id. at § 4693.  
In sum, consistent with the thrust of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, 
the first Utah Code of Criminal Procedure in 1898 contained detailed procedures to 
ensure that victim-initiated prosecution was possible and that prosecutor discretion not to 
pursue criminal charges was subject to close judicial review.  It appears that these 
provisions remained in place for a significant part of the twentieth century.  Although we 
have not done an exhaustive survey of the subject, through at least 1943, the Utah Code 
of Criminal Procedure maintained verbatim many of the provisions just discussed.  See, 
e.g., Utah Code of 1943 at §105-11-2 (required “every person” with knowledge of crime 
to make complaint before a magistrate); § 105-17-1 & 2 (requiring prosecutor to file 
charges against preliminary examination and authorizing contempt action for failure to 
file charges). 
D.  The 1984 Amendment to Article I,  Section 16 Continued to 
Protect a Utah Constitutional Right for Victims to Seek a 
Court-Appointed Prosecutor. 
The victim’s constitutional right to seek a court-appointed prosecutor was 
reaffirmed by the citizens of Utah in 1984, when the constitutional provision was 
reenacted as part of a broader constitutional reassessment.  Perhaps a reason for retaining 
this constitutional provision was a change in the statutory provisions just described.  By 
1980, it appears that victims no longer had a clear statutory right to approach a judge to 
seek the filing of serious criminal charges.  Instead, as of 1980, the Utah Code of 
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Criminal Procedure provided that “Unless otherwise provided by law, no information 
may be filed charging the commission of any felony or class A misdemeanor unless 
authorized by a prosecuting attorney.”  Utah Code § 77-2-1 (enacted in 1980).   
Around the same time, however, the citizens of this state revisited the Court-
Appointed Prosecutor Provision – and specifically retained and reaffirmed the right of 
victims to seek such appointments.  This was done as part of a comprehensive review of 
the Utah Constitution’s judicial article, article VIII.  As one scholar explains, “By the 
early 1980s, it seemed that a thorough study of the [judicial] article was overdue, and the 
Constitutional Revision Commission took on the task.  The result was a complete 
revision of the article, which was approved by the Legislature and by the voters in 1984.  
This revision, which took effect in 1985, resulted in the repeal of ten sections that were 
considered outdated or unnecessary . . . . The objective of the 1984 revision was to create 
a modern, unified court system and an independent judiciary.”  BICKMORE, THE UTAH 
STATE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 113.  
With regard to the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, it resided in a section in 
article VIII that also contained language regarding the structure of public prosecuting 
offices.  During the redrafting of article VIII, considerable attention was paid to that 
language on prosecuting offices, as the consensus was that the language was “unduly 
restrictive and precluded the establishment of other prosecutorial structures such as 
district attorneys.” State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1996) (citing OFFICE OF 
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH AND GENERAL COUNSEL, REPORT OF THE UTAH 
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CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION 38 (Jan. 1984) (hereinafter “1984 CRC 
REPORT”).   
The revisers of the Judiciary Article do not appear, however, to have had any 
doubt about retaining the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision.  The only direct history 
we have been able to locate is from the Constitutional Revision Commission, which 
specifically recommended language for the section that would “retain[] the [judicial] 
authority to appoint prosecutors pro tempore, but clarif[y] that the supreme court is to be 
the appointing authority.”  1984 CRC REPORT, supra, at 38.  The result was that the 
citizens of this State approved the court-appointed prosecutor language that currently 
appears in Utah’s Constitution, moved from article VIII, § 10 to article VIII, § 16: 
Article VIII, Section 16.  [Public prosecutors.]   The Legislature shall 
provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall have primary 
responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of 
the State of Utah and shall perform such other duties as may be provided by 
statute. Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by statute, 
and shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. If a public prosecutor fails 
or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint 
a prosecutor pro tempore. 
Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16 (emphases added) (approved by the voters in the 1984 general 
election). 
Several things are noteworthy about this language.  First, in 1984 the voters 
specifically decided that public prosecutors would have only the “primary” responsibility 
– not exclusive responsibility – for criminal prosecutions.  This new language (not 
contained in Utah’s constitution as originally drafted) validates the importance of court-
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appointed prosecutors as a backstop against failures by the “primary” mode of 
prosecution – i.e., public prosecutors.   
Second, the new language broadened the grounds for appointing a prosecutor.  
While the original language authorized court appointment of a prosecutor when a public 
prosecutor “fail[ed] or refuse[d] to attend and prosecute according to law”, Utah Const., 
art. VIII, § 10 (1896) (emphasis added), the new amendment deleted that language of 
limitation – i.e., it was no longer a requirement that a prosecutor had failed or refused to 
prosecute “according to law,” but only that the simple fact of a failure or refusal to 
prosecute existed.    
Third, the new language clarified that the Judiciary (specifically this Court) had 
the power to appoint a “prosecutor pro tempore.”  Previously, the judiciary could appoint 
“an attorney pro tempore.” 
The Legislature designed these and other changes to enhance the prosecution of 
dangerous criminals.  For example, Senator Haven J. Barlow, opining on the changes in 
the 1984 Amendment, stated that “[T]he judicial system in the state of Utah has been 
sensitive to what I think the people have tried to tell them and that is ‘let’s be a little bit 
tougher on the criminals.’ And that has come through.”  RECORDING OF SPEC. SESS. 
DISCUSSION OF SUBSTITUTE SJR 1, HELD BY THE SENATE OFFICE OF THE UTAH 
LEGISLATURE (March 26, 1984).  In addition, Senator Jack M. Bangerter argued that the 
changes were important to provide for swift punishment of criminals:   
The reason that the criminals are making such a mockery out of the justice 
system is because we are continually changing the laws and destroying the 
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precedents upon which justice is based . . . . I plead with you my colleagues 
that we cooperate more with the judges and the judicial system and let the 
criminals among us know that we are going to stop this process and make it 
so the law is the same today as it was yesterday and will be the same 
tomorrow . . . punishment would be swift and once again crime would not 
pay. 
Id.  Thus, one of the underlying goals of the 1984 amendment was to ensure swift and 
certain prosecution of criminals.   
III.  This Court Should Use Its Power under the Court-Appointed 
Prosecutor Provision When a Public Prosecutor Fails or Refuses 
to Prosecute a Criminal Charge that is Clearly Supported by 
Probable Cause and Where Nothing Indicates that the 
Appointment Would Be Contrary to the Public Interest.  
While the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision clearly creates the ability for this 
Court to appoint a prosecutor, the issue remains as to what a victim needs to offer to this 
Court to justify the exercise of such authority.  Read in context, the provision requires a 
crime victim (or other petitioner) seeking Supreme Court appointment of a prosecutor to 
prove three things – and only three things: (1) that the public prosecutor has failed or 
refused to prosecute criminal charges for a crime committed against her; (2) that the 
filing of criminal charges is supported by a clear showing of probable cause; and (3) that 
the appointment of a prosecutor is not contrary to the interests of justice.   We explain 
each of these three requirements in the following sections. 
A.  The Only Textual Requirement for Appointment of a 
Prosecutor Under Article VIII, Section 16 is a Showing that 
a Public Prosecutor Has Failed or Refused to Prosecute. 
Utah’s Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision is part of a three-sentence section of 
the judicial article of the Constitution (section 16), which is designed to establish a 
system for prosecuting crimes in which public prosecutors were the “primary” – but not 
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the exclusive – means for doing so.  Looking at the three sentences together, it becomes 
clear that the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision must be understood as the 
counterweight to the “primary” system of public prosecution.  The way in which that 
counterweight springs into action is through Supreme Court appointment of a “prosecutor 
pro tempore” – i.e., a court-appointed prosecutor.   
This understanding is supported by the provision’s “history and purpose.”  
American Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 24.   The language allowing judicial appointment of a 
prosecutor was adopted as part of Utah’s Constitution in 1895, following experience in 
the Utah territory with significant under-prosecution.  See Part II.B, supra.  It was 
adopted at a time when private prosecution was still widely available in America, if 
somewhat less often used.  See Parts II.A & II.B, supra.  Utah’s voters carried forward 
court-appointed prosecution in 1984, when they amended the State’s judicial article – but 
specifically retained (and even modestly expanded) the Court-Appointed Prosecutor 
Provision.  See Part II.D., supra.    
This Court has previously interpreted article VIII, § 16 consistently with this 
understanding.  In State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 889 (Utah 1996), this Court considered a 
challenge to the constitutionality of unelected city attorneys pursuing criminal charges.  
This Court began by noting that article VIII, § 16 specifically refers to “public 
prosecutors” as elected officials, id. at 890, and city attorneys are not elected officials.  
This Court nonetheless refused to block prosecutions by city attorneys, explaining that 
“article VIII, section 16 confers only ‘primary,’ not ‘exclusive,’ responsibility on elected 
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public prosecutors for the ‘prosecution of criminal actions.’”  Id. at 891.   The Court thus 
concluded that an “implicit residual or nonprimary responsibility” remained for 
prosecution outside of publicly elected prosecutors, which the city attorneys could 
exercise. Id. at 893.   
This Court also explained that “by specifically designating this Court as the entity 
empowered to appoint a prosecutor pro tem[pore] when a public prosecutor is delinquent 
in performing his or her obligation to file a criminal action, the text of article VIII, 
section 16 evinces more concern with a failure to exercise prosecutorial powers than with 
their abuse.”  Id. at 892 n.6 (emphasis added). 
While this Court in Robertson clearly held that the public prosecutors are not the 
exclusive mode of criminal prosecution, it did not have occasion to explore the breadth of 
the last sentence in article VIII, section 16 – the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision.  
This Court has since made clear, however, that it is unnecessary for any particular public 
prosecutor to pursue a criminal prosecution.  In Salt Lake City v. Peterson, 2010 UT 64, 
245 P.3d 197, this Court explained that “it was not necessary for the Salt Lake City 
Prosecutor to take this case in order for any prosecution to occur,” and noted (among 
various ways for the problem of non-prosecution to be addressed) that “article VIII, 
section 16 of the Utah Constitution states that ‘[i]f a public prosecutor fails or refuses to 
prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have the power to appoint a prosecutor pro 
tempore.’”  Id. at ¶ 11, n.4. 
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The only textual prerequisite in the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision for 
appointment of such a prosecutor is a “fail[ure] or refus[al]” to prosecute. While this may 
seem like a straightforward requirement, it is worth considering what this phrase was 
intended to require.  These two alternative grounds for court-appointed prosecution 
presume that a criminal case has been presented to the prosecutor for consideration, as 
only thereafter could some sort of “failure” or “refusal” to prosecute occur.  But other 
than a showing of a failure or refusal to prosecute, the text of the Court-Appointed 
Prosecutor Provision contains no limitations on the judiciary’s power to appoint a 
prosecutor.10   
A showing that a prosecutor has failed or refused to prosecute also obviates the 
need for a crime victim to resort to another vehicle might be able to use to secure a 
prosecution: the summoning of a grand jury.  The essentially theoretical possibility of a 
grand jury indictment does not preclude a victim using the Court-Appointed Prosecutor 
Provision. 
Utah Constitution, article I, § 13, provides that the Legislature shall have power to 
prescribe “[t]he formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof . . . .”  This 
Court recently reviewed the origins of the grand jury provision.  This Court explained 
that the provision was drafted against the backdrop of the nineteenth century view that 
grand jury investigations were “costly, slow, amateur, and prone to error . . . .”  State v. 
                                            
10  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, in 1984, the voters specifically struck the earlier 
requirement that the appointment could only take place when a public prosecutor 
“fail[ed] or refuse[d] to attend and prosecute according to law.”   Utah Const. of 1896, 
art. VIII, § 10 (amended in 1984 and moved to art. VIII, § 16).  
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Christiansen, 2015 UT 74, ¶ 17, 365 P.3d 1189.  As a result, “our constitution’s framers . 
. . distrusted grand juries and allowed them to be appointed only in unusual 
circumstances.”  Id. at 74, ¶ 46.   
Given this historical distrust of grand juries, only judges could summon grand 
juries when Utah became a state.  See 1898 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure § 4696 (“A 
grand jury shall be drawn or summoned only when, in the opinion of the judge of the 
district court of the county, public interest demands it”).   In fact, “[u]ntil 1990, no statute 
gave prosecutors the right even to request a grand jury . . . .”  State v. Christiansen, 2015 
UT 74, ¶ 36, 365 P.3d 1189, 1196.   
Pursuant to its constitutional power in art. I, § 13, today the Legislature has 
provided for summoning a grand jury in certain limited circumstances.  See Utah Code § 
77-10a-2.  A victim of a crime could theoretically seek to use those procedures to seek 
the formation of a grand jury and, ultimately, a criminal prosecution of a crime.  See Utah 
Code § 77-10a-2(1)(a) (a panel of judges will “hear in secret all persons claim to have 
information that would justify the calling of a grand jury”).  The focus of those 
procedures, however, appears to be securing an investigation of an alleged crime.  See 
Utah Code § 77-10a-3(2)(b) (panel of judges supervising grand jury may “refer a matter 
to the attorney general, county attorney, district attorney, or city attorney for investigation 
and prosecution” (emphasis added)); § 77-10a-10(1) & (2) (noting grand jury’s “duty to 
inquire into offenses” and ability to obtain “documents or other evidence”).  Indeed, 
under these procedures, a judges panel considering whether to summon a grand jury can, 
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instead, refer a matter to a district attorney, presumably for investigation.  Utah Code § 
77-10a-3(1)(b).  Thus, the existing grand jury procedures do not appear to be directed at 
circumstances such as this one, where a district attorney has previously investigated a 
crime through law enforcement agencies and declined to prosecute.   
Even more problematic, the current grand jury procedures do not even require the 
summoning of a grand jury when good cause exists.  See Christiansen, 2015 UT 74, ¶ 38 
(panel of judges “hearing a private citizen's request may decline to summon a grand jury 
even if good cause exists” (citing Utah Code § 77–10a–2(2))).  In fact, it is hard to 
understand how a victim could trigger the summoning of a grand jury, as a prerequisite is 
a judicial finding that a grand jury is “necessary.”  Utah Code § 77-10a-2(2)(a).  Given 
the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, it appears that it would not be “necessary” to 
summon a grand jury until after a victim had first sought court appointment of a 
prosecutor.11 
Also, from a policy perspective, using grand juries in sexual assault cases such as 
these could lead to further traumatization of the victims.  Under the grand jury 
procedures, a person seeking the filing of charges “shall be placed under oath and 
examined by the judges conducting the hearings.”  Utah Code § 77-10a-3(1)(c).  It is 
                                            
11  Similarly inapposite to this case is a provision in the grand jury procedures authorizing 
appointment of a “special prosecutor” to conduct the grand jury proceedings.  Utah Code 
§ 77-10a-12(2).  For reasons explained above, grand jury proceedings do not appear to be 
needed to investigate the Jane Does’ cases.  And, in any event, appointment of a special 
prosecutor is only permitted under this provision where the supervising judge makes a 
written finding that a conflict of interest exists for other prosecuting agencies, including 
the Utah Attorney General’s Office.  As we discuss in Part IX, infra, the Utah Attorney 
General’s Office does not have a conflict of interest in handling these cases and, indeed, 
may be well situated to do so.   
 51 
unclear whether crime victims would be required to testify under oath to avail themselves 
of the grand jury provisions.12  But if victims were required to testify, this could lead to 
“secondary victimization” from an additional court appearance that should not be 
required to obtain the filing of charges.  See DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL, 
MARGARET GARVIN & STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25 (4th ed. 
2018) (discussing the fact that avoiding “secondary victimization” is a fundamental 
purpose of crime victims’ rights enactments).  
 In any event, this Court should conclude that the existence of the statutory 
possibility for a crime victim to approach the grand jury does not preclude their protected 
constitutional right to pursue this petition.  Given the historical distrust of and significant 
limitations placed on grand juries – not to mention the concomitant time, expense, and 
delay associated appointment of a grand jury of between nine to fifteen members to 
investigate and evaluate a case, see Utah Code § 77-10a-4(1) – a victim’s right to seek a 
prosecutor pro tempore should not be contingent on first seeking the summoning of a 
grand jury. 
If, despite the foregoing arguments, the Court nonetheless concludes that a 
prerequisite to seeking relief under art. VIII, § 16 is the need to first seek the summoning 
                                            
12  In the next sentence, the procedures indicate that “[h]earsay evidence may be 
presented at the hearings only under the same provisions and limitations that apply to 
preliminary hearings.”  Utah Code § 77-10a-3(1)(c).  The issue of whether sexual assault 
victims have to testify at preliminary hearings has recently been the subject of 
(inconclusive) litigation before this Court.  See State v. Hernandez, --P.3d---, 2018 WL 
3865317.  The Jane Does in this petition adopt the position of Amici R.A., Utah Crime 
Victims Legal Clinic, and National Crime Victim Law Institute, who argued that victims 
need not testify at a preliminary hearing.  But the issue has not been definitively resolved 
at this point.   
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of a grand jury investigation, then the Jane Does would respectfully request an 
opportunity to do so.   
B.  Article VIII, Section 16 Contains an Implicit Probable 
Cause Requirement for the Court to Appoint a Prosecutor. 
While failure or refusal to prosecute is the only textual requirement contained in 
the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, one other requirement is implicit.  It would 
make no sense for the judiciary to go to the trouble of authorizing a private prosecution in 
circumstances where the prosecution would be a nullity.  From the earliest days of the 
Utah Constitution, for a prosecution to move forward in the criminal justice system, 
probable cause must exist that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed 
it.  See, e.g., State v. Spencer, 15 Utah 149, 49 P. 302, 304 (Utah 1897) (noting the 
“probable cause” requirement for prosecution).  In light of this fact, an implicit 
requirement of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision is the existence of probable 
cause for a prosecution.   
Traditionally, the probable cause requirement has been a prerequisite to private 
prosecution.  Thus, shortly before the Utah Constitution was drafted, Supreme Court 
Justice Bradley explained that “every man in the community, if he has probable cause for 
prosecuting another, has a perfect right, by law, to institute such prosecution, subject 
only, in the case of private prosecutions, to the penalty of paying the costs if he fails in 
his suit.”  Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 198 (1879) (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
A probable cause requirement is also consistent with the assumption that a court-
appointed prosecutor would have to follow rules of legal ethics, which are applicable to 
 53 
prosecutors.  The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct indicate that a prosecutor has a 
“special responsibility” to “[r]efrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows 
is not supported by probable cause.”  Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.8(a).  
The Utah Constitution also assumes that such a “probable cause” determination 
lies within judicial competence.  Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution of 1896 provides 
that no warrants shall issue “but upon probable cause.”  This probable cause requirement 
calls on judges to assess the merits of collecting evidence in support of filing a criminal 
charge.  Even more directly, article I, § 13 of the Utah Constitution of 1896 allows 
criminal cases to move forward “by information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate.”  The magistrate, of course, would be making a probable cause assessment 
about the underlying strength of the criminal case.  The same determination accordingly 
lies within the competence of this Court, as acknowledged within the Constitution itself, 
when a victim presents a petition seeking a court-appointed prosecutor.  Cf. Brant v. 
McSoley, 260 A.2d 443 (R.I. 1970) (sustaining a lower court’s finding of lack of probable 
cause for a victim-initiated prosecution).  
This probable cause requirement is one of many clear checks on any abuse of the 
Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision.  Of course, a probable cause determination 
automatically screens out any unfounded and merely mischievous complaints.  See State 
v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶ 20, 137 P.3d 787, 792 (the “fundamental purpose” served by a 
probable cause determination “is the ferreting out of groundless and improvident 
prosecutions.”)  Indeed, whenever this Court deploys article VIII, § 16, a defendant will 
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be doubly protected against “groundless and improvident” prosecutions, since after the 
appointment of a prosecutor, a defendant would be constitutionally entitled to a 
preliminary examination to review the specific charges filed.  See Utah Const., article I, § 
13.  As an additional safeguard, the defendant obviously must ultimately be proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial before suffering any punishment.  And if at any point 
in the process the victim makes a false statement about the crime, the victim herself can 
be prosecuted criminally for such an offense.  See Utah Code §§ 76-8-501 to 503 (making 
a false statement during trial a second-degree felony and a false statement to mislead a 
public official a misdemeanor).  The victim is also subject to a civil action for malicious 
prosecution.  See, e.g., Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991) 
(approving malicious prosecution action against alleged victim of crime who falsely 
instituted criminal prosecution).  As a result, “while there is the possibility of frivolous 
suits and vindictive behavior by some complainants [who initiate a prosecution], abuses 
are checked and deterred by the court’s discretion and by the various other remedies 
available for malicious prosecution.”  State of New Jersey v. Kinder, 701 F. Supp. 486, 
492 (D.N.J. 1988). 
On top of all these safeguards, this Court recognized another protection against 
abusive prosecutions in Robertson.  In that case, a defendant had raised “the specter of 
‘unaccountable’ city attorneys harassing the citizenry and abusing their discretion by 
filing unfounded or poorly considered charges.”  924 P.2d at 892 n.6.  The Court of 
Appeals had addressed such concerns by, among other things, noting “that the attorney 
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general retains common law authority to intervene in any case involving the prosecution 
of a state criminal statute.”  Id. (citing State v. Robertson, 886 P.2d 85, 90-91 (Utah App. 
1994)).  This Court stated that “[a]lthough we do not address that portion of the Court of 
Appeals’ opinion, we do note that as a general matter we have previously held that the 
attorney general retains common law powers of the type described by the Court of 
Appeals.  924 P.2d at 892 n.6 (citing Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 652 P.2d 
1332, 1337 (Utah 1982); State v. Jiminez, 588 P.2d 707, 708–09 (Utah 1978); Hansen v. 
Barlow, 456 P.2d 177, 178–80 (Utah 1969)).  The ability of the Attorney General to 
intervene provides yet another safeguard against the speculative possibility of an abusive 
court-appointed prosecutor. 
Finally, in this petition, the Jane Does present not marginal cases of probable 
cause, but rather very clear cases of probable cause.  Presumably this will be the situation 
with other victims who go to the time and trouble of petitioning this Court seeking 
appointment of a prosecutor – and the expenditure of judicial time and energy evaluating 
such petitions can be mostly easily justified in such circumstances.  Accordingly, the 
Court may wish to interpret the probable cause requirement for seeking appointment of a 
prosecutor to be not simply the bare-bones minimum showing of probable cause, but 
rather a clear showing of probable cause. 
C.  The Court Can Consider Interests of Justice Under Article 
VIII, Section 16 in Appointing a Prosecutor. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision does not 
require this Court to appoint a prosecutor in every single case in which prosecution has 
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been refused and clear probable cause exists.  The ultimate safeguard against abusive 
prosecution is this Court.  The Provision is written so that this Court has “the power” to 
appoint a private prosecutor.  But the question naturally arises of when, following a 
properly presented petition, the Court should exercise its power to appoint a prosecutor. 
A partial answer to this question can be immediately derived from the text of 
article VIII, § 16 itself.  As currently drafted, the provision indicates that the Legislature 
“shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility 
for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of Utah . . . .” 
Utah Const., art. I, § 16 (italicized language added via 1984 amendment).  Thus, the 
standards that the Court employs for evaluating (for example) victim-initiated petitions 
for prosecution should not be so demanding as to turn public prosecutors from the 
constitutionally-envisioned “primary” mode of proceeding in criminal cases to the 
exclusive mode.   As this Court has explained, rejecting a challenge to unelected city 
prosecutors bringing criminal charges, “article VIII, section 16 confers only ‘primary,’ 
not ‘exclusive,’ responsibility on elected public prosecutors for the ‘prosecution of 
criminal actions.’ It follows that a residuum of prosecutorial power exists . . .” outside the 
realm of public prosecutors.  State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1996).   
The obvious – although somewhat open-ended – answer to the question of when 
this Court should appoint a prosecutor is that the Court should do so when it is in the 
interests of justice.  The appellate courts of this state have applied an interest of justice 
standard hundreds of times.  See, e.g., Westlaw search (“interest +2 justice” in Utah state 
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database producing hundreds of results).  For example, this Court has familiarity in 
applying an interest of justice standard in the context of Rule 65B petitions.  See, e.g., 
Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ¶ 14, 123 P.3d 400.   And the Court’s own Rule 24(a) 
authorizes trial courts to grant a new trial “in the interest of justice if there is any error or 
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.”  Utah R. 
Crim. P. 24(a).  Similar standards exist in civil cases.  See, e.g., Watson v. Watson, 561 
P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1977) (noting trial court power to reopen divorce proceedings to 
the extent it is “necessary and desirable in the interests of justice”).   
The judiciary is also familiar with applying an interests of justice standard in 
circumstances analogous to those presented here.  As one specific example, the flipside 
of the power to initiate a criminal prosecution is the power to terminate a criminal 
prosecution.  This Court has promulgated its own rule of criminal procedure – Rule 25 – 
allowing district courts, on their own initiative, to dismiss criminal charges upon a 
showing of “substantial cause and in the furtherance of justice.”  Utah R. Crim. P. 25(a) 
(emphasis added).  Just as courts in this State can reject charges when doing so promotes 
justice, upon the filing of a proper petition and a showing of clear probable cause, the 
judiciary should authorize the filing of criminal charges when doing so is in furtherance 
of justice.  Cf.  People v. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131, 142 (Cal. 2013) (reading judicial power 
to dismiss in “furtherance of justice” broadly). 
The interests of justice are served whenever a prosecution is “fair and right.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 96 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “interests of justice”). This 
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broad and flexible standard gives the Court this ability to assess the broad array of issues 
that will arise when petitions are filed seeking appointment of a prosecutor.  For example, 
relevant and important issues of under-prosecution of rapes committed against women 
(discussed in Part VII.C, infra), possible conflicts of interest when prosecutions of 
government officials are considered (discussed in Part VI.C, infra), and discriminatory 
treatment of rape victims who are examined by one particular nursing agency (discussed 
in Part VII.J, infra) all fit comfortably within an interests-of-justice determination.   
Overarching any individualized consideration, this Court should weigh in the 
balance the fact that “the enforcement of a state’s criminal code constitutes a clear and 
substantial public policy.”  Fox v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1997) 
(citing Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 166 (Utah 1991)).  In this case, for 
example, prosecution of sexual violence serves to provide redress to women and other 
groups who are disproportionately harmed by such violence.  Appointment by the court 
of a prosecutor to pursue well-founded criminal charges will, in the absence of any 
contrary evidence, be itself in the interests of justice.   
D.  The Victims’ Rights Amendment, Utah Const.,  art.  I,  § 28, 
Supports Interpreting the Court-Appointed Prosecutor 
Provision to Allow Prosecutions that Promote Fairness to 
the Victim. 
The interpretation of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision just offered is 
fully supported by another important – and more-recently adopted – section in the Utah 
Constitution: The Utah Victims’ Rights Amendment.  In 1994, the Legislature proposed 
and Utah’s citizens approved an amendment extending state constitutional protections to 
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crime victims throughout the criminal justice process.  See generally Paul G. Cassell, 
Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights 
Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373.13  Among the rights extended to crime victims by 
the amendment was the right “[t]o be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity . . . 
throughout the criminal justice process.”  Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1)(a).  This provision 
“effects a fundamental change in the criminal justice system. Instead of adopting a two-
party, State v. Defendant, paradigm, this provision requires that the system consider 
interests of third parties, specifically crime victims. Unfair practices that deny crime 
victims respect or dignity are unconstitutional under the Amendment.”  Cassell, supra, 
1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1387.   
While the Victims’ Rights Amendment does not specifically discuss court-
appointed prosecutors, the Amendment extends victims’ rights “throughout the criminal 
justice process.”  Utah Const., art. I, § 28(a)(1).  And the opening words of the 
Amendment extend rights to victims in order to “preserve and protect victims’ rights to 
justice and due process . . . .”  Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1).  Moreover, the Legislature, as 
part of its constitutional right to enforce and implement the Amendment, see Utah Const., 
art. I, § 28(4), directed that the provisions should be construed “to assist the victims of 
crime.”  Utah Code § 77-38-12(1); see also Cassell, supra, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1422 
n.252 (discussing this provision). 
                                            
13  This law review article was reviewed by Senate sponsor Craig A. Peterson and House 
sponsor R. Lee Ellertson and endorsed as a statement of the drafters’ intentions.  1994 
UTAH L. REV. at 1393 n.*.   
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Evaluating the Victims’ Rights Amendment and supporting legislation, this Court 
has held that “Utah law now recognizes that victims have fared poorly in the criminal 
justice system and that they are to be more involved in the process of punishing the acts 
of which they became unwilling participants.”  State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 16, 63 
P.3d 56, 60.  In light of these constitutional and statutory provisions, it would be 
inappropriate – indeed, unconstitutional – for the Court not to appoint a prosecutor when 
a crime victim makes the appropriate showings, including a showing that appointment is 
in the interests of justice.  Nothing could be further from treating a crime victim with 
“fairness” and “justice and due process” than to deny appointment of prosecutor when the 
interests of justice demand doing so.  Accordingly, Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment 
fully supports the interpretation of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision offered 
here. 
* * * 
To briefly recapitulate, for all the reasons just explained, a crime victim seeking 
appointment of a prosecutor under article VIII, § 16, should be required to demonstrate 
three – and only – three things: 
(1) The appropriate public prosecutor has failed or refused to pursue criminal 
charges that have been presented to the prosecutor; 
(2) The criminal charges are supported by clear probable cause; and 
(3) The filing of the criminal charges is in the interests of justice. 
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IV.  Under Article VIII, Section 16, This Court Should Evaluate 
Whether to Appoint a Prosecutor Based on Merits of the 
Proposed Prosecution Rather than Evaluating the Previous 
Declination of the Public Prosecutor. 
The interpretation of article VIII, section 16 just offered is based on a detailed 
review of the text of the provision, as well as the historical evidence of the framers’ intent 
and related context.  See American Bush, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 10, 140 P.3d 1235 (highlighting 
all these factors as important considerations in interpreting state constitutional 
provisions).  But the Jane Does acknowledge that their interpretation might be regarded 
as somewhat different than that provided in this Court’s brief memorandum order in In re 
Request for Appointment of Special Prosecutor by Eric Hunting, No. 960558, 939 P.2d 
177 (Mem.) (1997) (hereinafter “In re Hunting”).  The memorandum order in In re 
Hunting seems to have read the required showing for court appointment of a prosecutor 
as some sort of proof of an abuse of discretion by the public prosecutor.  This Part 
demonstrates that the memorandum order is not binding in this case – or, if binding, 
should be reconsidered based on full briefing and argument.  This Section then explains 
why article VIII, section 16 does not employ an abuse of discretion standard, which 
would require this Court to intrusively focus on why the public prosecutor made the 
decision not to prosecute.  Instead, the focus should be on the underlying merits of the 
petition presented to this Court.   
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A.  This Court’s Memorandum Order in In re Hunting  
Mentioning an Abuse of Discretion Standard is Not 
Controlling Precedent on this Issue. 
Perhaps the only decision by this Court to involve a petition for appointment of a 
prosecutor under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16, is its memorandum order In re Hunting, No. 
960558, 939 P.2d 177 (Mem.) (1997).14  The terse memorandum order, only two 
paragraphs long, simply concluded that petitioner Eric Hunting had “not met his burden 
of demonstrating that the Vernal City prosecutor has acted outside the legitimate scope of 
the discretion conferred upon a prosecutor.”  Id. (citing State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 and 
finding no abuse of discretion).  
The In re Hunting memorandum order and its reference to an abuse of discretion 
standard should not be regarded as precedential.  The issue of whether an abuse of 
discretion standard applies to the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision was never 
briefed and argued to this Court, but rather was simply assumed. As described in the terse 
published reports from this Court on the case, Mr. Hunting filed a “request” with the 
Court for appointment of a prosecutor to pursue alleged failures of the Vernal City 
prosecutor to pursue criminal violations by the Vernal City Chief of Police.  In re Request 
for Appointment of Special Prosecutor by Eric Hunting, No. 960558, 930 P.2d 904 
(Mem.) (1997).  Records in the State archives reveal that the request was a very brief 
letter, written by a non-attorney, Eric Hunting.  [App. at 213.]  Without citing any legal 
authority other than article VIII, section 16 of the Utah Constitution, Mr. Hunting 
                                            
14  The designation of the opinion as “Mem” – i.e., “memorandum” – appears in the 
Westlaw version of the case.  In 1997, it appears that the official reports of Utah Supreme 
Court decisions were via Westlaw’s Pacific Reporter system.   
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summarily requested appointment of a prosecutor to prosecute a Vernal City police 
officer for the purported crime of not having on file the required oath of office.  [App. at 
213.]  Curiously, attached to his letter was correspondence from the Vernal County 
Attorney stating that the Chief of Police did, indeed, have the required oath of office on 
file.  [App. at 214-15.]   
In response to that fleeting request, this Court ultimately entered a one-paragraph 
order stating that “[a]s one requesting the appointment, Mr. Hunting has the burden of 
demonstrating that the failure or refusal of the Vernal City prosecutor to prosecute 
constitutes an action outside the legitimate scope of the prosecutor’s discretion.” 930 P.2d 
904 (Mem.) (1997) (citing Mohi).  The Court then gave Hunting an opportunity to “file 
any additional materials he thinks necessary to persuade the court that he has met this 
burden.”  Id.  The Court’s brief order concluded by stating: “The court will take the 
matter under consideration, presumptively without oral argument.”  Id. 
As is readily apparent, in entering that order, the Court essentially assumed that an 
abuse of discretion standard was applicable to petitions under art. VIII, § 16.  It does not 
appear to have received any briefing on the issue – simply a short letter from a pro se 
litigant.  Nor did the Court give interested parties (such as the Utah Council on Victims 
of Crime) any opportunity to seek to participate in the case, via amicus briefing or 
otherwise, on what was an important state constitutional issue of first impression.   
Indeed, the Court never received any briefing on the state constitutional law 
issues.  Cf. State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 65, 353 P.3d 55 (“As a general rule, we 
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decline to rule or opine on [state constitutional law] issues that are not briefed by the 
parties.”); State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 18, 164 P.3d 397, 405 (“Inadequate briefing 
denies our fledgling state constitutional analysis the full benefit of the interested parties’ 
thoughts on these important issues.”).  Vernal City filed a response to Hunting’s request, 
but it did not discuss the meaning of article VIII, § 16.  [App. at 220-27.]  Instead, Vernal 
City argued that it had made a decision within its discretion (as this Court’s earlier order 
suggested) – specifically a non-prosecution decision that was obviously correct because 
the officer in question had, indeed, taken his oath of office.   
Shortly thereafter, the Court entered its memorandum order, denying the petition.  
Perhaps the reason for disposing of the petition so rapidly was that this Court perceived a 
lack of merit – indeed, frivolity – in the claims being raised.  But in any event, given the 
way the case unfolded, all that it produced was the short memorandum order concluding 
Mr. Hunting had not carried his burden of persuasion. 
This Court has previously explained that “[m]emorandum decisions are intended 
to address cases which do not present novel issues of law on appeal, with reference to 
well-established precedent arising either from case law or from unambiguous statutory 
language.”  State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ¶ 27, 147 P.3d 448 (noting that because such 
decisions “apply the law but do not develop it and therefore are of interest only to those 
with a stake in the outcome”); accord Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, ¶ 7, 44 P.3d 
734 (“Memorandum decisions are . . . intended to be of use only to the lower tribunal 
whose work is the subject of the appeal, and to the litigants and parties in the case.”).   
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As perhaps the first decision to interpret this important constitutional provision, 
this Court does not appear to have intended for its two-paragraph order in Hunting to 
settle important constitutional questions of crime victims’ rights.  Accordingly, Hunting 
should not be regarded as controlling here.   
B.  If In re Hunting is Precedential,  It Should Now be 
Reconsidered Based on Full Briefing and Argument. 
If the Court believes that the brief memorandum order in Hunting has precedential 
force, then at a minimum, the Court should reconsider the issue of how to interpret article 
VIII, § 16 and whether it incorporates an abuse of discretion standard.  This Court has 
made clear that “[stare decisis] is neither mechanical nor rigid as it relates to courts of last 
resort.”  Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553, 557.  This Court has 
“identified two broad factors that distinguish between weighty precedents and less 
weighty ones: (1) the persuasiveness of the authority and reasoning on which the 
precedent was originally based, and (2) how firmly the precedent has become established 
in the law since it was handed down.”  Id.  Analyzing these two factors makes clear that 
Hunting is, to put it mildly, not a “weighty” decision. 
Turning to the persuasiveness of In re Hunting’s reasoning, the only reason that 
the memorandum decision offered for reading an abuse of discretion standard into the 
Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision was a citation to State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 
(Utah 1995).  Hunting failed to include a pin-point, page reference for its citation to 
Mohi.  Notably, in Mohi, the Court did not even cite article VIII, § 16, much less discuss 
how the provision should be interpreted.  To be sure, while analyzing the issues at play in 
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that case (the constitutionality of a “direct-file” statute authorizing prosecutors to directly 
file certain serious adult criminal charges against juveniles), Mohi did briefly discuss 
“traditional prosecutor discretion.”  Id. at 1002-03.   But that terse analysis hardly sheds 
light on how a state constitutional provision obviously designed to address prosecutorial 
failures or refusals to file charges should be interpreted.   
The second factor – how firmly rooted a decision has become – also counsels 
against giving In re Hunting any weight. So far as we can tell, the Hunting order has 
never been cited in another court opinion.  As explained above, Hunting is inconsistent 
with a proper understanding of the original meaning of article VIII, § 16 (and its 
predecessor article VIII, § 10).  Reconsidering Hunting’s abuse-of-discretion language, 
after full briefing and argument, will not create any “injustice or hardship.”  Eldridge v. 
Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 22, 345 P.3d 553, 557.  Here, the Court’s reconsideration 
would place the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision within the strong tradition of 
victim-initiated prosecution and thus establish that In re Hunting is not only “erroneous” 
but also that “more good than harm will come by departing from [the] precedent.” State 
v. Mauchley, 2003 UT 10, ¶ 11, 67 P.3d 477, 481 (Utah 2003). 
C.  Article VIII, Section 16 Does Not Require Judicial 
Evaluation of the Merits of Adequacy of a Prosecutor’s 
Declination Decision. 
On the merits of the issue, in suggesting that Utah’s Court-Appointed Prosecutor 
Provision creates an abuse-of-discretion standard, the In re Hunting order was simply 
wrong.  Under the Provision, the Court’s decision whether to appoint a prosecution rest 
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on the merits of that petition – not evaluation of the reasons for a prosecutor’s inaction.  
This conclusion follows naturally from the text of the provision, its underlying history, 
and the unworkability of an abuse-of-discretion standard. 
For starters, the text of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision does not even 
hint at an abuse of discretion standard.  As initially adopted in 1896, the provision gave 
district courts the “power to appoint an attorney pro tempore” in “all cases where the 
attorney for any county . . . fails or refuses to attend and prosecute according to law.”  
Utah Constitution of 1896, art. VIII, § 10 (emphasis added).  An abuse of discretion 
standard makes no sense in interpreting this language.  For example, it is obvious that a 
county prosecutor could “fail to attend and prosecute” a court hearing for any number of 
reasons – including death, illness, inability to travel to the court, scheduling difficulties, 
etc.  Indeed, in 1896, lacking modern communication devices and expansive road 
networks, situations where a prosecutor might have been unavailable for perfectly 
legitimate reasons are easy to imagine.  In such cases where a prosecutor was absent, it 
could hardly be said that the prosecutor abused his discretion by failing to attend and 
prosecute – but Utah’s constitutional drafters wanted to ensure that the prosecution would 
not be blocked by the prosecutor’s absence.  Accordingly, the drafters specifically 
authorized court appointment of a “prosecutor pro tempore” – i.e., a temporary 
prosecutor who could insure the case would move forward even where prosecutors had 
acted reasonably.   
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Interestedly, the fact that a prosecutor might be unavailable is not simply an 
historical artifact from the nineteenth century.  Indeed, during the debates regarding the 
1984 Amendment to the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, Senator Karl N. Snow 
discussed other provisions in Utah Const., art. I, § 16, explaining that “[t]he constitution 
requires that every county have its own prosecutor in the person of the county attorney.  
Now, in some of our rural counties, this is not feasible.”  RECORDING OF SPEC. SESS. 
DISCUSSION OF SUBSTITUTE S.J.R. 1, HELD BY THE SENATE OFFICE OF THE UTAH 
LEGISLATURE (March 26, 1984).  This discussion confirms that one concern being 
addressed by the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision was, at its text indicates, a simple 
“failure” to prosecute rather than the underlying reasons a prosecution was not moving 
forward.  An abuse of discretion standard is simply inconsistent with that part of the 
Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision. 
Given that an abuse of discretion standard does not apply to the “failure” to 
prosecute, it would make little sense to read it into the adjoining word “refusal” in article 
VIII, section 16.  Neither word is modified by an adjective that provides a textual basis 
for such a construction – e.g., the drafters (both in 1895 and 1984) did not condition 
appointment of a prosecutor on some sort of “unreasonable” refusal to prosecute. Instead, 
a victim was given the ability to seek appointment of a prosecutor whenever a prosecutor 
“fails or refuses” to prosecute – nothing more and nothing less.   
Moreover, read in context with other provisions of the 1896 Constitution, article 
VIII, § 16 was not designed to address situations of prosecutorial abuse of discretion.  As 
 69 
originally drafted, Utah’s Constitution addressed that subject in Article VIII in a 
provision contained several sections earlier.  Article VIII, § 4.  That section gave the Utah 
Supreme Court “original jurisdiction to issue writs” against government officials – 
specifically authorizing “writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and 
habeas corpus” (emphasis added).  As originally understood, a mandamus petition could 
be pursued where someone could show a “peculiar interest separate and distinct from that 
of the community in general.”  Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 83, 299 P.3d 1098 
(Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  A prosecutor who failed to prosecute 
a victim’s attacker for no good reason or grossly abused his discretion could likely be 
subject to a writ of mandamus under § 4.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Master v. Cleveland, 661 
N.E.2d 180 (Ohio 1996) (reviewing petition for writ of mandamus and noting that “[a] 
prosecuting attorney will not be compelled to prosecute a complaint except when the 
failure to prosecute constitutes an abuse of discretion”); Brack v. Wells, 40 A.2d 319, 321 
(Md. Ct. Apps. 1944) (noting mandamus against a prosecutor for failing to file 
discretionary charges will not lie “[u]nless that discretion is grossly abused”) (citing 38 
Corpus Juris 623).  See generally Note, The Use of Mandamus to Control Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 563 (1976).  Thus, it appears that the Constitution’s 
drafters were addressing something other than the prosecutor’s discretion when they 
added to article VIII not only the writs provision but also a separate Court-Appointed 
Prosecutor Provision.   
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In addition, interpreting article VIII, § 16 to provide for judicial review of the 
underlying merits of a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute would be in tension with the 
structure of the Constitution as adopted in 1896, which generally provided by separation 
of powers.  See Utah Const. art. V, § 1.  Against this backdrop of separated powers, the 
role of the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision comes clearly into focus.  It was 
designed not to provide for judicial review of the substantive merits of prosecutorial 
decisions – something not normally done by the judiciary – but rather simply to provide a 
means for an independent assessment of whether a prosecutor for a particular case would 
be useful where a public prosecutor had failed or refused to move forward.  This inquiry 
does not involve judicial actors second-guessing a previous prosecutorial decision, but 
rather making a separate decision about the merits of a criminal case – and, if 
appropriate, appointing a prosecutor to proceed with that case.   Indeed, as this Court has 
specifically explained, the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision “evinces more concern 
with a failure to exercise prosecutorial powers than with their abuse.”  See Robertson, 
924 P.2d at 892.  After appointment of a “prosecutor pro tempore,” the judiciary would 
not be involved in the prosecution, which would be handled by the court-appointed 
prosecutor in an appropriate way.   
Finally, the idea that the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision somehow contains 
an abuse of discretion standard founders for other reasons as well.  While In re Hunting 
briefly asserted that it was up to the petitioner to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by 
the prosecutor, the decision offered no guidance as to how this showing might be made.  
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Presumably this is because prosecutors almost invariably decide not to prosecute cases 
based on “non-apparent, unarticulated, difficult-to-weigh factors.”  Norman Abrams, 
Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 
(1971).   Judicial review of the wisdoms of such decisions is essentially impossible, 
particularly if the judiciary does not compel prosecutors to develop guidelines for 
charging decisions.  See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1571 (1981) (“Without guidelines, courts have little or no basis on 
which to evaluate prosecutorial actions, and the limitations [against abuse of discretion] 
therefore become meaningless”); Peter L. Davis, The Crime Victim’s “Right” to a 
Criminal Prosecution: A Proposed Model Statute for the Governance of Private 
Prosecutions, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 329, 375 (1989) (“regardless of the steps taken to make 
the exercise of discretion within prosecutors’ officers more visible, that exercise will 
always be essentially unchallengeable without a full airing of the case in a completely 
open forum”).  This Court should not interpret the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision 
to require crime victims to demonstrate that decisions based on such hidden and obscure 
factors were an abuse of discretion, because doing so would often be sending them on a 
fool’s errand.   
In addition, showing an abuse of discretion by the prosecutor will inevitably 
involve complicated questions as to whose discretion is under evaluation.  The Salt Lake 
District Attorney’s Office, for example, contains dozens of different prosecutors spread 
through different sections.  See Abrams, supra, 19 UCLA L. REV. at 6 (“prosecution 
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offices are particularly notorious for their high rate of turnover” and thus “the problems 
of trying to maintain consistency among many different decisions makers must be 
reckoned with”).  An abuse of discretion standard would be complicated to administer, as 
it would presumably necessitate comparing actions of multiple persons taken at multiple 
times. 
Finally, prosecutors themselves may not want this Court to adopt an abuse of 
discretion standard.  Traditionally, such standards involve judicial review of an 
articulated reason for a decision by an executive branch agency, followed by 
consideration of the adequacy of those reasons.  See, e.g., Drake v Industrial Comm’n of 
Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181-82 (Utah 1997).  Such an inquiry may involve whether the 
findings of the executive branch agency are supported by “substantial evidence,” among 
other things.  Id. at 181.  Judiciary inquiry into an internal prosecutorial decisionmaking 
process will necessarily be more intrusive than a separate inquiry into the historical facts 
regarding a potential criminal case – facts often readily-available (as in this case) in 
police reports. 
At a minimum, if this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard, a crime victim 
seeking appointment of a private prosecutor would not have to take a prosecutor’s 
representations at face value.  Instead, as with other litigation involving constitutional 
rights, the victim would be entitled to reasonable discovery on the issues.  As an 
illustration of this point, the Jane Does in this case (as a fallback, protective matter) seek 
such discovery into the prosecuting practices of the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office 
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in the immediately following section of this brief.  But the simplest way for the Court to 
avoid entering the abuse-of-discretion quagmire is simply to set up a different inquiry all 
together – which is what the Jane Does propose. 
For all these reasons, Utah’s Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision should not be 
interpreted as containing an abuse of discretion standard. 
D.  If Article VIII, Section 16 Requires Evaluation of the 
Adequacy of a Prosecutor’s Decision, the Jane Does Are 
Entitled to Discovery Regarding the Basis of the 
Prosecutor’s Decision. 
If the Court nonetheless concludes that an abuse of discretion standard applies to 
petitions brought under the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, the Jane Does would 
request an opportunity to demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred in their 
cases – after they have received appropriate discovery. 
If this Court is going to resolve their petition on an abuse of discretion standard, 
the Jane Does would be entitled to discovery concerning the specific reasons why the 
prosecutors refused to prosecute their cases and whether these reasons are pretexts, rest 
on unconstitutional (state or federal) grounds, or otherwise rest on “rape myths” (as 
discussed in Part VII.E, infra).  In particular, the Jane Does would request an opportunity 
to depose the prosecutors who made the decision not to file charges in their cases.  The 
Jane Does would also request that the Court direct the Salt Lake District Attorney’s 
Office to provide all information relevant to the decision not to prosecute, including any 
communications within the Office regarding the particular decisions in their cases and 
prosecutorial guidelines regarding sexual assault cases in general.  The Jane Does 
 74 
respectfully submit that, with appropriate discovery, they could demonstrate that the 
decisions not to prosecute their cases constituted clear abuses of discretion.  They 
respectfully request guidance from this Court as to what steps they can take in support of 
showing an abuse of discretion.   Of course, because this Court has original jurisdiction 
over this petition, is not limited to “conduct[ing] a review in [its] appellate capacity, but 
rather serve[s] as the forum in which claims are initially heard.”  Mouty v. The Sandy City 
Recorder, 2005 UT 41, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 521, 525 (internal citation omitted).   Because the 
claims are being “initially heard” before this Court, if this Court applies an abuse of 
discretion standard, it should also ensure that the victims have all information relevant to 
litigating under that standard. 
V.  The Court-Appointed Prosecution Provision Represents Utah’s 
Unique Solution to the Well-Recognized Problem of Under-
Prosecution. 
The problem of how victims can obtain review of inappropriate decisions by 
prosecutors failing to pursue well-founded criminal charges is not unique to Utah.  This 
Part explains why this is a recurring problem, to which Utah’s Court-Appointed 
Prosecutor Provision is addressed.  This Part first discusses why crime victims need to be 
able to have an opportunity to obtain the filing of criminal charges when a public 
prosecutor has decided not to file any.  This Part then situates Utah’s Court-Appointed 
Prosecution Provision within a larger body of law for other states designed to ensure that 
prosecutors do not have unreviewable discretion to refuse to file criminal charges. 
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A.  Victim-Initiated Prosecution Continues to Serve Valuable 
Social Purposes for Crime Victims and the Public at Large 
Today. 
Utah’s Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision represents a far-sighted anticipation 
of the need for crime victims to be able to independently pursue the filing of criminal 
charges when public prosecutors have declined to act.  This Provision must be assessed 
against the broader crime victims’ rights movement, which reflects a consensus in Utah 
and elsewhere around the country that victims deserve to actively participate in the 
criminal justice process. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (noting “nationwide ‘victims’ rights’ movement”).  Victim involvement in 
criminal prosecutions is not a matter of vengeance, but rather a recognition that victims 
have suffered terrible wrongs at the hands of criminals.   For example, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has directly held that “in the administration of criminal justice, courts may not 
ignore the concerns of victims.”  Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, (1983).  And this 
Court, too, has recognized that in some circumstances a crime victim can proceed in the 
criminal justice process “not through the intermediary of the prosecution” but rather by 
“a direct filing by the victim.”  State v. Brown, 2014 UT 48, ¶ 18, 342 P.3d 239, 242 
(discussion restitution).  See generally BELOOF, CASSELL, GARVIN & TWIST ET AL., 
supra, at 30-36 (discussing the crime victims’ movement); Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Redefining Roles: The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 517.   For 
example, in 1982, a Presidential Commission called for numerous changes in the criminal 
justice system to further the interests of crime victims.  See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 
VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982).  In the wake of the Task Force Report, 
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numerous states passed state constitutional amendments protecting crime victims – 
including Utah.  See Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and 
Effects of Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373, 1381-82. 
As a result of all these victim-related reforms, a new model of criminal procedure 
has emerged – one that recognizes the rights of crime victims to participate in the 
process.  See generally Douglas E. Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The 
Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289.  Victim involvement is appropriate 
because of the harm that victims have suffered from the crime.  The social contract 
between the citizen and society requires that victims be involved in the process of holding 
wrongdoers accountable.  See id. at 294-95; Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional 
Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right Not to be a Victim, 11 PEPP. L 
REV. 63, 69-73 (1984).  Victim involvement is also important to avoid “secondary 
victimization” – that is, avoiding additional psychological trauma to the victim by 
perpetuating the subordinate position that the crime itself placed her in.   Dean G. 
Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto, Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in Criminal 
Proceedings for Victims: Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 34 WAYNE L. 
REV. 7, 19 (1987). 
Crime victims’ ability to seek court-initiated prosecutions is, of course, one 
possible step in that direction of active victim involvement.  As noted above, see Part 
II.D, supra, in 1984, Utah’s electorate chose to add language into our state’s constitution 
confirming that public prosecutors would be the “primary” method of prosecution – 
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leaving room for victims to seek prosecution of those who have harmed them.  Thus, the 
narrow interpretative issue here is not whether article VIII, § 16 should be viewed as a 
way of replacing elected prosecutor efforts, but rather how it can supplement those 
efforts.  See State v. Woodmansee, 35 A. 961, 961 (R.I. 1896) (public and private 
prosecution are “additional” and “supplementary,” not exclusive of one another). 
Against this backdrop of the importance of considering victims’ interests in the 
criminal justice process, a strong reason exists for giving a robust interpretation to Utah’s 
Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision.   It would require remarkable confidence in the 
infallibility of public prosecutors to believe that a system of public prosecution operates 
perfectly.  Rather than leave completely unreviewable discretion in the hands of 
government prosecuting agencies, it has long been the policy of Utah (and other states, 
see discussion below) to provide an opportunity for review of the public prosecutor’s 
decision not to pursue criminal charges. 
Public prosecuting offices, no less than other governmental bureaucracies, can 
make mistakes or, worse, act for improper reasons.  It has long been recognized that 
“[t]he affirmative power to prosecute is enormous, but the negative power to withhold 
prosecution may be even greater, because it is less protected against abuse.”  KENNETH 
CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188 (1969).   Indeed, 
“[p]erhaps nine-tenths of the abuses of the prosecuting power involve failure to prosecute 
. . . .”  Id. at 191 n.2.  Precisely because it can go unchecked, prosecutorial discretion to 
decline to file charges “holds the potential for abuse.”  Note, Private Challenges to 
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Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 490 
(1988).  Moreover, the exercise of discretion “takes place out of public view – in the 
hallways of the courthouse in the prosecutors’ offices, or on the telephone.”  James 
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1522 
(1981).   
In the absence of some way to try to independently seek a prosecution, “crime 
victims are left with little or no recourse when government prosecutors decide not to 
pursue a criminal complaint.”  Michael T. McCormack, The Need for Private 
Prosecutors: An Analysis of Massachusetts and New Hampshire Law, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 497, 509–10 (2004).  Moreover, without some means for securing the filing of well-
justified criminal charges, other rights for crime victims remain entirely unprotected.  
Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment, for example, promises victims a “right to justice and 
due process,” including the right to be heard on plea agreements and at sentencing.  See 
Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1) & (1)(b); see also Utah Code § 77-38-4.  When a public 
prosecutor refuses to file well-founded criminal charges, those rights never come into 
existence.  Thus, as Professor Welling has explained, “In jurisdictions that have made the 
decision to grant victims a participation right at other stages, victim participation in the 
charging decision is consistent with the current structure and would contribute to a 
coherent system.”  Sarah N. Welling, Victims in the Criminal Process: A Utilitarian 
Analysis of Victim Participation in the Charging Decision, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 117 
(1988).   
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This case provides an excellent illustration of the risks lurking in absolute 
discretion to refuse to file criminal charges.  Across this country today (indeed, around 
the globe), a debate is occurring about whether women who report sexual assaults to law 
enforcement are taken seriously – a debate reflected in the ubiquitous #MeToo hashtag 
used on social media.  In these four cases, prosecutors have offered little real explanation 
for why they chose not to file crime charges against those who raped or sexually 
assaulted Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4.   A typical reason for 
declining to pursue a case – lack of evidence – simply does not exist here.  As recounted 
above, the investigative law enforcement agencies to whom the four Jane Does reported 
their attacks assembled evidence providing a strong basis for prosecution and presented 
the cases for prosecution to the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office.  Thus, the Jane 
Does’ cases fit precisely the situation where court-appointed prosecution is most 
appropriate.  As Professor Gittler has explained, “The victim-initiated prosecution could 
be regarded as a needed and desirable check on prosecutorial charging discretion, insofar 
as it leads to decisions based upon administrative considerations which neither promote 
the victim’s interests nor serve the purposes of the criminal law and the goals of the 
criminal sanctioning process.”  Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a 
Criminal Action: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117, 158 
(1984).  Utah’s electorate who approved court-appointed prosecution in 1895 – and the 
electorate who retained such prosecution in 1984 – presumably recognized that victim-
initiated prosecutions “may prove useful in trying cases that may otherwise go unnoticed 
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by the system, may help relieve the burdens of overworked public prosecutorial offices, 
and allow the use of expert prosecutors in particularly complex cases . . . .”  Michael 
Edmund O'Neill, Private Vengeance and the Public Good, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 659, 
662 (2010). 
B.  Victim-Initiated Prosecution Remains the Law in Many 
States Today. 
Utah is not the only State to have considered how to respond to the problem of 
prosecutors not filing strong criminal cases.  As explained above, see Part II.A, supra, 
public prosecutors were created only after the birth of this country.  While public 
prosecution has since developed as the main form of criminal prosecution, today many 
states retain various forms of victim-initiated prosecution or review of public prosecutor 
decisions.  See generally DOUGLAS E. BELOOF, PAUL G. CASSELL, MARGARET GARVIN & 
STEVEN J. TWIST, VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  157-224 (4th ed. 2018) 
(summarizing various forms of victim involvement in prosecution decisions).15   
                                            
15  Victim-initiated prosecution has also been recognized in the federal system, albeit on a 
more limited based.  Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), 
considered the question of whether a federal trial court possessed the inherent authority to 
appoint private counsel to prosecute several defendants for criminal contempt of a court-
ordered injunction (rather than requiring the court to refer the matter to the federal 
prosecuting authorities). Young answered this question in the affirmative. 481 U.S. at 
793.  Young also considered whether attorneys for the victim could be those prosecutors.  
Noting that Congress specifically has provided that “each United States attorney, within 
his district, shall . . . prosecute for all offenses against the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 
547 (emphasis added), Young concluded that the victim’s attorneys were not appropriate 
prosecutors in that particular case in light of this federal statute.  481 U.S. at 808-09.  
Thus, Young says little about the state constitutional law issues in play in this case.  See 
Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 876–77 (R.I. 2001) (finding Young 
inapplicable in a state case involving Rhode Island private prosecution).   
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“Despite widespread belief that such instances of private initiative in the 
prosecution of crime are extremely rare, the history of the American public prosecution 
system indicates that this is not so.”  Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the 
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 374 (1986).  For example, 
Professor Moley, writing in 1929, found that the extent of “private” prosecution in the 
United States was “great and apparently enlarging.”  R. MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION 230 (1929).  And another commentator, writing in 1955, found that 
“private prosecutors in fact play an extensive role in law enforcement.”  Comment, 
Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE 
L.J. 209, 218 (1955).   
Generally speaking, prosecution by a private actor is permitted unless there is a 
specific statutory prohibition.  As we discussed above, the common law plainly 
authorized private prosecution.  See Part II.A, supra.  That common law tradition 
continues unless blocked by legislative enactment, as explained in Ohio v. Ray, 143 
N.E.2d 484 (Ohio App. 1956).  While no state statute specifically authorized a victim to 
bring her own prosecution, the Ohio court recognized that “it is common knowledge that 
the common-law practice (of private prosecution) still prevails, to some extent at least in 
inferior courts.” Id. at 485.  The court continued: “[w]e know of no statutory or 
constitutional reason for prohibiting such practice and, in our opinion, it is well and wise 
that the policy of the law permits the appearance of private counsel, especially in courts 
with limited jurisdictions.” Id.  Small wonder, then, that state statutes may not specify 
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victim-initiated prosecution, because such statutes are superfluous to the operation of the 
common law – although Ohio has recently chosen to codify this general approach in 
statute.  See Ohio Rev. Code § 2935.09(D) (allowing private citizen to file an affidavit 
seeking filing of charges).   And the common law right to prosecution for private 
individuals continues to be relied upon today, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did in 
affirming a criminal conviction (for domestic violence) obtained by a private prosecutor.  
See Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 871 (R.I. 2001) (affirming conviction 
and noting that “prosecutions based upon complaints filed by private individuals have a 
pedigree that stretches back into early English law; indeed, they have been described as a 
principal feature of English criminal law” (citing Blackstone)). 
Some states have, however, specifically enacted statutes authorizing prosecution 
by crime victims.  For example, Pennsylvania sets forth in statutory language essentially 
the same right that Utah provides in constitutional language, allowing for a prosecution if 
a prosecutor “neglects or refuses” to prosecute.  16 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7710 (emphasis 
added).  Idaho law contains a similar provision.  IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-504; see State v. 
Murphy, 584 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Idaho 1978) (finding that “Idaho’s law provides that a 
warrant for arrest may be issued upon a complaint filed upon information by a private 
citizen if the magistrate, after investigation, is satisfied that the offense has been 
committed”). 
Many states allow private citizens to prosecute misdemeanors.  In New Jersey, a 
victim can file a misdemeanor criminal complaint and, if the public prosecutor declines to 
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pursue the case, “any attorney may appear on behalf of any complaining witness and 
prosecute the action on behalf of the state or municipality.” See State of New Jersey v. 
Kinder, 701 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1988) (discussing New Jersey Municipal Court Rule 
7:4-4(b)16 and rejecting constitutional attack on it) (emphasis added); see also Voytko v. 
Ramada Inn of Atlantic City, 445 F. Supp. 315 (D.N.J. 1978) (violation of defrauding of 
innkeepers statute).  Other states give victims the right to initiate charges in various 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Bradford v. Knights, 695 N.E.2d 1068, 1071 (Mass. 1998) 
(recognizing that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 218, section 35A, “allow[s] 
private parties to seek criminal complaints in the case of misdemeanors”); Wash. Crim. 
Rules for Courts of Limited Jurisdiction 2.1(c) (authorizing citizen complaints); Ala. 
Code § 28-4-314 (2001) (giving “private parties the right to prosecute violations of laws 
prohibiting “the evils of intemperance.”).   
Moreover, in many jurisdictions around the country, victims have the power to 
challenge the public prosecutor’s decision not to bring charges.  The most common 
procedure is to allow victims to present a case directly to the grand jury.17   Other states 
                                            
16  While the rule has recently been redrafted and renumbered, citizen complaints remain 
authorized in New Jersey today.  See Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New 
Jersey, Rule 7:2-2(a)(1) (authorizing issuance of a complaint-warrant on the basis of a 
complaint made by a “private citizen”) (available at 
https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/rules.html (visited Sept. 4, 2018)).   
 17 See, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Smith, 285 S.E.2d 500 (West Va. 1981) (upholding a 
citizen’s state constitutional right to directly report crime to grand jury without public 
prosecutor interference); Brack v. Wells, 40 A.2d 319 (Md. 1944) (upholding citizen 
access to the grand jury); King v. Second Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 173 So. 498, 499-500 
(Ala. 1937) (observing that “[p]ublic policy demands that the citizen, without hazard to 
himself, may freely bring before the grand jury the fact that a crime has been committed, 
request an investigation, and furnish such information as he has in aid of the 
investigation”); State v. Sullivan, 105 So. 631, 633 (La. 1925) (“[a]ny person has a right 
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allow victims to approach the grand jury with the court’s permission.18  Still other states 
have statutes allowing victims to challenge the public prosecutor’s failure to bring 
charges in this country.  See Stuart P. Green, Comment, Private Challenges to 
Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488 (1988) 
(“at least nine states have, or recently had, statutory schemes that potentially enable 
private persons to challenge prosecutorial inaction”).  And in still other jurisdictions, 
citizens may collect signatures and present a petition within the judicial district to 
convene a grand jury on the criminal case. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1401.  Other 
jurisdictions have specific statutory provisions for challenging a prosecutor’s decision via 
judicial review.   See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Benz, 565 A.2d 764, 767 (Pa. 1989) (court-
ordered charges filed in homicide case on motion of victim’s mother); State v. Unnamed 
Defendant, 441 N.W. 2d 696 (Wis. 1989) (permitting court to conduct investigation and 
review and order charges filed pursuant to “John Doe” procedure).   
                                                                                                                                             
to go before the grand jury and prefer a charge against another”); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code 
Ann. art. 20.09 (“The grand jury shall inquire into all offenses liable to indictment of 
which any member may have knowledge, or of which they shall be informed by the 
attorney representing the State, or any other credible person.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
12-104 (a)-(c) (“Any person having knowledge or proof of the commission of a public 
offense triable or indictable in the county may testify before the grand jury.”); Watts v. 
Civil Serv. Bd. for Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 282–83 (Tenn. 1980) (“no one may 
prevent a person from appearing before a grand jury. Indeed, it is his duty to do so if he 
has evidence of a crime.”).   
18  See, e.g., In re New Haven Grand Jury, 604 F. Supp. 453 (D. Conn. 1985); In re 
Petition of Thomas, 434 A.2d 503 (Me. 1981); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-5-204(4)(l) 
(allowing “any person” to approach “the grand jury);  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1410.01 
(similar statute to Colorado’s); State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 364-65 (Minn. 
1977) (observing that while a private citizen “does not have a right to appear before the 
grand jury, he is free to attempt to get the grand jury to take action”).  
 85 
Outside the United States, numerous common law countries provide private 
individuals participation rights, including prosecutorial authority, in criminal cases.  See 
Verónica Michel & Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights Prosecutions and the Participation 
Rights of Victims in Latin America, 47 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 873, 881-82 (2013) 
(identifying 21 common law countries providing prosecutorial participation or civil actor 
rights in criminal cases).   
Such procedures – in America and around the globe – give lie to any argument 
that the public prosecutor should be an indispensable prerequisite to the initiation of 
criminal charges.  As Justice Day of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has cogently 
explained, in this time “when we see interest in ‘victim’s rights’ come to the fore, 
certainly having one’s tormentor brought to justice should be near the rights at the top of 
any victim’s rights program, second only to the right not to be a victim in the first place.”  
State v. Unnamed Defendant, 441 N.W.2d. at 707 (Day, J., concurring).  Justice Day 
concluded that “[c]rime victims should have recourse to the judicial branch when the 
executive branch fails to respond.”  Id.  Of course, in Utah, victims are constitutionally 
promised that recourse through the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision.   
VI.  Each of the Four Jane Does Have Presented a Compelling Case 
for Appointment of a Private Prosecutor.   
Each of the four Jane Does easily satisfies the three-part test described above for 
obtaining appointment of a private prosecutor under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16.  
Specifically, each of the four Jane Does has provided information in this petition 
establishing: (1) the public prosecutor has failed or refused to prosecute; (2) a prosecution 
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is supported by clear probable cause; and (3) the appointment of a prosecutor would be in 
the interests of justice.  We discuss each of the four Jane Does’ cases individually in the 
four following sections. 
A.  Jane Doe 1 Has Presented an Appropriate Case for the 
Appointment of a Prosecutor. 
The facts regarding the Jane Doe 1 case have been described above.  See Facts, 
Part I, supra.  Given the specific declination letters that she has received – from the Salt 
Lake County District Attorney’s Office (as well as the Attorney General’s Office) – it is 
obvious that the public prosecutor has failed and refused to prosecute. 
Jane Doe 1 has also provided clear probable cause for the filing of a rape charge.  
Based on her report to law enforcement, the only issue is whether the assault was non-
consensual.  This Court has emphasized that consent in rape cases is “a fact-intensive, 
context-dependent question, decided on a case-by-case basis.  To determine whether a 
victim has truly consented, the factfinder must pay close attention to the verbal and 
nonverbal cues given by the victim and to a wide range of other elements of context.” 
State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 39, 349 P.3d 676, 684.  Thus, this Court has instructed 
that “contextual nuances are . . . why, as a general rule, our law has long left the matter of 
consent in the hands of the jury.”  Id.   
Here, there are ample circumstances from which a jury could reasonably conclude 
both that Jane Doe 1 had not consented and that Richard Roe 1 was well aware of her 
lack of consent.  For example, the rapid and aggressive nature of the attack, combined 
with Jane Doe 1’s lack of participation in the encounter and physical inability to resist, 
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are all facts that, taken together, easily support clear probable cause for a finding of non-
consent.  Moreover, while Roe 1 may attempt to argue at trial that Doe’s “freezing” led 
him to believe consent existed, this Court has specifically held that “freezing” is an 
“excellent example” of something that must be evaluated in context – and by the jury at 
trial.  See Barela, 2015 UT 22, at ¶ 39 n.7.  Cf.  State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 12, 63 
P.3d 56 (noting that the “vehicles for institutionalized suspicion of rape complainants 
have typically been . . . [legal] requirements, where the focus is shifted to the victim’s 
acts, rather than the defendant’s”).   
Indeed, the facts of the Barela case are quite similar to this one, making clear that 
a prosecution would likely lead to a conviction.  In Barela, victim K.M. “testified that she 
had not flirted with Barela, and did not say or do anything to suggest she wanted to have 
sex with him.”  Id. at ¶ 7.  She also testified that she did not physically resist or tell 
Barela “no”; indeed, she said nothing at all.  Instead, she clung to a blanket and “just 
froze.”  Id.  She said she felt fearful because she was alone, and because the only other 
person in the massage parlor was a male receptionist.  Id.  She repeatedly stressed that 
“everything happened very fast.”  Id.  She elaborated she “checked out,” “kind of 
withdrew,” and “was scared.”  Id.  These facts are eerily parallel to Jane Doe 1’s facts 
and make clear that Utah juries have convicted on evidence such as Jane Doe 1 presents. 
The District Attorney’s Office seemed to rest its non-prosecution decision on 
outmoded notions that a victim must physically resist to her utmost to establish non-
consent.  See generally SUSAN EHRLICH, REPRESENTING RAPE: LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL 
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CONSENT (2001) (noting that while the “utmost resistance” standard was replaced as a 
legal construct after the 1950s, it too often remains a reference for evaluating rape 
charges in modern times). But in recent decades at least, this Court has made clear that a 
“resistance” requirement has no place in modern rape law.  See State v. Blake, 2002 UT 
113, ¶¶ 12-13, 63 P.3d 56 (noting abandonment of resistance requirement in modern rape 
law).  In the year 2018, this Court should send a clear message that (as with the Court of 
Appeals) it “reject[s] outright [any] suggestion that a victim is responsible for stopping 
her own sexual assault.”  State v. Cady, 2018 App 8, ¶ 27 n.8, 414 P.3d 974. 
Finally, Doe’s physical limitations further support not only probable cause but a 
prosecution in the interests of justice.  Because Jane Doe 1 has a form of muscular 
dystrophy, she has muscle atrophy, muscle weakness, and disturbances in peripheral 
sensation.  [App. at 3, 309.]  As a result, she is physically weak, [App. at 14, 309.] 
Functionally, she must act slowly and deliberately, including with her speech.  [App. at 
309.]  What strength she does have diminishes rapidly during a sustained effort and she 
fatigues quickly.  [App. at 309.]   
Given all these facts, authorizing a prosecution is clearly in the interests of justice.  
Prosecution will not only insure that Jane Doe 1’s abuser is brought to justice, but also 
help to protect particularly vulnerable persons in Utah.  The most recently available data 
from the U.S. Department of Justice reveals that the rate of victimization for rape and 
sexual assault against persons with disabilities is more than three times higher than those 
without.  See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AGAINST 
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PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 2009-2015 at 3 (2017).  And yet, despite that increased 
vulnerability, prosecutions for those who abuse the disabled do not appear to be a priority 
in the criminal justice system.  Nancy M. Fitzsimons, Justice for Crimes Victims with 
Disabilities in the Criminal Justice System: An Examination of Barriers and Impetus for 
Change, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 66 (2016).  The reason for this lack of interest 
appears to be that “[p]ersons with disabilities – the ‘victimological others’ – do not make 
an ideal victim within our society or the criminal justice system.”  Id.  Appointing a 
prosecutor to pursue a case of sexual violence against Jane Doe 1 would be in the 
interests of justice by helping to secure justice for physically disabled persons within this 
State. 
In sum, Jane Doe 1 amply demonstrates that this Court should appoint a 
prosecutor under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16.  A proposed charging document to begin 
the prosecution is attached to this petition.19   
B.  Jane Doe 2 Has Presented an Appropriate Case for the 
Appointment of a Prosecutor.   
For many of the same reasons as explained for Jane Doe 1, this Court should also 
appoint a prosecutor to prosecute the sexual assaults committed against Jane Doe 2.  She 
provides a clear and credible account of suffering repeated sexual assaults at the hands of 
a repeat sex offender.  See Facts, Part II, supra.  Indeed, Richard Roe 2 used the fact that 
he was sex offender to coerce Jane Doe 2 into the situation where he could assault her.  
                                            
19  Because Richard Roe 1 was a juvenile at the time that he attacked Jane Doe 1, the 
charging instrument is a petition under the juvenile justice provisions of the Utah Code.  
See Utah Code § 78A-6-601 et seq.   
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Jane Doe 2 was not only broadly coerced, but also specifically coerced.  During the 
sexual attacks, she told Richard Roe 2 to stop, but he refused.  Of course, intercourse or 
other sexual activity that follows withdrawal of consent is rape.  See generally Offense of 
Rape After Withdrawal of Consent, 33 A.L.R.6th 353 (2008 & 2018 Supp.).  And, as a 
women suffering from cerebral palsy, her ability to resist Roe was obviously impaired.  
As with Jane Doe 1, the “contextual nuance[s]” surrounding the attacks on Jane Doe 2 
should be placed “in the hands of the jury.”  State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 39, 349 P.3d 
676, 684.   
In sum, Jane Doe 2 amply demonstrates that this Court should appoint a 
prosecutor under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16.  A proposed criminal information to begin 
the prosecution is attached to this petition. 
C.  Jane Doe 3 Has Presented an Appropriate Case for the 
Appointment of a Prosecutor.   
For many of the same reasons as explained for Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2, this 
Court also should appoint a private prosecutor for Jane Doe 3.  The Salt Lake District 
Attorney’s Office has failed and refused to prosecute.  See Facts, Part III, supra.  Equally 
clearly, Jane Doe 3 has provided credible evidence of multiple acts of rape – each of 
which is thus well-supported by probable cause.  Id.  Thus, as with Jane Doe 1 and Jane 
Doe 2, proceeding with a prosecution is in the interests of justice, both to hold her rapist 
accountable and enforce this State’s laws against sexual violence.    
In addition to the above-detailed compelling reasons for prosecution, an additional 
reason exists as well: Richard Roe 3 is a prominent law enforcement official in a county 
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adjoining Salt Lake County.  As a result, an inevitable perceived (if not actual) conflict of 
interest existed when other law enforcement officials (Salt Lake County prosecutors) 
decided not to prosecute him.  The only way in which the public can have assurance that 
the matter has been handled appropriately is for this Court to appoint an independent 
prosecutor to pursue the matter to a resolution in open court proceedings.20  The simple 
fact is that, “[f]or better or worse, most prosecutors may have reason to be concerned 
about public opinion in high-profile cases” of possible crimes by police officers.  Roger 
A. Fairfax, Jr., The Grand Jury’s Role in the Prosecution of Unjustified Police Killings - 
Challenges and Solutions, 52 HARV. CIV. R.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 397, 409 (2017).  Because 
of the inevitable suspicion associated with a decision not to prosecute a law enforcement 
officer where clear probable cause exists, appointing a prosecutor to prosecute Richard 
Roe 3 is in the interests of justice. 
In sum, Jane Doe 3 amply demonstrates that this Court should appoint a 
prosecutor under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16.  A proposed criminal information to begin 
the prosecution is attached to this petition. 
                                            
20  We are not the first to recognize this problem, which has gained salience in recent 
years as potential crimes by law enforcement officers have been much in the news.  
Indeed, it might make sense (as some have suggested) to flatly bar local prosecutors from 
ever making the final decision on whether to file charges against a law enforcement 
officer: “Automatically removing a local prosecutor spares her from having to balance 
the public’s desire for police accountability and the police officers’ indignation at being 
over-scrutinized, thus preserving the local prosecutor’s relations with both her 
constituency and law enforcement partners.”  Caleb J. Robertson, Restoring Public 
Confidence in the Criminal Justice System: Policing Prosecutions When Prosecutors 
Prosecute Police, 67 EMORY L.J. 853, 867 (2018). 
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D.  Jane Doe 4 Has Presented an Appropriate Case for the 
Appointment of a Prosecutor.   
For many of the same reasons as the other Jane Does, Jane Doe 4 has presented a 
clear case for this Court to appoint a prosecutor.  As explained in the fact section above, 
the District Attorney’s Office has rejected not only her plea for a prosecution, but also 
those of the relevant law enforcement agency.  See Facts, Part IV, supra.  Probable cause 
also clearly exists.  For example, the anal penetration that Jane Doe 4 alleges during a 
massage [App. at 123-24] clearly establishes probable cause for a sex offense.   Indeed, 
this is not simple case of two counter narratives, as the later sexual assault examination 
found a confirming rectal tear.  [App. at 202-03.] More than ample probable cause exists 
for a prosecution to move forward.   
In sum, Jane Doe 4 amply demonstrates that this Court should appoint a 
prosecutor under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16.  A proposed criminal information to initiate 
the prosecution is attached to this petition. 
VII.  The Under-Enforcement of Criminal Laws Forbidding Sexual 
Assault Against Women by Prosecutors Further Warrants 
Appointment of Prosecutor. 
The appointment of a private prosecutor is warranted not only by the specific facts 
of each of the Jane Does’ cases, but also by the broader pattern of under-prosecution that 
exists for crimes of sexual assault committed against women and girls.  In this Part of the 
petition, we document the existence of this under-enforcement, both at a national and 
local level.  In light of this under-enforcement, appointment of prosecutors is appropriate 
to protect not only the values enshrined in the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, but 
 93 
also those contained in the Utah’s Uniform Operations of Laws Provision, Utah’s Equal 
Rights Provision, and the federal constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.    
A.  Sexual Assault Against Women is a Problem of Staggering 
Proportions in this Country in General and Utah in 
Particular. 
Rape and other forms of sexual violence21 against women and girls leads to 
pervasive victimization in the United States in general and Utah in particular. National 
epidemiological data indicate that 18% to 25% of women will be raped or sexually 
assaulted during their adult lifetimes.  REBECCA CAMPBELL, ET AL., THE IMPACT OF 
SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER PROGRAMS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASE 
OUTCOMES: A MULTISITE REPLICATION STUDY, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1, 2 (May 
2014).   For example, the National Violence Against Women Survey conducted in 1995 
and 1996 found that “17.7 million women and 2.8 million men in the United States were 
forcibly raped at some time in their lives, with 302,091 women and 92,748 men forcibly 
raped in the year preceding the survey.”  See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Nat’l 
Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Rape 
Victimization: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey, 1 (2006), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf.  A more recent survey 
reported that the number of females age 12 or older who experienced “completed, 
attempted, or threatened rape or sexual violence” are estimated to be about 270,000 in 
2010.  Michael Planty et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Female 
                                            
21  Where possible, the citations in this section identify with specificity the sexual 
offense(s) at issue in a referenced study.  
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Victims of Sexual Violence, 1994-2010, 1 (2013), available at https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf.  See also Staff of Sen. Jud. Comm., Violence Against 
Women: The Increase of Rape in America 1990, 102d Cong. 1 (1991) (describing the 
“rape epidemic” in this country). 
Sadly, Utah’s women and girls suffer horrifically from sexual violence, at rates 
well above national averages.  An important recent report from the Utah Office on 
Domestic and Sexual Violence found that “[d]omestic and sexual violence are two of the 
most serious crimes in Utah” and identified significant and long-term physical and 
psychological health consequences for victims of sexual violence.  Utah Office on 
Domestic & Sexual Violence, No More Secrets:  Utah’s Domestic & Sexual Violence 
Report 2013 at i (2013), available at https://justice.utah.gov/Violence/ 
Annual%20Reports/nms_annualreport_2013.pdf.  Another important report from Utah’s 
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice (“CCJJ”) found that “[r]ape is the sole 
Violent Crime Index offense for which Utah’s rate rises above that of the nation’s 
average” and that, among the adult Utah women surveyed, about one in three—28.9 
percent—reported having been sexually assaulted during their lifetimes.  Christine 
Mitchell & Benjamin Peterson, CCJJ, 2007 Rape in Utah Survey, 2, 5 (2008), available 
at https://justice.utah.gov/Documents/Research/SexOffender/RapeinUtah2007.pdf.    
FBI reports document that rape occurs in Utah at a significantly higher rate than 
the national average.  According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting data, the number 
of rapes in Utah in 2016, as reported by law enforcement agencies, was 49.8 per 100,000 
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inhabitants, as comparted to 40.4 nationally.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2016 Crime in the United States, Violent Crime, Rape (table 2). 
Sexual violence is not evenly proportionated between males and females but is 
disproportionately concentrated among females.  Both national and Utah-specific studies 
show that females (i.e., women and girls22) experience significantly higher rates of sexual 
assault crimes compared to males.  For example, one study used data from the National 
Crime Victimization Survey to examine the prevalence of sexual violence committed 
against U.S. female residents age 12 or older from 1995 to 2005 and found that only 10 
percent of rape and other sexual assault victimizations were perpetrated against men.  
Michael Planty et al., supra, at 3. Another national survey of adult men and women found 
that approximately 86 percent of rape and attempted rape victims are women.  Tjaden & 
Thoennes, supra, at iii, 1, 3; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Identifying and Preventing 
Gender Bias in Law Enforcement Response to Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Guidance Document 5 (2015) (citing research showing that 
“[s]exual assault and domestic violence are crimes that disproportionately impact women, 
girls, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals in the United 
States”).  
Utah is no exception to this pattern.  As the Utah Office on Domestic and Sexual 
Violence reported (based on Utah Department of Health data collected in 2010), 12.2 
                                            
22  Sexual violence research, including research cited in this brief, is generally framed in 
gendered terms (e.g., “female,” “women,” “girls”), without clearly differentiating 
whether these terms exclusively reference persons whose gender was assigned at birth. 
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percent of females and 1.2 percent of males in Utah reported experiencing rape or 
attempted rape in their lifetimes.  No More Secrets:  Utah’s Domestic & Sexual Violence 
Report 2013, supra, at 18.   
Young women – such as the Jane Does filing this petition – are among the 
population most at risk for sexual assault crimes.  A recent Justice Department report 
found that “females ages 18 to 24 had the highest rate of rape and sexual assault 
victimizations compared to females in all other age groups” during the 1995-2013 period.  
See Sofi Sinozich & Lynn Langton, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Rape and Sexual Assault 
Victimization Among College-Age Females, 1995-2013, 1, 5 (2014).  Another report 
found that females ages 12 to 17 (the age range of Jane Doe 1 when she was raped) 
experienced sexual violence at the rate of 11.2 victimization per 1,000, and those ages 
18-34 experienced sexual violence at the rate of 7 victimizations per 1,000.  Michael 
Planty et al., supra, at 3.  Indeed, one report found that 54 percent of the female victims 
reported that they experience their first rape or attempted rape before the age of 18.  
Tjaden & Thoennes, supra, at 3, 18.  Here again, clear gender disparities exist.  For 
example, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention has highlighted findings from the 
2012 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence survey and reported that 
“[a]pproximately 8% or an estimated 10 million girls under the age of 18 experienced 
rape or attempted rape while 0.7% or an estimated 791,000 boys under age of 18 
experience either rape or attempted rape.  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Nat’l Ctr. for Injury Prevention and Control, Fact Sheet on Sexual Violence in Youth 
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(2012), available at https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ 
2012FindingsonSVinYouth.pdf.  Turning to Utah specifically, Utah girls suffer 
disproportionately from these attacks, as 78.7 percent of the Utah women who reported 
victimization were first sexually assaulted before the age of 18.  Mitchell & Peterson, 
supra, at 5.   
The Jane Does were all attacked by someone they knew to some degree.  Their 
cases are typical, as across the nation the vast majority of sexual assault crimes against 
women were perpetrated by a non-stranger.  See, e.g., Tjaden & Thoennes, supra, at 21 
(observing the 1995-1996 national survey shows almost 83 percent of female victims’ 
perpetrators were current or former intimate partners, current or former dates, boyfriends, 
and girlfriends); Planty, et al., supra, at 1 (finding “[i]n 2005-10, 78% of sexual violence 
involved an offender who was a family member, intimate partner, friend, or 
acquaintance”).  The same pattern of disproportionate violence against women by non-
strangers exists in Utah, as in Utah “[m]ost sexual assaults were committed by male 
perpetrators who were known to the victims.”  Mitchell & Peterson, supra, at 5.   
Finally, because two of the Jane Does bringing this petition suffer from physical 
disabilities, it is important to note that there is a “growing body of research that crime 
victimization is a serious, persistent, and pervasive problem for people with disabilities.”  
Nancy M. Fitzsimons, PhD, MSW, LISW, Justice for Crimes Victims with Disabilities in 
the Criminal Justice System: An Examination of Barriers and Impetus for Change, 13 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 46–47 (2016).  A recent Crimes Against Persons with Disabilities 
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Report (2009-2015) estimated that the rate of rape and sexual assaults committed against 
persons with disabilities was more than three times that for persons without disabilities.  
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime Against Persons with 
Disabilities, 2009-2015 at 3 (2017).  And females with disabilities are victims of sexual 
assault crimes at higher rates than those without disabilities.   See, e.g., Joseph Shapiro, 
The Sexual Assault Epidemic No One Talks About, NPR (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/08/570224090/the-sexual-assault-epidemic-no-one-talks-
about (finding “[t]he rate of rape and sexual assault against people with intellectual 
disabilities is more than seven times the rate against people without disabilities,” and the 
rate for females victims with intellectual disabilities “is about 12 times the rate” against 
people without disabilities); see also Matthew J. Breiding & Brian S. Armour, The 
Association Between Disability And Intimate Partner Violence In The United States, 
25(6) ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 455 (2015) (similar); R. Amy Elman, Confronting the 
Sexual Abuse of Women with Disabilities, VAWnet, National Online Resource Center on 
Violence Against Women, 2-3 (Jan. 2005) (similar). 
B.  Crimes of Sexual Violence Against Women and Girls Cause 
Horrific Consequences that Demand the Highest Level of 
Attention, Including in Utah’s Criminal Justice System. 
“Short of homicide, [rape] is the ‘ultimate violation of self.’”  Coker v. Georgia, 
433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting U.S. Dept. of Justice Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration Report, Rape and Its Victims: A Report for 
Citizens, Health Facilities, and Criminal Justice Agencies 1 (1975)).  Victims of sexual 
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violence may experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, substance 
abuse, and suicidal thoughts or behavior.  One meta-study reviewed 37 studies involving 
over three million male and female participants with history of “sexual abuse”23 and 
concluded that there is “an association between a history of sexual abuse and a lifetime 
diagnosis of anxiety, depression, eating disorders, PTSD, sleep disorders, and suicide 
attempts.”  Laura P. Chen, et al., Sexual Abuse and Lifetime Diagnosis of Psychiatric 
Disorders: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 85 MAYO CLIN PROC. 619, 625 (July 
2010) (emphasis omitted).  Another study found “[s]exual assault is a particularly potent 
predictor of PTSD” while another indicates adult female rape victims have “[l]ifetime 
prevalence rates of PTSD . . . [that] range from approximately 32% to 80%.”  Melissa A. 
Polusny & Paul A. Arbisi, Assessment of Psychological Distress and Disability After 
Sexual Assault in Adults, in PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN COURt 97, 98 (Gerald 
Young et al. eds., 2006).  Research by Utah’s CCJJ found that, in this State, “[w]omen 
with a history of sexual assault reported poorer physical and mental health than non-
victims, including increased rates of PTSD and depression.”  Mitchell & Peterson, supra, 
at 6.   
Sexual violence can also lead to serious physical problems, such as chronic pain, 
gastrointestinal disorders, unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases, migraines 
                                            
23  The study defined “sexual abuse” to include “rape and all forms of sexual abuse,” 
including, but not limited to, “noncontact exposure of genitalia, threatened sexual 
violence, and contact involving genitalia and the mouth.” 
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and other frequent headaches, and cervical cancer.24  Another consequence is that sexual 
victimization clearly leads to an increased risk of being “sexually revictimized.”  
Catherine C. Classen, et al., Sexual Revictimization:  A Review of the Empirical 
Literature, 6 J. TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 103, 124 (2005) (reviewing approximately 
90 empirical studies that examined sexual victimization during childhood, adolescence, 
or adulthood and finding that “approximately two of three individuals who are sexually 
victimized are [sexually] revictimized”).  When sexual assault is perpetrated against 
minor-victims, the impacts of childhood victimization can continue into adulthood.   See, 
e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Nat’l Ctr. for Injury Prevention and 
Control, Fact Sheet on Sexual Violence in Youth, supra (highlighting findings from the 
2012 National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, and stating that sexual 
violence in youth, “without appropriate trauma-informed interventions, can result in 
immediate and lifelong consequences, including physical, emotional, behavior, and social 
challenges, as well as suffering future abuse or continuing the cycle in adulthood by 
abusing others”); Michael D. De Bellis et al., Neurodevelopmental Biology Associated 
with Childhood Sexual Abuse, 20 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 548, 549 (2011) (explaining 
that childhood sexual victimization “can cause disrupted development leading to delays 
                                            
24  See, e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Sexual Violence:  
Consequences, 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/sexualviolence/consequences.html; No More 
Secrets:  Utah’s Domestic & Sexual Violence Report 2013, i (2013), available at 
https://justice.utah.gov/Violence/Annual%20Reports/nms_annualreport_2013.pdf 
(identifying physical and psychological health consequences for victims of sexual 
violence).   
 101 
in, deficits of, or failures of multisystem achievements in motor, emotional, behavioral, 
language, psychosocial, social, and cognitive skills” and these disruptions can persist into 
adulthood). 
C.  Decisions by Prosecutors to Decline to Prosecute Sexual 
Assault Crimes Disproportionately Harm Women and Girls.    
Despite the widespread prevalence and devastating impacts of sexual violence 
against women and girls, such crimes are under-prosecuted both nationally and in Utah.  
The problems begin with the fact that a comparatively low percentage of crimes of sexual 
violence are ever reported to law enforcement.   A commonly reported figure is that 
“most of the [rape] cases—in fact, over 80 percent of the cases still go unreported.”  Rape 
in the United States: The Chronic Failure to Report and Investigate Rape Cases, Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs, Sen. Jud. Comm., 111th Cong. 27 (2010) 
(statement of Dean G. Kilpatrick).  Indeed, “[r]ape and other forms of sexual 
victimization” are “among the most severe and underreported crimes in the United 
States.”  Patricia L. Fanflick, Victim Responses to Sexual Assault: Counterintuitive or 
Simply Adaptive?, Special Topics Series, Nat’l Dist. Attorneys Ass’n, at 1 (2007).  One 
comprehensive study found that only 19.1 percent of the women who were raped (or 
experienced attempted rape) since their 18th birthday reported the crime to the police.  
Tjaden & Thoennes, supra, at 3, 33.  Racial disparities also exist, as the rate of reporting 
for sexual violence is even lower for victims who are women of color.  See, e.g., Colleen 
Murphy, Another Challenge on Campus Sexual Assault:  Getting Minority Students to 
Report It, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 18, 2015), available at 
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https://www.chronicle.com/article/Another-Challenge-on-Campus/230977.   And under-
reporting of sexual violence is pervasive in Utah and, indeed, may be even more 
pronounced than in other parts of the country.  Mitchell & Peterson, supra, at 6 (finding 
only 11.8 percent of adult female victims surveyed in Utah reported the sexual assault to 
the police).  This Court, too, has recognized that “women raped by acquaintances, as 
opposed to strangers, are much less likely to report those rapes to police.”  State v. Blake, 
2002 UT 113, ¶ 14, 63 P.3d 56. 
If reporting alone was the problem, interventions to increase accessibility of 
reporting and responsiveness of law enforcement might be the answer.  Even when 
victims report sexual assault crimes, however, most are never prosecuted.  This has long 
been the reality for victims across the country – and particularly in Utah.   See Campbell 
et al., supra, at 2 (“[d]espite the alarming prevalence of this crime, most sexual assault 
victims do not report to law enforcement, and of those incidents that are reported, the vast 
majority will not be prosecuted”).  One widely cited study examined data obtained from 
state criminal justice statistical analysis centers for 1990 and found that “98% of the 
victims of rape never see their attacker caught, tried and imprisoned.”  See Majority Staff 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., The Response to Rape: Detours 
on the Road to Equal Justice, 2, 57 (1993).  Another study reviewed 1995-1996 national 
survey data and found that only 37 percent of the rapes and attempted rapes against 
women that were reported to the police resulted in criminal prosecution.  Tjaden & 
Thoennes, supra, at 3. 
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In Utah, it appears that non-prosecution is even more pronounced than in other 
States.  For example, Utah’s Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice found that 
among the 11.8 percent of sexual assault crimes reported to the police, charges were filed 
in 44.3 percent of those cases – producing an overall prosecution rate of just 5.2%.  
Mitchell & Peterson, supra, at 6.    
A variety of factors contribute to the low prosecution rate.   Recent research 
reports deep “skepticism of rape accusations” within America’s criminal justice system.  
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32 & n.181 (2017).   Part of the skepticism stems from systemic 
gender-bias.  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement As Unequal Protection, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1312-34 (2016) (discussing the Justice Department’s findings of 
systematic gender-based bias that contributed to the under-investigation and under-
enforcement of sexual assault crimes against women).  Other research shows an 
acceptance of “rape myths” by prosecutors.  See generally Rape Victims’ Access to 
Justice:  Understanding and Combatting Pervasive Rape Myths, NCVLI Victim Law 
Bulletin (Nat’l Crime Victim Law Inst., Portland, Or.), Apr. 2014, available at 
https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/16725-ncvlivawrape-victims-access-to. 
The likelihood of a prosecution is particularly low when the accused perpetrator is 
a person known to the victim – as is the situation in these four cases.  This Court has 
itself acknowledged a “long held institution-wide distrust of rape victims in cases where 
they were acquainted with their assailants.”  State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 11, 63 P.3d 
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56.  A clear consensus has developed in the scholarly literature that prosecutors are 
particularly unlikely to pursue non-stranger rape cases: 
Whatever their other disputes, rape-law scholars agree about several 
fundamental realities.  They agree that, for practical purposes, forcible 
rape is really two crimes.  The consensus is that the criminal justice system 
performs at least reasonably well in dealing with “aggravated” rapes, 
defined as rapes by strangers, or men with weapons, or where the victim 
suffers ulterior injuries.  With equal unanimity, scholars agree that the 
justice system often has performed poorly in cases involving rapes by 
unarmed acquaintances (dates, lovers, neighbors, co-workers, employers, 
and so on) and in which the victim suffers no additional injuries.  Victims 
are less likely to report these acquaintance rapes . . . ; [and] if a victim does 
report it, the police are less likely to believe her [and] prosecutors are less 
likely to file charges . . . . 
David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 317–18 (2000) (citations 
omitted).25 
D.  The Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office Disproportionately 
Fails to Prosecute Sexual Assault Crimes Committed Again 
Women and Girls.   
Against this national backdrop of under-prosecution of sexual assault cases alone, 
the four Jane Does would have a compelling case for appointment of prosecutors.  But 
when one looks at the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office (which was the prosecuting 
entity that chose not to prosecute their cases) the case is even more compelling.  This is 
the conclusion found in the expert report of one of the nation’s leading experts on the 
                                            
25  See also Cassia Spohn & Katharine Tellis, Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv., 
Policing & Prosecuting Sexual Assault in Los Angeles City & County:  VI-VII (2012), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237582.pdf (discussing problems 
of underprosecution of non-stranger sexual assault compared to stranger sexual assault); 
Lisa R. Avalos, Policing Rape Complainants: When Reporting Rape Becomes A Crime, 
20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 459, 476–77 (2017) (similar).   
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subject.  See Utah R. Evid. 702 (authorizing expert opinion evidence).26  Dr. Julie 
Valentine’s expert report, and accompanying CV are attached in the appendix.  [App. at 
228-46 (report); App. at 248-71 (CV).]  As shown there, Dr. Valentine has a B.S. degree 
in Nursing from the University of Arizona, a Masters degree in nursing from the 
University of Utah, and a Ph.D. in Nursing (emphasis on research and forensic nursing) 
from Duquesne University.  She is certified by the International Association of Forensic 
Nurses (IAFN) as a sexual assault nurse examiner for adolescent and adult patients 
(SANE-A).  She serves as co-chairperson for the IAFN Research Committee establishing 
an international forensic nursing research agenda.  In addition, she serves as the IAFN 
Utah Chapter President.  Among other distinctions, she has served on the National 
Institute of Justice’s Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Report Act (SAFER) Working 
Group to establish national best practice guidelines for sexual assault kits.  She has 
worked as an assistant professor of nursing for Westminster College (2009-11) and 
Brigham Young University (2011 to current).  Further information about Dr. Valentine is 
found in her attached report and CV, all of which show significant training, experience, 
and other specialized knowledge in this area.  [App. at 248-71.] 
                                            
26  Because this petition lies within the original jurisdiction of this Court, this Court 
should perform, in the first instance, the “gatekeeper” role for assessing expert testimony 
by Dr. Valentine and the Jane Does’ other experts.  Utah R. Evid. 702, Advisory Comm. 
Notes.  Under the rules, a proponent of expert testimony need only make “a threshold 
showing of reliability.”  Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 
59, ¶ 12, 242 P.3d 762, 766 (citing Utah R. Evid. 702(b)-(c)).  Dr. Valentine’s opinions 
easily meet that requirement, as do the Jane Does’ other expert opinions below.  
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Dr. Valentine’s methodology was to rely on a “Toolkit” developed by the National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) to evaluate criminal case outcomes in adult sexual assault cases 
in which victims received care and evidence collection by sexual assault nurse examiners 
(SANEs).  [See App. at 229 (citing Campbell, R., Greeson, M., Karim, N., Shaw, J., & 
Townsend, S., Evaluating the Work of Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) Programs 
in the Criminal Justice System: A Toolkit for Practitioners (U.S. Dep’t Justice Document 
No. 240917) (2013).]  She implemented this Toolkit in Salt Lake County in 2013 as an 
urban site, as explained in detail in her expert report.  [App. at 229.]  The NIJ toolkit has 
theoretical and statistical support, reliability, and validity.  [App. at 243.]   
Dr. Valentine found that in Salt Lake County from 2003 to 2011, in cases in which 
sexual assault victims reported to law enforcement with intent to prosecute and had a full 
forensic examination, only 9% were filed by prosecutors.  [App. at 233.]  Although 
prosecution rates of adult sexual assault cases are low nationally, “the findings from Salt 
Lake County are the lowest reported for an urban site and at the lowest end of the 
spectrum for all communities.”  [App. at 233.]  Other urban areas report prosecution rates 
of about 16% to 18% -- nearly twice as high as Salt Lake County.  [App. at 234.]   
These figures must be assessed against the backdrop of significant law 
enforcement screening before sexual assault cases reach the Salt Lake District Attorney’s 
Office.  Law enforcement referred only 34% of cases to the Office for prosecution – a 
very significant winnowing, which presumably leads to only the strongest cases being 
reviewed for prosecution.  [App. at 235.]  But even after such screening, the Office 
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prosecuted only 25%, declining the other 75% of sexual cases.  [App. at 235.]  The four 
Jane Does are thus like most sexual assault victims who have their cases referred by law 
enforcement agencies to the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office – after the referral, the 
Office usually declines to prosecute.  As Dr. Valentine explains: “The Jane Doe cases 
outlined within the petition to the Utah Supreme Court are representative of the majority 
of rape cases reported to law enforcement in Salt Lake County. The law enforcement 
agencies conduct their investigations prior to referring the cases to the Salt Lake District 
Attorney’s Office with recommendations for criminal charges. Most rape cases, even 
after police investigations, are rarely prosecuted in Salt Lake County as typified in the 
Jane Doe cases.”  [App. at 243.] 
Dr. Valentine also collected data regarding the victims in the sexual assault cases, 
focusing on two years of the study: 2010 and 2011.  It appeared that these data were 
similar from year-to-year, as a data base from 2012 to 2016 in eight Utah counties 
showed similar results.  [App. at 244.]  In Salt Lake County from 2010 to 2011, 95% of 
the sexual assault victims in the study were female [App. at 240] – like the four Jane 
Does.  Also, 75% of the victims were below the age of 34 years [App. at 241] – again, 
like the four Jane Does.  Also, 56% of the victims were assaulted by acquaintances [App. 
at 241] – again, like the four Jane Does.  Also, 80% of the victims had physical injuries 
and 69% had genital injuries.  [App.  at 244.]  Finally, the data indicated that sexual 
assault perpetrators often target vulnerable individuals and those less likely to report and 
to be believed.  [App. at 242.] 
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Interestingly, Dr. Valentine’s study has been replicated by another study.  [App. at 
243.]  One of Utah’s most respected media sources – KSL television – was contacted by 
a rape victim frustrated that her attacker was not being prosecuted, even though she 
promptly called the police and had a rape kit collected. Mike Headrick & Tania 
Mashburn, Data Reveals Few Utah Rape Cases Prosecuted, Nov. 13, 2014, available at 
https://www.ksl.com/?sid=32340680&nid=1171.  KSL investigators researched the issue 
over many months, collecting data from July 1, 2009, through December 31, 2013.  
During that time, 2,319 forcible rapes were reported to Salt Lake County police.  Of 
those, only 760 were sent to the District Attorney’s Office to be screened for prosecution, 
which “means two thirds of those [reported rape cases] went nowhere.”  Id. 
Once cases were reported to the District Attorney’s Office, during the five-year 
period, the office declined more than 500 forcible rape cases while prosecuting only 
about 200 – a prosecution rate of about 28% (200 ÷ 700).  Id.  Ultimately, of these cases 
it prosecuted, the Office won about 60%, meaning that the Office obtained a conviction 
in only about 5.5% of all forcible rape cases reported.  Id.  According to Holly Mullen, 
then-Director of the Rape Recovery Center in Salt Lake City, it appeared as though the 
District Attorney’s Office was only taking cases where they knew that they would win: 
“[The victims] feel a complete lack of respect.  They feel a complete lack of 
understanding and cynicism and concern about where is this American justice?”  Id.   
When asked about these statistics and whether the Office only prosecuted so-
called “slam dunk” cases, the District Attorney stated, “If that is the way historically 
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we’ve done business, then that’s something we should not be doing.  Those cases where 
there is a victim, there is evidence, there is probable cause, but there is not the certainty 
of conviction, we should not shy away from those.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The District 
Attorney went on to admit that “I think we have sometimes shied away from that to our 
own fault.”  Id.  The District Attorney concluded rape victims “deserve better justice. 
And we can always do more for them.”  Id.   
Finally, it seems likely that the problem of under-prosecution may only be 
increasing in Salt Lake County.  In the wake of the #MeToo movement, there has been a 
significant spike in cases of sexual assault being reported to the Rape Recovery Center 
(located in Salt Lake County).  From the September 2016 to August 2017, the Rape 
Recovery Center served 1,009 sexual assault survivors and responded to 451 calls at Salt 
Lake County hospitals for rape kit exams.  The #MeToo movement began trending in 
October 2017, and since then (from September 2017-August 2018), the Center served 
1,720 survivors and responded to 626 calls for exams.  Ginna Roe, One Year After 
#MeToo Movement Started, Salt Lake Sees Spike in Sexual Assault Reports, Sept. 26, 
2018, https://kutv.com/news/local/one-year-after-metoo-movement-started-salt-lake-sees-
spike-in-sexual-assault-reports.  That is a 70% increase in sexual assault reports in a 
single year – a dramatic increase in reporting that, so far as we are aware, has not been 
matched by a proportionate significant increase in prosecutions.   
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E.  Prosecutors’ Use of a “Convictability” Standard Leads to 
Systemic Credibility Discounting of Women and Girls and 
Reliance on “Rape Myths.” 
Prosecutors can file criminal charges when they have probable cause to do so.  But 
prosecutors around the country, including those in Salt Lake County, often employ a 
“convictability” standard in filing sexual assault cases.  Cf. Lisa Frohmann, Constituting 
Power in Sexual Assault Cases: Prosecutorial Strategies for Victim Management, 45 
SOCIAL PROBS. 393, 395 (1998) (reporting that “[t]ypically, prosecutors use the standard 
of convictability to account for their case filing decisions”).  Indeed, in its declination 
letter to Jane Doe 1, the District Attorney’s Office described as a “principle factor” in its 
decision “the probability of conviction.”  [App. at 314.]  The Office told Jane Doe 1 that 
it believed her statement that she had been raped, but nonetheless decided the “fact-finder 
is unlikely to convict [Richard Roe 1] . . . .” [App. at 17, 314.]   
As with other many other prosecutors, the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office 
appears to prosecute so few sexual assault cases because it is using an extreme 
“convictability” standard in making its prosecution decisions.  This approach leads to the 
systemic credibility discounting of women and girls who have been the victims of sexual 
assault, as well as reliance on “rape myths” about females who have been assaulted. 
An important recent article by Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer of Northwestern 
University Pritzker School of Law summarizes the available research and explains how 
prosecutors can unfortunately move to a low prosecution rate.  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, 
Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(2017).   As Professor Tuerkheimer reports, credibility is central to the legal treatment of 
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sexual violence, as epitomized by the iconic “he said/she said” contest.  Id. at 3.  Victims 
who present allegations of sexual violence to prosecutors do not fare well in these 
contests.  Over time, skepticism of rape allegations has remained entrenched in the 
criminal justice system while migrating from formal legal rules to informal practices that 
achieve much the same result – the dismissal of women’s reports of sexual violation.  Id.  
This “credibility discounting” is the dominant feature of the criminal justice system 
response to rape.  Id.  In particular, “credibility discounting” is an unwarranted failure to 
credit an assertion where this failure stems from prejudice.  Id.   
This convictability standard requires prosecutors to “endeavor to predict how 
jurors would likely evaluate the proof at trial, including the credibility of the [sexual 
assault victim].”  Tuerkheimer, supra, 166 U. PA. L. REV. at 38.  While this standard 
appears to be the one that prosecutors (such as those in the Salt Lake District Attorney’s 
Office) employs in practice, this convictability “inquiry in not generally sanctioned.”  Id.  
For example, the American Bar Association has promulgated standards for prosecutors, 
which this Court has found informative in other cases.  See, e.g., State v. Span, 819 P.2d 
329, 336 n.3 (Utah 1991).  The ABA standards specifically indicate that “[a] prosecutor 
may file and maintain charges even if juries in the jurisdiction have tended to acquit 
persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in question.”  AM. BAR ASS’N, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3.4(c) (4th 
ed. current through 2018).   
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In light of this guidance, “[e]very prosecutor must closely evaluate the competing 
interests involved in protecting the human rights of all citizens regardless of the ingrained 
prejudices that may attach to female victims.”  Tamara F. Lawson, A Shift Towards 
Gender Equality in Prosecutions: Realizing Legitimate Enforcement of Crimes 
Committed Against Women in Municipal and International Criminal Law, 33 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 181, 193–94 (2009).  With regard to sexual assault cases in particular, prosecutors 
should not decline to pursue such cases merely because “they are more difficult and less 
‘winnable’ cases. Juries in . . . sexual assault cases have been known to unfairly blame 
the victim(s) for being raped or beaten.   In other words, jurors vote to acquit defendants 
in order to express their contempt for the victim, instead of because their belief in the 
defendant’s innocence.”  Id.  Prosecutors must challenge these unfair stereotypes, not 
accept them.   
To be sure, it may be difficult to determine who is discounting the credibility of 
sexual assault victims.  As Professor Tuerkheimer explained, “we cannot tell who 
precisely is wronging the [victim] by discounting her credibility – the prosecutor or the 
imagined factfinder.  . . . [But] [e]ven if this reliance is genuine or correct, it results in 
systemic credibility discounting.”  Tuerkheimer, supra, 166 U. PA. L. REV. at 39.   
This credibility discounting both results from and perpetuates the use of “rape 
myths.” Credibility discounting by prosecutors draws on a stock of narratives that 
“incorporate[] stereotypes of real crimes and credible victims.”  Cassia Spohn, Dawn 
Beichner & Drika Davis-Frenzel, Prosecutorial Justification for Sexual Assault Case 
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Rejection: Guarding the “Gateway to Justice”, 48 SOC. PROBS. 206, 208 (2001).  In other 
words, “framed by an inquiry into how the archetypical juror would assess the [victim’s] 
account, prosecutorial decision-making [under a convictability standard] transposes the 
widespread acceptance of rape myths into a legitimate rationale for declining to pursue 
charges.”  Tuerkheimer, supra, 166 U. PENN. L. REV. at 40.   
Against this backdrop, a prosecutor’s decision not to charge a defendant may 
reflect not only his or her own discounting of victim credibility; it may also anticipate 
discounting by potential jurors – what Professor Tuerkheimer describes as “anticipatory 
discounting.”  Id. at 38.  As she explains, “Prosecutorial charging in sexual assault cases 
is inexorably linked to concerns – whether well founded or not – that jurors will 
downgrade the [victim’s] credibility.”  Id.   
The existence of facts in the Jane Does cases on which rape myths could be 
founded can be established through an expert evaluation of the four cases at issue here.  
Attached to this petition is the expert report of Julie Ann Melini, MS, APRN, SANE-A, 
SANE-P.  [App. at 272-79.]  She has been a nurse for more than 35 years and is currently 
the Clinical Director for Wasatch Forensic Nurses (WFN) (formerly known at Salt Lake 
Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners).  [App. at 272.]  In that capacity, she is responsible for 
training and overseeing more than twenty registered nurses who provide forensic medical 
exams for sexual assault victims at hospitals throughout Salt Lake and Utah Counties.  
[App. at 272.]  She also works with community partners for WFN, including law 
enforcement officers and prosecuting attorneys, and has previously served as an expert 
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witness on subjects related to her experience with sexual assault victims.  [App. at 272-
73.]  Her CV provides additional qualifications.  [App. at 282-86.] 
Ms. Melini provides her well-founded expert opinion regarding “rape myths,” 
explaining that they are “stereotypical, prejudicial, or false beliefs about rape, rape 
victims, or rapists that are generally untrue but are accepted and believed by society.”  
[Id. at 273 (citing K.G. Weiss, “Boys Will Be Boys” and Other Gendered Accounts: An 
Exploration of Victims’ Excuses and Justifications for Unwanted Sexual Contact and 
Coercion, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 810 (2009)).]  Of particular relevance to this 
case, Ms. Melini identifies four common “rape myths”:   
1.  Sexual assault victims do not know the assailant; 
2.  Sexual assault victims will forcefully resist their assailant; 
3.  Sexual assault victims will have significant physical and/or anogenital injury; 
and 
4.  Sexual assault victims will immediately report the crime. 
[App. at 273.]  Ms. Melini provides citations to academic research and other reasons for 
concluding that each of these four purported facts are “myths,” which contribute to 
assailants not being held accountable for their actions.  [App. at 273-76.] 
Ms. Melini then identifies the presence of a number of these myths in each of the 
four cases that the Jane Does present through their petition.  [App. at 276-78.]  Ms. 
Melini explains, for example, that Jane Doe 1’s account of being frozen by her fear, 
which is consistent with a “freeze” or “comply” response that is very common for victims 
of sexual assault.  [App. at 275.]  Jane Doe 2 similarly was groomed so that Richard Roe 
2 could coerce her into sexual contact.  [App. at 277.]  Jane Doe 3 was coerced by 
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Richard Roe 3’s use of fear.  [App. at 277.]  And Jane Doe 4 similarly froze when 
assaulted by Richard Roe 4, once again a “normal response to sexual assault.”  [App. at 
277.]   
F.  Failure to Appoint a Prosecutor to Pursue the Well-
Founded Sexual Assault Cases of Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, 
Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4 Will Lead to Institutional 
Betrayal of these Victims. 
An additional reason for the Court to appoint a prosecutor is to avoid what is best 
described as “institutional betrayal” of the victims.  Annexed to this petition is the expert 
affidavit of Lecturer Nicole Bedera, who teaches a course on sexual violence at 
Westminster College and is a leading researcher on how organizations and institutions 
impact sexual assault survivors’ experiences of sexual violence.  [App. at 287-93 (report); 
App. at 294-99 (CV).]  As Bedera clearly explains, institutional betrayal is defined in the 
relevant academic literature as “institutional action and inaction that exacerbate the 
impact of traumatic experiences.”  [App. at 288 (citing Carly Parnitzke Smith & Jennifer 
J. Freyd, Dangerous Safe Havens: Institutional Betrayal Exacerbates Sexual Trauma, 26 
JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS 119 (2013)).]  As Bedera describes, “Among these 
actions and inactions are minimizing the severity of a victim’s experience, refusal to take 
proactive steps in preventing or addressing victimization, and responding inadequately to 
claims of trauma.   Institutional betrayal is intensified when the abuse itself takes place in 
the context of the same institution tasked with responding to abusive behavior, including 
the criminal justice system.”  [App. at 288 (citing Carly Parnitzke Smith & Jennifer J. 
Freyd, Institutional Betrayal, 69 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 575-587 (2014)).] 
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To be clear, institutional betrayal is more than mere negative feelings toward an 
organization a victim hoped would help her.  [App. at 288.]  Rather, the betrayal 
compounds and creates trauma – a trauma so intense that researchers regularly refer to 
maltreatment by organizations tasked with serving sexual assault survivors as “the second 
rape.”  [Id. at 288 (citing Lee Madigan & Nancy C. Gamble, The Second Rape: Society’s 
Continued Betrayal of the Victim (1991)).]  While seeking and receiving effective 
resources following an instance of sexual assault can promote healing and reduce the risk 
of long-term traumatic effects, victims who encounter maltreatment or negligence by 
institutional actors tasked with helping them are at higher risk of severe traumatic 
symptoms.  [App. at 288 (citing Courtney E. Ahrens, Giannina Cabral & Samantha 
Abeling, Healing or Hurtful: Sexual Assault Survivors’ Interpretations of Social 
Reactions from Support Providers, 33 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN QUART. 81-94 (2009)).]  
This is not simply a theoretical conclusion, as in two separate studies, institutional 
betrayal experienced by sexual assault victims was correlated with anxiety, depression, 
sleep problems, sexual problems, and dissociation.  [App. at 288 (citing Carly Parnitzke 
Smith & Jennifer J. Freyd, Insult, Then Injury: Interpersonal and Institutional Betrayal 
Linked to Health and Dissociation, 26 JOURNAL OF AGGRESSION, MALTREATMENT & 
TRAUMA 1117-1131 (2017), Smith & Freyd 2013, supra).] 
Bedera has also reviewed the four cases described in this petition.  It is her expert 
opinion that each of the Jane Does encountered treatment by the criminal justice system 
that amounts to institutional betrayal.  [App. at 289-90.]  By refusing to prosecute cases 
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with probable cause, the prosecutors “minimized the severity of the Jane Does’ 
experiences, refused to take proactive steps in responding to their victimization, and 
responded inadequately to their claims of trauma.”  [App. at 289.]  Further, the inaction 
by the prosecutors likely created particularly intense trauma for the four Jane Does 
because of the length of their engagement with the criminal justice process, including 
their cooperation during forensic exams and police interviews, which can be emotionally 
taxing for sexual assault victims.  [App. at 289 (citing Shabna L. Maier, “I Have Heard 
Horrible Stories ... ”: Rape Victim Advocates’ Perceptions of Revictimization of Rape 
Victims by the Police and Medical System, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN  786 (2008)).]  
Bedera also concludes, based on the scientific literature on institutional betrayal, that in 
her expert opinion each of the Jane Does are at a greater risk for long-term traumatic 
symptoms as the result of the institutional betrayal they have endured, including anxiety, 
depression, sleep problems, sexual problems, and dissociation.  [App. at 290.] 
To be clear, the Jane Does are not asking that the Court authorize appointment of a 
prosecutor in this case simply to assuage their feelings.  As described above, these cases 
all are supported by a very strong factual basis amounting to more than clear probable 
cause.  Against that backdrop, this Court should consider the far greater stakes at issue 
for the Jane Does – specifically, reducing the risk of long-term traumatic systems.  On 
this dimension, sexual assault cases may stand on somewhat different footing than other 
kinds of criminal cases.  Given the strong underlying factual support for prosecutions 
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here, the Court can readily determine that it is in the interests of justice to move forward 
to avoid institutional betrayal.   
G.  In Light of the Foregoing Facts, It Is in the Interests of 
Justice for the Court to Appoint a Prosecutor for the Jane 
Does.   
As explained in Part VI, supra, even focusing just on the individual facts of each 
case, it is in the interests of justice to appoint a prosecutor for each of the four Jane Does.  
But the systemic problems just discussed in this section also support the conclusion that it 
is in the interests of justice to appoint a prosecutor for each of the Jane Does under Utah 
Const., art. VIII, § 16.  For example, appointing a prosecutor will address the widespread 
problem of sexual assault in Utah (Part VII.A, supra) as well as the horrific consequences 
of sexual assault crimes that demand attention (Part VII.B, supra).   Appointing a 
prosecutor will also obviously address the under-prosecution of sexual assault crimes 
against women and girls, both as reflected in national statistics (Part VII.C, supra) and 
Salt Lake County statistics (Part VII.D, supra).  The appointment will also fight the 
problem of the credibility discounting of women and prosecutorial reliance on “rape 
myths” to allow sexual assaults to go unpunished (Part VII.E, supra).  Appointing 
prosecutors will also prevent institutional betrayal of the Jane Does (Part VII.F, supra).  
For each of these reasons individually – and collectively – this Court should appoint 
prosecutors for the crimes committed against the Jane Does. 
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H.  In Light of the Foregoing Facts, The Uniform Operation of 
Laws Clause, Utah Constitution, Article I,  Section 24, and 
the Equal Rights Provision, Utah Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 1, and the Utah Victims’ Rights Amendment, 
Article I,  Section 28, Require Appointment of a Prosecutor 
for the Jane Does. 
Appointment of prosecutors for the Jane Does is also required by the conjunctive 
operation of three important provisions in the Utah Constitution: The Uniform Operation 
of Laws Clause, Utah Const., art. I, § 24; the Equal Rights Provision, Utah Const., art. 
IV, § 1; and the Utah Victims’ Rights Amendment, Utah Const., art. I, § 28.  The 
Uniform Operation of Law Clause provides that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation.”   The Equal Rights Provision provides that “[b]oth male and female 
citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and 
privileges.”   The Utah Victims’ Rights Amendment provides that to “preserve and 
protect victim’s rights to justice and due process, victims of crimes have the[] right, as 
defined by law, . . . to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity . . . .”  Given the 
gender disparities and other problems identified in this Part, failure to appoint prosecutors 
for the Jane Does would violate these three constitutional provisions severally and 
collectively.   
Turning first to the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause, even though the provision 
is the State’s analogue to equal protection under federal law, this Court’s “construction 
and application of Article I, § 24 are not controlled by the federal courts’ construction 
and application of the Equal Protection Clause.” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 33, 233 
P.3d 476.  Indeed, the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause is “at least as exacting” as its 
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federal counterpart and may, “in some circumstances, [be] more rigorous than the 
standard applied under the federal constitution.” Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 33, 
54 P.3d 1069.   
The Court has explained that the “most notable of these differing legal 
consequences” between federal and state constitutional law “is that article I, section 24 
demands more than facial uniformity; the law’s operation must be uniform.”  Drej, 2010 
UT 35, ¶ 33 (citing Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 37 (emphasis added)).  Thus, as this Court 
recently explained with regard to such state constitutional provisions, “Historically, 
uniform operation provisions were understood to be aimed not at legislative classification 
but at practical operation.”  State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 34, 308 P.3d 517, 524 
(emphasis in original).  Thus, as originally understood, the Clause was designed to 
require “consistency in application of the law to those falling within the classification 
adopted by the legislature . . . .”  Id. 
In this particular case, however, Utah’s Uniform Operation of Laws Clause must 
not be read in isolation, but in conjunction with Utah’s Equal Rights Provision promising 
equal rights to women.  This conjunctive reading is important to avoid too narrow an 
application of the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause here.  While this Court has recently 
reaffirmed the caselaw surrounding the Uniform Operation of Law Clause that makes it a 
“miniature equal protection clause,” this Court has also suggested (in dicta) that the 
historical focus of these types of clauses, at least in some contexts, was not “to seek equal 
protection of the laws but rather [to] guard against discrimination in favor of a minority.”  
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State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 34 n.7, 308 P.3d 517, 525 (citing G. ALAN TARR, 
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 198 (1998)).  But Professor Tarr’s reference 
was to uniformity provisions that “for the most part antedated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, with its emphasis on protecting minorities against majoritarian abuse.”  
TARR, supra, at 198.  Of course, Utah’s Uniform Operation of Law provision was drafted 
well after the Fourteenth Amendment and should be understood in that context of the 
need to protect equal rights for minorities.   
Even more important, Professor Tarr emphasized the need to acknowledge the 
importance of state constitutional “guarantees of gender equality.”  Id.  Unlike the United 
States Constitution, which as initially drafted excluded women from the electoral process, 
the Utah Constitution was specifically designed not only to enfranchise women but also 
much more broadly to extend gender equality as to all civil and political rights.  See 
generally Jean Bickmore White, Woman’s Place Is in the Constitution: The Struggle for 
Equal Rights in Utah in 1895, UTAH HIST. Q. 344 (fall 1974).  Indeed, even before the 
drafting of the Utah Constitution, Utah women had been enfranchised by an act of the 
territorial legislature, voting from 1870 to 1887.  That right of women state citizens was 
stripped way by federal congressional action in Washington, D.C., with the passage of 
the Edmunds-Tucker Act.  See Thomas G. Alexander, An Experiment in Progressive 
Legislation: The Granting of Women Suffrage in Utah in 1870, UTAH HIST. Q. 8 (Winter 
1970).  But when the initiative for addressing these gender issues returned to this State, 
leaders in the women’s suffrage movement were determined that Utah’s Constitution 
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should broadly protect equal rights for women.  Thus, on the eve of the drafting of Utah’s 
Constitution, Susan B. Anthony wrote to the women of Utah, explaining: “Now in the 
formative period of your constitution is the time to establish justice and equality to all 
people.  That adjective ‘male’ once admitted into your organic law, will remain there.”  
White, supra, at 345 (citing WOMEN’S EXPONENT, 23 (Aug. 1 and 15, 1894), 169).   
During Utah’s Constitutional Convention, the plight of women was specifically 
equated with the plight of the newly-freed slaves (strongly protected, of course, by the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  For example, Delegate Andrew Anderson explained that: 
Millions of ignorant slaves have been admitted to the right of 
suffrage . . . and yet why hesitate to grant our mothers, our wives and our 
sisters the rights of suffrage, most of whom are native born, many are 
property owners and well educated, and all are most vitally interested in the 
welfare of the government, in the principles of liberty and the perpetuation 
of the same. 
Proceeding of the Utah Constitutional Convention, 1:420-28 (quoted in White, supra, at 
356).   
Ultimately the Convention voted to enshrine equal rights for women.  Utah’s 
Constitution could not be clearer on this point.  Utah Const., art. IV, § 1 directly provides 
not only for equal voting rights (i.e., “[t]he rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote 
and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex”), but much more 
broadly that “[b]oth male and female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all civil, 
political and religious rights and privileges” (emphasis added).    
This important second sentence – the Equal Rights Provision – has been little 
discussed by Utah’s courts.  But this Court has briefly described it as a “clear and 
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comprehensive statement in our foundational law [that] correlates with the purpose that 
there shall be no discrimination based on sex.”  Kopp v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 170, 
172, 506 P.2d 809, 810 (1973).  And this Provision has important implications in this 
case, through its interplay with the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause and Utah’s 
Victims’ Rights Amendment. 
The Jane Does here are not challenging the statutory language of Utah’s sexual 
assault provisions, which on their surface may appear to be written in gender neutral 
terms.  Accordingly, this Court’s three-part analysis of “classifications” created by the 
statutory text is unnecessary.  Cf. State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶¶ 40-41, 345 P.3d 1226 
(analyzing classifications created by statute).  Instead, the Jane Does challenge the laws’ 
“practical operation,” Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 34 (emphasis in original), and particularly 
how they operate in the hands of local prosecutors.   
It does not appear that this Court has had occasion to consider a challenge to law 
enforcement or prosecuting practices under Utah’s Uniform Operation of Laws Clause.  
But given that the Clause is “at least as exacting” as the federal equal protection clause, 
Spencer v. Utah State Bar, 2012 UT 92, ¶ 26, 293 P.3d 360, 368, federal precedents will 
serve to demonstrate a floor below which state law enforcement and prosecuting agencies 
cannot go.  Federal precedents recognize that while “there is no right to state protection 
against madmen or criminals, there is a constitutional right . . . to have police services 
administered in a nondiscriminatory manner—a right that is violated when a state actor 
denies such protection to disfavored persons.” Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 592 F.3d 1003, 
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1007 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up);  see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. 
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989) (“The State may not, of course, selectively deny its 
protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.”); Estate of Macias v, Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018, 1019, 1028 (9th Cir, 2000) (in case 
alleging “inferior police protection on account of status as a woman, a Latina, and a 
victim of domestic violence,” holding that there is an equal protection right to have law 
enforcement services administered in a nondiscriminatory manner).27 
For purposes of federal constitutional review, gender is a suspect class 
necessitating heightened scrutiny. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 440 (1985).  The previous decisions from this Court applying the Utah Uniform 
Operations of Law Clause have simply assumed that federal equal protection standards 
apply, while “reserving the right to depart from those standards in an appropriate case in 
the future.”  State v. Canton, 2013 UT 44, ¶ 36, 308 P.3d 517.  This Court has noted that 
previous cases have not provided the required specialized briefing necessary to develop 
                                            
27  It is important to emphasize that the Jane Does are not, in this petition, seeking money 
damages from prosecutors or other state actors.  Accordingly, the doctrine of 
prosecutorial immunity recognized by this Court in decisions such as Jensen ex rel. 
Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ¶ 52, 250 P.3d 465, is simply not in play.  The 
doctrine rests on the premise that imposing financial liability on prosecutors (or others 
acting in a similar capacity) will render them unable to render disinterested decisions.  
See, e.g., Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1998).  Judicial appointment of a 
prosecutor to independently pursue a viable criminal case does not pose any threat to 
disinterested decisionmaking by public prosecutors.  Because immunity doctrines are not 
at issue in this petition, the Jane Does do not discuss recent judicial opinions and 
scholarship- calling such immunity doctrines into question.  See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing separately to express “my 
concerns about our qualified immunity precedents”); William Baude, Is Qualified 
Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45 (2018). 
 125 
independent state constitutional doctrine.  Id.  The Jane Does in this case will provide that 
briefing and, specifically, demonstrate that the Utah Constitution – and particularly the 
conjunction of the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause, the Equal Rights Provision, and 
Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment – requires in the particular setting of this case not 
merely the federal “intermediate” scrutiny of gender discrimination, but (at a minimum) 
the much-more-difficult-to-satisfy “strict” scrutiny that federal law deploys for racial 
discrimination. 
Interpretation of Utah’s Equal Rights Provision must begin with the fact that 
article IV, § 1 contains two sentences.  The first sentence – about the right to vote and 
hold officer not being denied on account of sex – is the one that seems to have attracted 
the most attention.  But the second provides a very broad command that women “shall 
enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights.”  Against the backdrop of the history 
described above, that broad provision should not be read as merely providing some sort 
of ill-defined “intermediate” scrutiny of general-classifications, but rather, at a minimum, 
“strict” scrutiny – the same sort of scrutiny that the newly-freed slaves were provided in 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Indeed, the Provision is best read as 
requiring absolute equality that not even strict scrutiny can satisfy.  Nothing else would 
honor the textual command of insuring women the opportunity to “enjoy equally” all 
rights civil, political, and religious. 
Other states have reached similar conclusions with similar gender equality 
provisions in their state constitutions.  For example, in Rand v. Rand, 374 A.2d 900 (Md. 
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Ct. App. 1977), the Maryland Court of Appeals, surveyed various state provisions, noting 
that some provisions allowed gender discrimination.  See id. at 904 (noting that La. 
Const., art. I, § 3 forbids only “unreasonable” discrimination based on sex).  But the 
Maryland provision – providing that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be 
abridged or denied because of sex” – admitted no such possibility.  See id. at 904-05 (“the 
broad, sweeping, mandatory language of the amendment is cogent evidence that the 
people of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and women”).   
Similarly, Washington has a broad state constitution provision promising that 
“[e]quality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied or abridged on 
account of sex.”  The Washington courts have interpreted this provision as barring any 
discrimination on account of gender.  See, e.g., Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 890 
(Wash. 1975) (concluding that such equality provisions “may not be qualified in the 
manner that ‘suspect classification’ or ‘fundamental interest’ doctrines allow”).   
We acknowledge that this strong interpretation of the Provision might appear to 
conflict with an earlier decision of this Court more than one hundred years old: Salt Lake 
City v. Wilson, 46 Utah 60, 18 P. 1104, 1107 (Utah 1915), upholding a road poll tax of $2 
or in-kind road work made applicable to men but not to women.  However, this Court’s 
rationale was that payment of the tax was “neither a political, religious, or other civil 
right or privilege.”  Id.   Thus, the Provision was, at least according to this Court, not 
directly at issue.  Moreover, this Court should disavow the rationale it offered in 1915 in 
support of this conclusion.  This Court argued that “[s]urely one need not at this day and 
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age point out the physical differences that exist between the sexes, nor dwell upon the 
reasons why females, in the nature of things, cannot respond to all the demands of the 
state.”  Id.   Moreover, reasoned this Court, “[i]t is a matter of general knowledge that 
man, during his active career, is the breadwinner for the family, and that upon him must 
fall the direct burden of discharging the public duties, and especially so when physical 
exertion and strength are required.”  Id.  This reasoning should be explicitly overruled as 
an outmoded decision.28   
Women and girls in Utah do not equally enjoy the “civil right” of having 
prosecutors enforce the laws against sexual violence.  As explained above, as currently 
applied, the laws against sexual violence are under-enforced in a way that disadvantages 
women and girls.  And this underenforcement can lead women and girls to enjoy less-
than-equal protection in their daily activities, as they are pressured to take steps that men 
and boys are not required to take.  Cf. Nicole Bedera & Kristjane Nordmeyer, “Never Go 
Out Alone”: An Analysis of College Rape Prevention Tips, 19 SEXUALITY & CULTURE 
533 (2015) (noting that colleges provide sexual assault prevention messages to women 
such as women should never be alone and there are no safe places for women).  Indeed, 
the fact that women are expected to alter their lives to avoid being sexually attacked is so 
pervasive that it permeates many routine activities.  See, e.g., Collin Gossel, Women Are 
                                            
28  This Court has similarly not hesitated to overrule poorly-reasoned decisions reflecting 
outdated gender stereotypes.  For example, while this Court at one point recognized a 
gender-based preference in child custody cases, see, e.g., Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994, 996 
(Utah 1975), later decisions concluded that such a preference would violate the Equal 
Rights Provision.  See, e.g., Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986).   
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Revealing All the Things They’d Enjoy Doing if Men Had a Curfew I Eye-Opening 
Thread, Oct. 2, 2018, available at https://www.georgetakei.com/women-men-curfew-
9pm-twitter-2609495872.html (noting that without fear of sexual assault from men, many 
women would enjoy being able to simply go for a walk at night).   
As applied by prosecutors of the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office, the state 
laws protecting the four Jane Does against sexual assault does not produce the strict 
uniformity required and operates to disadvantage them as women – who are 
disproportionately victims of sexual assault in Utah.  See Part VII.A, supra.  As explained 
in the sections above, prosecutors in the Office appear to use a “convictability” standard 
in filing criminal cases, in which the touchstone for filing criminal charges is the 
likelihood of conviction – and women invariably are not given equal treatment.  See Part 
VII.E, supra.  Indeed, women disproportionately are betrayed by the criminal justice 
process to which they turn for help.  See Part VII.F, supra. 
By proceeding in this fashion, the District Attorney’s Office has transgressed the 
standards of equal treatment inherent in Utah’s Uniform Operation of Laws Clause and 
the Equal Protection Provision, specifically creating an operation of law that fails to 
provide equal protection to women.  Such “credibility discounting” by prosecutors of 
women who are sexual assault victims is “a form of discrimination based on group 
membership.”  Tuerkheimer, supra, 166 U. PA. L. REV. at 51.  This is precisely the kind 
of disparate operation of law that this Court can address through the Uniform Operation 
of Laws Clause and the Equal Rights Provision. 
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Finally, reinforcing this need for stronger enforcement is that fact that the Utah 
Victims’ Rights Amendment provides that to “preserve and protect victim’s rights to 
justice and due process, victims of crimes have the[] right, as defined by law, . . . to be 
treated with fairness, respect, and dignity . . . .”  Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1).  As explained 
above, see Part III.D, supra, this provision is a substantive provision, requiring Utah’s 
prosecutors and courts to treat victims fairly.  This provision provides significant support 
for concluding that under-enforcement of laws against sexual violence violates the Utah 
Constitution. 
Fortunately, in this petition, the relief that Jane Does seek is extremely modest.  
Other recent lawsuits raising similar equal protection claims about under-enforcement of 
sexual assault laws have sought extensive money damages or class-wide injunctive relief.  
See, e.g., Amy Smith and Others Similarly Situated v. City of Austin, et al., No. 1:18-cv-
505 (Dist. Ct. for W.D. Tex. June 18, 2018).  Here, in stark contrast, the four Jane Does 
ask this Court to take the very modest step of simply exercising its undoubted power 
under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16, to appoint a prosecutor to pursue criminal charges 
against their attackers.  This Court can accordingly leave for another day the full 
parameters of relief that might be available under the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause, 
the Equal Rights Provision, and Utah’s Victims’ Rights Amendment.  All it needs to do 
here is conclude that the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, read in light of these 
other three provisions and against the factual backdrop of serious sexual violence 
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committed against the Jane Does, requires appointment of a prosecutor to pursue these 
four cases. 
I.  In Light of the Foregoing Facts, Federal Equal Protection 
Requires Appointment of a Prosecutor for the Jane Does. 
While the focus on this petition has been on state constitutional law, we would be 
remiss if we failed to also raise an appropriate federal equal protection claim.  For the 
reasons just explained, the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office’s failure to pursue 
criminal charges for the four Jane Does also violates the federal Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const., art. XIV, § 1.   Accordingly, the Jane Does 
are also entitled to appointment of a prosecutor to protect their rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.   
It is a long-standing principle of federal constitutional law that a facially neutral 
policy still violates the equal protection clause if its application results in discrimination. 
See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 362-63 (1886).  And, for purposes of federal 
constitutional review, gender is a suspect class necessitating heightened scrutiny. City of 
Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits intentional sex discrimination, including selective or 
discriminatory enforcement of the law. Whren v, United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) 
(“[T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations 
such as race”); Elliot-Park v. Manglona, 592 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010) (Equal 
Protection Clause prohibits law enforcement from intentionally discriminating in the 
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provision of any services to any degree).  In addition to affirmative discrimination against 
members of protected groups, a failure to take action on behalf of these individuals can 
constitute unlawful discrimination. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 309 (1964) 
(Goldberg, J., concurring) (“[D]enying the equal protection of the laws includes the 
omission to protect”) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has explained 
specifically that the constitutional right to have law enforcement services delivered in a 
nondiscriminatory manner “is violated when a state actor denies such protection” to 
members of protected groups.  Estate of Macias, 219 F.3d at 1028.  The courts have 
applied this principle to police under-enforcement of the law where such deliberate 
under-enforcement adversely harms women.  See, e.g., id.; Balistreri v, Pacifica Police 
Dep’t, 901 F .2d 696, 7001 (9th Cir. 1990) (recognizing an Equal Protection claim based 
upon the discriminatory denial of police services to a victim of domestic violence 
because of her sex). 
Law enforcement action violates the Fourteenth Amendment when a 
discriminatory purpose is a contributing factor; discrimination need not be the sole 
motivation for the discrimination to violate the Constitution. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro, Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).  Recognizing that discriminatory 
purpose is rarely admitted or blatant, courts look to the totality of the circumstances to 
evaluate whether a law enforcement activity was motivated by discriminatory intent and 
will consider factors that indirectly indicate an intent to discriminate, including evidence 
of discriminatory impact, evidence of departures from proper procedures, and 
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contemporaneous statements by a decision maker or by responding officers. See id. at 
265-68; Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 701. 
Differential treatment of women premised on sex-based stereotypes, such as 
stereotypes about the role women should play in society or how they should behave, also 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 
517 (1996) (holding invalid explicit sex classification and stating that “generalizations 
about ‘the way women are,’ estimates of what is appropriate for most women, no longer 
justify denying opportunity to women”); Nevada Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 
721, 730 (2003) (“Reliance on such [invalid gender] stereotypes cannot justify the States’ 
gender discrimination” in employment); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718, 726 (1982) (holding that denying otherwise qualified males the right to enroll in 
state nursing school violated the Equal Protection Clause). Thus, where a prosecuting 
agency’s failure to adequately respond to sexual assault is premised, at least in part, on 
sex-based stereotypes, that failure violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
The evidence of disparate treatment here is strong enough to support the finding of 
a discriminatory policy, practice or custom. For example, in Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 
712, 715 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit was asked to determine whether the defendant 
county employed a policy or custom of affording less police protection to victims of 
domestic violence, who are disproportionately women, as compared to other crime 
victims. Id. at 715. In support of her argument, the plaintiff introduced evidence, through 
witness testimony, that it was the practice of 911 dispatchers not to classify domestic 
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violence calls as Code 2, or “emergency procedure” calls.  Id.  In reversing the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, the Circuit held that the plaintiff's 
evidence that domestic violence calls were not treated as emergencies was sufficient to 
raise a question of fact as to whether the county maintained a custom or policy of treating 
domestic violence calls with less priority than other crimes. Id. 
But here, the Court need not reach any such sweeping “custom or policy” 
conclusions.  Cf. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Equal Protection, 57 B.C. 
L. REV. 1287 (2016) (discussing how custom and practice enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to prevent under-prosecution of rape laws coincides with the vision of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters).  Instead, this Court merely needs to determine 
whether prosecution of four particular sexual assault cases would be in the “interest of 
justice,” as explain in Part III.C, supra.  The evidence and analysis presented in this 
petition strongly supports the conclusion that the four cases before the Court have not 
been prosecuted due to prosecutorial analysis that disadvantages women in the 
enforcement of sexual assault laws.29  While this might well support a finding of a 
constitutional violation and resulting broad injunctive or other relief, the petition simply 
requests a small step toward addressing the problem through simply appointing a 
                                            
29  While not presented by this case, similar analysis may help protect women who are 
victims of other under-prosecuted crimes, such as a domestic violence.  See, e.g., Cronan 
ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866 (R.I. 2001) (upholding private prosecution in a 
domestic violence case).   Cf. Kenneth L. Wainstein, Judicially Initiated Prosecution: A 
Means of Preventing Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial Inaction, 76 
CAL. L. REV. 727, 733 (1988) (calling for ways for domestic violence victims to secure 
criminal prosecution of abuse, because “the prosecutor's inaction effectively leaves a 
battered wife vulnerable to continued abuse”).   
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prosecutor.  Indeed, it is hard to understand how the enforcement of Utah’s criminal laws, 
by action through this State’s highest court, could be in any way problematic.  See Fox v. 
MCI Commc'ns Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 860 (Utah 1997) (“the enforcement of a state’s 
criminal code constitutes a clear and substantial public policy”).  Given that federal 
constitutional rights are at stake for these women who have been sexually attacked, the 
Court should take that modest step.     
In pressing the federal equal protection claim, we acknowledge U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent that, broadly speaking, crime victims have no federal constitutional 
standing to challenge non-prosecution decisions. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614, 616-19 (1973) (rejecting private plaintiff’s challenge on federal equal protection 
grounds to state policy of prosecuting only married men for failures to pay child support, 
and concluding that “in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a 
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”).  But 
Linda R.S. is distinguishable from the circumstances presented here.  Linda R.S. 
specifically noted that the Legislature may enact laws “creating legal rights, the invasion 
of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”  Id. at 
617 n.3.  Utah, of course, has done precisely what Linda R.S. envisioned: it has created a 
constitutional procedure that crime victims are entitled to pursue for appointment of a 
prosecution in Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16; and (among other rights) it has created broad 
rights for victims for crime “to justice and due process,” as well as to “be treated with 
fairness, respect, and dignity . . . .”  Utah Const., art. I, § 28(1).  These provisions give 
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crime victims standing to pursue a federal constitutional claim that might not otherwise 
exist.30 
In any event, Linda R.S. should be overruled.  While we recognize that the 
decision is binding on this Court, the decision was simply wrongly-decided.  To preserve 
the possibility of review of this issue before the U.S. Supreme Court, we briefly outline 
the grounds for overruling the decision in the footnote below.31 
For all these reasons, appointment of a prosecutor for the four Jane Does is 
required by federal constitutional law.   
J.  Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 4 Are Also Entitled to 
Appointment of a Prosecutor Because They Were Examined 
by a Specially Trained Nurse from Wasatch Forensic 
Nurses and the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office Refuses 
to Use Such Nurses as Witnesses in Their Criminal Cases. 
One final point is worth brief mention as to why a court-appointed prosecutor is 
necessary to handle the sexual assault cases of Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 4.  Both women 
quite promptly reported the crimes to law enforcement.  Accordingly, the possibility of 
gathering physical evidence to corroborate their accounts of the crime existed.  Both 
victims were, indeed, examined by the Wasatch Forensic Nurses (WFN).  As explained in 
                                            
30  We discuss standing issues further in Part IX, infra.   
31  The case for overruling Linda R.S. was well articulated by Yale Law Professor 
Abraham Goldstein.   As he explained: “Even on its own premises, the Supreme Court 
did not try very hard to find ‘standing’ for the plaintiff under the usual criteria. The 
challenged action had certainly caused her ‘injury in fact.’ The interest she sought to 
protect was as certainly ‘arguably within the zone of interests . . . regulated by the 
[nonsupport] statutes.’ Linda R.S. was more a decision on the merits than on standing.”  
Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS 
L.J. 515, 550–53 (1982); see also Donald G. Gifford, Equal Protection and the 
Prosecutor’s Charging Decision: Enforcing an Ideal, 9 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 712 
(1981) (“The Court’s holding in Linda R.S. is questionable”). 
 136 
the attached expert affidavit by Executive Director Deborah Koons-Beauchamp [App. at 
300-05], WFN is perhaps Utah’s premier organization of sexual assault nurse examiners 
(or SANEs).  [App. at 301.]  The nurses in that organization are highly trained to perform 
objective and unbiased examinations in the wake of reports of possible sexual assault.  
[App. at 301.]  The nurses respond 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to hospitals and other 
medical clinics along the Wasatch Front.  [App. at 302.]  Of course, as highly trained 
medical professionals the nurses who work for WFN must follow all applicable legal and 
ethical standards, such as the Health Insurance Affordability and Accountability Act 
(HIPPA).  [App. at 301.] 
Historically and unsurprisingly, Wasatch Forensic Nurses has worked hand-in-
hand with the Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office to present to juries the most 
probative evidence in sexual assault cases.  For example, WFN has historically been part 
of a weekly Multi-Disciplinary Team (MDT) meeting to evaluate the facts of various 
cases.  [App. at 302-03.]  WFN also provided expert witness testimony about patients 
who they have examined.  [App. at 303.]  As the first medical responders in many cases 
to reports of rape and sexual assault, these nurses may be able to provide information to 
juries evaluating these cases that no other witnesses can provide.  [App. at 303.] 
Remarkably, as of May 2018, the Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office 
decided that it would no longer work closely with the dedicated nurses of WFN.  [App. at 
303.]  The Office had concluded that because WFN considers its nurses “medical” nurses 
whose forensic medical examinations are constrained by HIPAA standards, that the 
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Office would no longer be using WFN’s services at the MDT meetings.  [App. at 303.]  
Even more curiously, the Office has decided that it will not use Wasatch Forensic Nurses 
as expert witnesses on cases, even when a WFN nurse performed the initial examination 
on the victim involved in the case.  [App. at 303.]  The Office has warned WFN that 
unless it stops adhering to medical practices and policies required by HIPAA, the WFN 
nurses would not be called upon to testify regarding the circumstances of the examination 
of the sexual assault victims that they have performed.  [App. at 304.]   
This recent change in policy was shocking, given that WFN have always had a 
positive working experience with the Salt Lake County District Attorney’s office in the 
past.  [App. at 304.]  WFN is concerned that, because of this punitive action by the 
Office, they will not be able to provide expert testimony for their patients in sexual 
assault cases or that otherwise-viable cases may not be selected for prosecution.  [App. at 
304.]  While WFN remains hopeful that the Office will reconsider, [App. at 304], as of 
this time, the nurses are not being called as expert witnesses.   
Jane Doe 2 is directly affected by this on-going dispute.  She was forensically 
examined by a WFN nurse.  [App. at 304-05.]  The findings of this specially trained 
nurse, corroborated Jane Doe 2’s allegations.  [App. at 305.] It is critical that this 
particular nurse be allowed to report on Jane Doe 2 situation, so that the details of her 
case can be fully and accurate presented to the prosecution and the jury.  [App. at 305.]   
Similarly, Jane Doe 4 is harmed by this on-going dispute.  A SANE from Wasatch 
Forensic Nurses performed the examination of Jane Doe 4 – an examination that 
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corroborated her allegations of anal penetration by finding a rectal tear.  [App. at 305.]  If 
WFN is prohibited from providing expert witness testimony on behalf of Jane Doe 4, 
then it is likely that case details will not be presented as objectively, completely and 
accurately as they would be by a surrogate expert witness.  [App. at 305.] 
It should go without saying that sexual assault victims such Jane Doe 2 and Jane 
Doe 4 have little choice in which SANE organization they are sent to for performance of 
a sexual assault exam.  Yet these SANE programs are a vital part of efforts to ensure that 
sexual assault victims receive the treatment and services that they need to recover from 
sexual violence.  See R. Campbell, D. Patterson & L. Lichty, The Effectiveness of Sexual 
Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) Programs: A Review of Psychological, Medical, Legal, 
and Community Outcomes, 6 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, AND ABUSE 1, 31 (2005).  For Jane 
Doe 2 and Jane Doe 4 to have their prosecutions handled in a less effective way because 
they were examined by nurses from Wasatch Forensic Nurses, while other victims do not 
have these problems, is the height of irrationality.  Fortunately, this Court can simply 
eliminate this problem by appointing prosecutors from outside the Salt Lake District 
Attorney’s Office to handle their cases.   
VIII.  For Judicial Economy and Efficiency, the Court Should Defer 
Briefing and Decision About Who Should Be Appointed as the 
Prosecutor Until It Has Decided What the Standards are for 
Appointment. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the four Jane Does are each entitled to appointment 
of a prosecutor under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16.  The only remaining question for this 
Court would then be whom that prosecutor should be.  For judicial efficiency and 
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economy, this Court should bifurcate the issues raised by this petition and defer the issue 
of the identity of the prosecutor until later briefing. 
The obvious first question presented by this petition is whether the Jane Does are 
entitled to appointment of prosecutors.  If this Court answers that question “no”, then no 
further issues are presented. If the Court answers that question “yes” – as we believe the 
foregoing evidence and argument makes abundantly clear it should – then the Court 
would need to consider whom it should appoint as a prosecutor.  As the Court can 
determine from the lengthy briefing already provided by this petition, the issues 
surrounding the initial question of the standards surrounding appointment of prosecutors 
are complicated ones of first impression.  Accordingly, the Jane Does simply ask the 
Court to determine that question first.  If the Court rules in the victims’ favor, then the 
Court could proceed to the secondary question of who should be appointed to prosecute 
the cases.   
Three possibilities for a court-appointed prosecutor immediately spring to mind.  
First, the Court could ask the Utah Attorney General’s Office to prosecute the cases.  The 
Utah Attorney General’s Office has many experienced prosecutors within it and perhaps 
that Office might be willing to serve as a backstop in cases where a County Attorney or 
District Attorney has failed or refused to prosecute a viable criminal case. 
Second, the Court could ask a public prosecutor in an adjoining County to pursue 
a well-founded petition under article I, § 16.32  This is the standard practice of “conflicts” 
                                            
32 The Court should not ask the same prosecuting office that declined the case initially to 
pursue the prosecution.  After a formal declination, a prosecuting office has clear 
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cases in this State, and perhaps it could simply be extended to court-appointed 
prosecutions as well. 
Third, the Court could appoint one or more of the undersigned attorneys for the 
Jane Does to handle the matter.  The undersigned attorneys include several experienced 
prosecutors who possess the experience and ability to handle complex sexual assault 
cases.  There is no need for a prosecutor in this State to be an elected public official.  See, 
e.g., State v. Balfour, 2008 UT App 410, ¶ 36, 198 P.3d 471, 481 (“We are also 
unpersuaded by Balfour’s claim that he is entitled to supervisory review by an elected 
official in the prosecution of the charges against him.”).   
To be sure, any such court-appointed prosecutor would have to follow all 
applicable rules of ethics for public prosecutors.  See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., 
Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 411, 453–54 (2009).  That is not a problem here, and accordingly no ethical 
impediment to their appointment exists.  Moreover, the prosecution would proceed by 
virtue of this Court’s authorization in the name of the State.  Cf.  Gregory v. Shurtleff, 
2013 UT 18, ¶ 77, 299 P.3d 1098, 1123 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“I can find no instance of a private party [in Utah] indicting or trying a criminal suspect 
independent of state involvement).  The prosecution would thus simply follow the well-
trodden path for criminal cases in this State. 
                                                                                                                                             
perceived, if not actual, conflict of interest, because it may wish to lose the case to prove 
that its initial non-prosecution decision was correct.   
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Considering which of these three options – or other options that might be possible 
– is best addressed after the Court has ruled on the merits of the underlying petition.  The 
Court’s ruling is likely to shed considerable light on the scope and application of Utah’s 
Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision, which will be helpful in considering who should 
act as a prosecutor. 
IX.  The Jane Does Have Standing to File This Petition, But No Other 
Entity or Person is a Party to This Petition. 
Finally, it is worth discussing a few points about how subsequent proceedings on 
this petition should unfold.  In particular, issues of “standing” should be considered.  
While the Jane Does each have standing to appear before this Court to seek appointment 
of a prosecutor for violent crimes committed directly against them, the four possible 
defendants (Richards Roes 1 through 4) are not entitled to appear as parties in 
proceedings associated with this petition. 
The four Jane Does naturally have “standing” to pursue judicial appointment of a 
prosecutor for crimes of violence committed against them.  Any other conclusion would 
simply render the Court-Appointed Prosecutor Provision effectively inoperative.  If a 
woman who has been raped lacks sufficient injury to seek appointment of a prosecutor to 
pursue her attacker, then no one will have sufficient injury – rendering the provision a 
dead letter.  Cf. Allen v. Rampton, 463 P.2d 7, 11 (Utah 1969) (cautioning against 
constructions that render provisions a nullity). 
Historically, it was well understood that a victim could seek a prosecution for a 
case involving herself.  For example, private prosecutions in Philadelphia were used by 
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women to prosecute sex crimes.  See ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA 1800-1890 at 69-71 (1989).  Reflecting on such 
history, Justice Stevens (among others) has recognized that the tradition of private 
prosecution means that “[t]he interest in punishing the defendant and deterring violations 
of law by the defendant and others was sufficient to support the ‘standing’ of the private 
prosecutor even if the only remedy was the sentencing of the defendant to jail or to the 
gallows.”  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 128 (1998) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).   
To be sure, there is an argument under federal constitutional law that a victim may 
lack standing to seek the initiation of a federal prosecution.  See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (discussed in Part VII.I, supra).  However, such a conclusion 
appears to rest on the “case and controversy” requirement contained in the federal 
constitution, see Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F. Supp. 2d 596, 637 (E.D. Pa. 2014) – a 
requirement that does not exist under Utah constitutional law.  See Gregory v. Shurtleff, 
2013 UT 18, ¶ 12, 299 P.3d 1098, 1102 (“Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of 
the state of Utah is not constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the 
United States Constitution requiring ‘cases’ and ‘controversies,’ since no similar 
requirement exists in the Utah Constitution.”).  Indeed, as a matter of state constitutional 
law, this Court may grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal 
impact are concerned.”  Id. at ¶ 12 (citing Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 
1978)).  It is hard to imagine very many issues of greater public importance and social 
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impact than the prosecution of sexual violence against women.  And it is also equally 
clear that there is no one “who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case” than the 
women who have been sexually assaulted and thus “the issue is unlikely to be raised at 
all” if the Jane Does are denied standing.  Gregory v. Shurtleff, 2013 UT 18, ¶ 13, 299 
P.3d 1098, 1103. 
On the other hand, the four putative defendants are not “injured” in the eyes of the 
law if criminal charges are authorized against them.  Generally, putative defendants have 
no right to present evidence during criminal investigations.   For example, it is generally 
recognized that defendants have no right to present testimony to grand juries who may be 
considering indicting them.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Fritz, 852 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 
1988); State v. Jessen, 633 P.2d 410 (Ariz. 1981); Moczygemba v. State, 532 S.W.2d 636 
(Tex. Crim. 1976); Alaska R. Crim. P. 6(p) (grand jury has “no duty to hear evidence on 
behalf of the defendant”); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 172.145 (grand jury “not bound to hear 
evidence for the defendant”); see also 1898 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure § 4715 
(“The grand jury shall not be bound to hear evidence for the defendant”).  The reason, of 
course, is that defendants have ample rights protecting them in the criminal justice 
process against wrongful conviction – once a prosecution is initiated.  See Utah Const. 
art. I, § 12 (listing rights of “accused persons” that apply only in “criminal 
prosecutions”).  Because a defendant has no right to avoid the filing of criminal charges 
when probable cause exists for those charges, the four Richard Roes are not parties to this 
petition.   
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Similarly, Salt Lake County (represented by the Salt Lake District Attorney’s 
Office) is not a party to this petition.  Salt Lake County and its District Attorney suffer no 
cognizable injury if, pursuant to constitutional power under Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16, 
this Court authorizes a criminal prosecution for the crimes of sexual violence committed 
against Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4.  Any such authorization 
does not “adversely affect” the District Attorney’s Office.  See Utah Chapter of Sierra 
Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶ 20, 148 P.3d 960 (discussing “injury” 
requirement for standing). 
By the same reasoning, the Utah Attorney General’s Office is not a party to this 
petition.  Just as with local prosecutors, the Attorney General’s Office is not adversely 
affected if this Court authorizes the filing of criminal charges.  Indeed, the Attorney 
General’s Office will have a later opportunity to intervene in any criminal case that this 
Court authorizes, see Part III.B, supra, thereby further reducing an (already non-existent) 
chance that it will be somehow injured. 
Nonetheless, the Jane Does acknowledge that the Court has discretion to call for 
the views of the Attorney General on important matters of state constitutional law, and 
the Jane Does would have no objection to the Court doing so here.33   
                                            
33  The Jane Does also believe that various organizations may like to file an amicus brief 
in support of their petition.  Any briefing schedule that the Court establishes should 
provided an opportunity for amicus support, as well as providing the Jane Does with an 
opportunity to reply to any arguments made against their petition.   
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X.  The Court Should Hold Oral Argument on this Important 
Petition. 
The victims believe that the issues they raise are extremely important and of first 
impression.  The issues involve important and fundamental state constitutional (and 
federal constitutional) issues concerning the role of victim-initiated prosecution in 
protecting women and girls in this State from rape and other crimes of sexual violence.  
Accordingly, the Court should hold oral argument on Jane Does’ petition.34   
  
                                            
34  Because the issues presented are novel and of first impression, should the petition 
suffer from any procedural deficiencies, the Jane Does would respectfully request leave 
to amend this petition after receiving guidance from this Court.   
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CONCLUSION 
This Court has previously called for litigants to present state constitutional issues 
so as to fully develop the protections set out in Utah’s organic law.  See, e.g., Brigham 
City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 506, overruled on other grounds, 547 U.S. 398 
(2006).  The Jane Does come before this Court to do exactly that.   
The framers of Utah’s Constitution anticipated cases in which public prosecutors 
would fail or refuse to prosecute well-founded criminal cases and provided a mechanism 
for the courts to permit victim-initiated prosecution.  And yet, for the more than 120 
years of this State’s history, it appears that Utah’s judiciary has seldom (if ever) 
employed that mechanism. This has effectively transformed a system constitutionally 
designed to give prosecutors only “primary responsibility” for deciding whether a 
prosecution should begin, Utah Const., art. VIII, § 16, into one where they effectively 
exercise exclusive and unreviewable control. 
The time for this Court to invoke its constitutionally conferred power has now 
arrived.  At a point in this country’s history where throughout the nation intense concern 
exists about the criminal justice system’s treatment of sexual assault victims, four women 
have suffered sexual violence in clear violation of Utah’s criminal laws.  And yet 
prosecutors have failed and refused to enforce those laws.  Under the Utah Constitution 
(and federal constitution), this Court can redress that injustice – and should do so.   
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should appoint a prosecutor for Jane Doe 1, 
Jane Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4 pursuant to its specific authority under Utah 
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Constitution, article I, section 16.  For the convenience of the Court, proposed Criminal 
Informations to be filed in each of the four cases are annexed to this petition.  The Janes 
Does also request that the Court direct briefing as to the appropriate prosecutor to be 
appointed. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 2018. 
/s/ Paul G. Cassell  
Paul G. Cassell 
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Certificate of Compliance 
 
I hereby certify that this petition does not violate any page limitations set forth in 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, because no page limitation for a petition under 
Utah Const., art. I, § 16, is set forth in the Rules.  In addition, in the interests of judicial 
economy, this petition is filed on behalf of four crime victims (and supporting groups, 
including the Utah Crime Victims’ Legal Clinic and the National Crime Victim Law 
Institute).  If the petition is viewed as analogous to a principal appellate brief, then each 
of the four victims would be entitled to file separate 14,000-word principal briefs.  By 
filing a single petition, the four victims have avoided duplicative arguments.  If the Court 
believes that any page limitations are applicable to this petition, the victim-petitioners 
would request an opportunity to move to exceed those page limitations in view of the 
importance, novelty, and complexity of the state constitutional (and federal 
constitutional) issues addressed in this petition.   
This petition also complies with the type face requirements of the appellate rules 
as well as Utah R. App. P. 21(g) regarding public and non-public filings. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 2018. 
/s/ Paul G. Cassell 
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Certificate of Service 
As discussed in the penultimate section of the petition, above, the petitioner-
victims do not believe that any other entity or individual is a party of their petition.  
Nonetheless, and without prejudice to their right to assert that position, the petitioner-
victims have today, October 16, 2018, provided a copy of their petition to the Appellate 
Section of the Utah Attorney General’s Office via email to criminalappeals@agutah.gov 
and to the Utah Solicitor General at notices@agutah.gov. 
/s/ Paul G. Cassell 
 
